Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was terminated as a probationary police officer. A supervisor stated that plaintiff violated departmental rules by revealing confidential information to another recruit during a training exercise, repeatedly failed to pass the firearms qualifying test, and admitted not reading the firearms manual (another rules violation). Plaintiff's father, then a deputy sheriff, argued for his son's reinstatement. Believing that the father had placed a threatening call to a school attended by the supervisor's children, the supervisor filed a complaint that resulted in a recommendation of termination and the father's early retirement. The father's suit under 42 U.S.C 1983 was dismissed; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's (son) suit, alleging bias based on his Polish ethnicity was also rejected by the district court. While both suits were proceeding, father and son pursued administrative remedies before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, obtained right-to-sue letters, and jointly filed a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 200e. The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff had previously worked for the employer before being hired as a full-time employee in 2005. When budget cuts necessitated layoffs, plaintiff thought his job was secure until he requested leave for surgery and was let go. The district court entered summary judgment for employer on claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act, which guarantees employees 12 workweeks of leave for serious health conditions, including the knee surgery plaintiff had, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. Because there was evidence from which a jury could infer that termination was based on the leave request, summary judgment was inappropriate. A memo made by a supervisor, for purposes of discussing the termination with the employer's attorney, did not fit within the crime-fraud exception and is protected by attorney-client privilege.

In May 2010 defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)) and two counts of distribution of heroin and crack (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C)). The offenses occurred in 2007-2009; he was sentenced in October 2010. The district court did not apply the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), sentenced him to 292 months imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, and imposed a $300 mandatory minimum fine for each count. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the Fair Sentencing Act is not retroactive, but remanded because neither of the statutes under which defendant was sentenced, not the general fine statute, 18 U.S.C. 3571-3574, imposes a mandatory minimum fine. Criminal fines are discretionary, and sentencing courts must consider ability to pay when determining whether to impose any fine .

Plaintiff claims that fiber identified on the nutrition label (required by 21 U.S.C. 343(q)(1))of "chewy bars" made and sold by defendants is inferior to unprocessed fiber and can be harmful. The district judge held that the suit was precluded by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 343-1(a)(5), which forbids states to impose "any requirement respecting any claim of the type . . . made in the label or labeling of food that is not identical to the requirement of section 343(r)." The Act does not create a private right of action; suit was filed under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS 510. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The labeling of the challenged products is compliant with the statute and FDA regulations. The disclaimers that the plaintiff wants added are not identical to the labeling requirements imposed by federal law, and so they are barred. The court further noted that plaintiff failed to state claim under Illinois law.

Airlines, users of airports owned by the City of Chicago, have use agreements that make they city responsible for runway clearing. The airlines pay a per-landing fee, based on the city's actual expenses. In 1999 and 2000 the airports were crippled by severe snowstorms. The city obtained $6,000,000 in reimbursement from FEMA under the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121. Years later FEMA ordered the city to return the money, based on a provision of the Act concerning duplicate benefits. FEMA asserted that the use agreements entitled the city to reimbursement of costs from the airlines. After exhausting administrative remedies the city filed suit. The district court denied the airlines' motion to intervene. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Finding that the airlines have standing, the court stated that t would not be as "efficient to litigate this three-cornered dispute in two lawsuits rather than one."

Plaintiff, an inmate, worked as a library clerk. Defendant, the director of education, ordered plaintiff fired on the ground that, on the job, he had highlighted copies of opinions for personal use and had stolen an opinion from the library. A day after plaintiff told the librarian that he had filed a grievance, defendant filed a conduct report to justify ordering plaintiff fired. Plaintiff had a receipt showing that he had checked out the opinion and the theft charge was dropped. The hearing officer upheld the copying charge and ordered plaintiff confined to his cell for 14 days and the copies destroyed. After the state court ordered a new hearing, the prison expunged the disciplinary order from plaintiff's record; the order had already been carried out. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district judge granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that plaintiff had not shown "that the challenged action would not have occurred but for the constitutionally protected conduct." The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to other defendants, but reversed with respect to the director of education, noting the timing of his conduct report and evidence of animus toward plaintiff.

Defendant's website displayed "exhibition" pornography, such as exhibition of children's genitals, but no images of sexual contact. Some users advertised or distributed child pornography to other users. When agents searched defendant's home, they found additional "hard core" pornography videos. The district court allowed the government to show the jury uncharged videos. Defendant was convicted of advertising and conspiracy to advertise child pornography and of distributing and conspiracy to distribute child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1)(A), 2252(a)(2) and 2252(b)(1)). The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The district court erred in admitting "hard core" pornography without examining it, in not explaining its reasoning under Rule 403, and in admitting the evidence even though it was highly inflammatory and had only minimal probative value.

The same day that debtor discharged his debts in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, his mother, died, leaving debtor and his brother equal shares in an estate. Debtor signed a disclaimer of his interest, but never told the trustee about his inheritance. Following a series of transactions between the brothers and various accounts, the U.S. Attorney's office launched an investigation, and the brothers were charged with bankruptcy fraud (18 U.S.C. 157(3)). Debtor was also charged with impeding a bankruptcy trustee in the course of his duties (18 U.S.C. 152(1)) and fraudulently concealing assets. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the brothers engaged in a fraudulent scheme. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Seven months after the bank recruited plaintiff to serve as a vice presidents, it fired her. She had no performance issues, no attendance problems, and no complaints against her. She had dinner with a member of the board of directors, who told her the fantasies he had about her. She declined his advances and complained to human resources. The board member resigned. Shortly after that, the bank's new president told its then-president that he heard plaintiff had done something that she should have been fired for. About two months after the new president assumed office, plaintiff was fired. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on her retaliation claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A retaliatory discharge case must be tried unless defendant presents unrebutted evidence that it would have taken the adverse employment action against the plaintiff in any case.

When police arrested defendant on an assault charge, they found crack cocaine secreted in his pants leg. The district court denied a motion to suppress and, after accepting a conditional guilty plea, imposed the mandatory minimum five-year term. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The arrest was supported by probably cause; police relied on an eyewitness. Defendant's use of a baseball bat in the assault justified a weapons enhancement to the sentence.