Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A successful Ford dealership in Iowa offered to assist struggling Middleton, Wisconsin dealership. The parties agreed that Iowa's general manager would provide management services to Middleton with compensation to begin after he turned Middleton profitable and also that Iowa would provide capital in exchange for an ownership interest. Negotiations continued after the manager started working at Middleton, but the parties never reached a more specific agreement. The relationship broke down after 11 months because Iowa failed to come forward with the expected cash. Still not earning a profit, Middleton did not pay for the manager's services. After a remand, the district court again entered judgment for Iowa, finding that Middleton became profitable during the manager's tenure and fired him before he had a fair opportunity to restore profitability. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the factual findings were inconsistent and clearly erroneous. Iowa is not entitled to quasi-contractual compensation for services under either quantum meruit or unjust enrichment.

When he arrived at the prison, plaintiff told the prison clinical director that he had rheumatoid arthritis and asked for Enbrel, a medication successful in controlling the condition before his incarceration. Because Enbrel was not on the approved formulary, personnel had to seek prior approval from the Central Office of the Bureau of Prisons. The doctor submitted a request for Gabapentin, used to treat nerve pain, but not Enbrel, and approved a consultation with an outside rheumatologist. Despite the rheumatologist’s instruction and plaintiff's repeated requests and complaints of pain and swelling, he didn’t receive Enbrel for 10 months. Because plaintiff sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court screened his "Bivens" complaint alleging cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed all defendants, except the clinical director, then entered summary judgment for the clinical director. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the non-medical defendants on the pleadings, but held that the prisoner properly stated a claim against medical defendants. Affirming summary judgment in favor of of the clinical director, the court found that plaintiff failed to meet his burden to submit evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference.

After pleading guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant was sentenced at the top of his Guidelines range to 33 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court properly refused to address the merits of an untimely motion to suppress the gun underlying his conviction; defendant waived this contention by pleading guilty unconditionally, and, therefore, did not preserve any issues for review.

Plaintiff began working as a correctional officer for DOC in 2006, assigned to duty that required walking. In 2007, she was reassigned to a control room and no longer required to walk. In 2007, plaintiff received a warning for excessive absenteeism and was switched to a different schedule. She never worked under the new schedule. She took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act and returned to the bettr schedule. After her return, she was in an automobile accident, but did not disclose physician's restrictions on activity until a 2008 hearing on her refusal of overtime. In early 2008, plaintiff used vacation time to visit her brother, who had been injured. When she returned, she had been reassigned to watch tour duty. She refused some duties, stating that she physically could not do the job and that it violated her medical restrictions. Her supervisor asked for her resignation. She was barred from entering and never returned to work. The district court entered summary judgment for the DOC on claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a material issue of disputed fact under the indirect method of proof analysis.

Plaintiffs alleged that the school district practice of holding high school graduation ceremonies and related events at a Christian church rented for the occasion violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, a declaratory judgment and damages. After the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Use of the rented church space was neither impermissibly coercive nor an endorsement of religion on the part of the district. The Establishment Clause does not shield citizens from encountering the beliefs or symbols of any faith to which they do not subscribe and plaintiffs offered no evidence that the district has in any way associated itself with the symbols or with the beliefs expressed by the Church or that any of the religious messages, such as materials in the pews, were placed there especially for graduations rather than being standard fare for Church activities.

Petitioner proceeded in forma pauperis in the district court, but the court discovered that $1,501 had been deposited in his prison account during the previous six months. When petitioner sought leave to appeal of denial of a motion to reconsider his sentence, the court ordered that money in his prison trust account be applied to his district court filing fee and to a special assessment against him that was imposed as part of his sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of reconsideration in a separate order, and denied the petition for mandamus, concluding that petitioner's inability to pay the filing fee was moot. The order directing payment of the unpaid filing fee from the prison trust account was proper (18 U.S.C. 3572(d)(3)) , but the order that the warden deduct money from the account to pay the special assessment was not, because petitioner was already enrolled in a payment plan.

Half-brothers, caught in sting operation, were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, and attempting to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit previously upheld one defendant's convictions and accepted the other's counsel's Anders submission as to several trial and sentencing issues. Rejecting a claim that defendant's nonattendance on the day of the robbery amounted to withdrawal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.

Between 2003 and 2006, more than 2,000 fell victim to defendants' internet fraud scheme that involved individuals outside the U.S., often based in Romania posing as sellers of goods on eBay and other internet auction sites. Victims were directed to send payment by wire transfer. The foreign co-schemers developed a network of individuals in the U.S., who collected payment using false identifications. Defendant S pled guilty to wire fraud, (18 U.S.C. 1343), and G pled guilty to several counts of wire fraud and two counts of receipt of stolen funds (18 U.S.C. 1343, 2315). On remand for sentencing, S was sentenced to 97 months and G to 78 months in prison, the same sentences originally imposed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the findings and reasonable inferences from the record supported accountability for the conduct of co-conspirators under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).

Petitioner fled Colombia after the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia pursued him relentlessly, subjecting him to multiple hijackings at gunpoint, directing death threats at him and his family, and burning his trucks. He applied for asylum, asserting that the government sat by and allowed FARC to persecute him because of his affiliation with the Liberal Party and his status as a pro-government trucker who refused to cooperate with FARC. The Immigration Judge found him credible and determined that he was eligible for asylum.The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected the IJ’s decision and ordered removal. The Seventh Circuit granted review and remanded, stating that the Board failed to take account of all the evidence in the record.

Plaintiff was operating a video camera in public park, perhaps because of the presence of a former domestic partner. An angry crowd accused him of videotaping their children in a public park and called police, who arrested him for disorderly conduct. The charges were eventually dropped and plaintiff sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming they arrested him without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, on grounds of qualified immunity. While videotaping is not a crime in Illinois, one officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was guilty of disorderly conduct and the other could have reasonably believed there was probable cause.