Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When an employee left the company in 1997, took a $47,850 lump sum distribution of his pension. He later believed that the payment should have included the present value of future cost of living adjustments that would have been included had he received his pension as an annuity. In 2002, he filed a class action suit. The district court granted summary judgment on liability in favor of the class and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a COLA is an accrued benefit, as defined in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(23)(A). Before the district court ruled, the parties reached a settlement that each early retiree would receive roughly 3.5% of her original lump sum, unless the COLA on a normal-retirement-age-based annuity outweighed her early-retirement subsidy, a rare situation. The district court approved the proposed settlement and awarded attorney's fees. Objectors were not allowed to opt out. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding determinations that the settlement was reasonable; that class counsel had adequately represented the early retirees and that further subclasses were unnecessary; that opt-out should be denied; and concerning attorney fees.

Because defendant, stopped for speeding, behaved oddly, the officer had a canine perform a free-air search. The dog alerted and defendant consented to a search of the car. During a pat-down, defendant tried to pull away, and, after feeling a hard object in defendant's pocket, the officer found a bundle of cash and a packet of cocaine. While being cuffed and while in the squad car, defendant made statements about being able to obtain additional cocaine. Convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)), defendant was sentenced to 236 months, based on 24 prior convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. An officer who encounters a small, hard object during a pat-down may have reasonable suspicion to believe the object is a weapon. The court suppressed all of defendant's responses to questions, but his other statements were not coerced and police are not precluded from listening to voluntary statements.

Following armed robbery of a drug stash house, one defendant conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute mixtures containing in excess of five kilograms of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846), and knowingly possessing and carrying firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2)) and was sentenced to 200 months in prison and five years supervised release. The other entered a plea as to the firearms count and was sentenced to 120 months and supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In determining the amount of drugs for which each defendant should be sentenced, the district court properly considered the amount of drugs "reasonably foreseeable" to the defendants.

In 1998 defendant was one of 14 persons charged in an indictment returned by a federal grand jury in Chicago with conspiracy to import and distribute heroin (21 U.S.C. 963). He was indicted in his own name and under supposed aliases, including "Alaji," but could not be found. The others were convicted. Defendant was found in England and, after protracted extradition proceedings failed, he apparently went to Nigeria. In 2009 he moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the English magistrate had found that he was not Alaji. The finding was based on a remarkable resemblance between defendant and his brother. The district judge denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the lack of finality in a denial of extradition and that the denial was not the equivalent of acquittal. Only findings that are necessary to a court's decision are entitled to preclusive effect.

Defendant, the master-mind of a mortgage fraud scheme, was convicted of wire fraud. She claimed that the 1,229-day delay between the date on which the last of her codefendants was arraigned and the start of her trial violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161 and the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss. The Act's 70-day "clock" permits the court to exclude delays resulting from continuances granted on the basis of findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and delays caused by absence or unavailability of an essential witness. The record indicated that the continuances and delays were justified and did not prejudice defendant.

Plaintiffs provide in-home care through Medicaid-waiver programs run by the Illinois Department of Human Services; some work through a Rehabilitation Program and others through a Disabilities Program. In 2003, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act was amended to designate personal care attendants and personal assistants working under the Home Services Program as state employees for purposes of collective bargaining. 20 ILCS 2405/3. Rehabilitation Program assistants designated a union, which negotiated an agreement that includes a "fair share" provision, requiring assistants who are not members to pay their proportionate share of costs of collective bargaining. Disabilities Program assistants voted against unionization. Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs claim that fair share fees violate the First Amendment by compelling association with, and speech through, the union. Disabilities Program plaintiffs argue that they are harmed by the threat of fair share fees. The district court dismissed both. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and remanded for dismissal of the Disabilities plaintiffs' case without prejudice because it was unripe. Because of the significant control the state exercises over all aspects of personal assistants' jobs, the assistants are employees of the state. The state's interests in collective bargaining are such that fair share fees withstand First Amendment scrutiny in a facial challenge to the imposition of the fees.

In 2000 the conservancy purchased property, but allowed the farmer to remain as a tenant through 2003. The farmer/seller was required to perform removal of specified substances and warranted that there were no undisclosed underground tanks. The conservancy withheld funds pending clean-up. In 2006 the conservancy sued for breach of the warranty and failure to complete the clean-up. The district court allowed the conservancy to amend and claim damages with respect to newly-discovered contamination and entered judgment in favor of the conservancy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claim is within the Illinois 10-year limitations period for actions and written contracts; the doctrine of laches does not apply.

Petitioner entered the U.S. in 1993 as a minor and became involved with a gang. In 2000, he was serving an Illinois sentence for robbery and aggravated battery. He was removed to Mexico in 2001 and was prohibited from re-entering without first seeking waiver of his inadmissible status. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)-(iii). Petitioner re-entered illegally and claims he was attacked by strangers in 2002. In 2010 he was arrested and the removal order was reinstated. He sought a U Visa (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)), which would grant him temporary lawful status based on the 2002 attack and his cooperation with the police at that time and waiver of his inadmissible status. Both were denied. The Seventh Circuit upheld reinstatement of removal and declined to review the visa denial for lack of jurisdiction.

A newborn suffered severe brain damage because doctors failed to promptly diagnose and treat an infection contracted at his 2003 birth. He was born prematurely and certain tests, normally done during pregnancy, were not performed by the federally-subsidized clinic where the mother received care. The clinic and its doctors are deemed federal employees under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(g)-(n), and shielded from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In 2005 the parents filed suit in state court and, in 2006, HHS denied an administrative claim for damages. Within six months of the denial the case was removed to federal court. In 2010, the district court held that the claim was filed within the two year statute of limitations under the FTCA (28 U.S.C. 2401(b)) and awarded more than $29 million in damages against the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A claim only accrues when a plaintiff obtains sufficient knowledge of the government-related cause of his injury; the plaintiffs were reasonably diligent.