Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging arrest without probably cause and assault. The judge allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis. After plaintiff delayed in responding to a draft pretrial order, the judge imposed a sanction of $9,055 against the plaintiff and an attorney who had agreed to represent him. Plaintiff was unable to pay and the judge rejected his offer of $25 per month. When plaintiff did not pay within the 30 day period set by the court, it dismissed his suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the fine was actually paid by the attorney after plaintiff complained to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The attorney admitted being unfamiliar with the federal rules and that he had never before filed a pretrial order.

Plaintiff was fired from his position as senior vice president and claimed that it was based on his actions in opposing actions by a mid-level supervisor that he claimed amounted to sexual and racial discrimination. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer on claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not present evidence challenging the veracity of the company's legitimate, performance-based concerns or evidence that those concerns were pretextual.

Plaintiff, an attorney, was fired from his job as an associate and filed suit, asserting defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After the suit was dismissed and while a state appeal was pending, he brought claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 for discrimination on the basis of race and national origin, with a supplemental claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court issued a stay based on the abstention doctrine, reasoning that the claims would be barred by res judicata once the state judgment became final. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Abstention requires more than pendency of another lawsuit. Although claims for defamation and emotional distress center on negative performance evaluation, plaintiff's federal discrimination claims (he says) encompass a broader scope of alleged misconduct over a longer period of time, including unfavorable treatment regarding assignments, promotions, disciplinary measures, salary, and work conditions.

Defendant did not inform the government when his mother died, but, for 12 years cashed checks for benefits she had earned under the Civil Service Retirement System, netting $158,000. He pleaded guilty to mail fraud. His Guidelines sentencing range was 21 to 27 months, but the judge sentenced him to 30 months, because she believed that he needed treatment for mental illness and alcoholism and that it would take more than 18 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge is to recognize that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation, 18 U.S.C. 3582(a), and may not increase the length of a prison term in order to facilitate rehabilitation or correction.

After a pyramid scheme that he had maintained for nearly a decade came to light, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The district court sentenced him well above the applicable guidelines range to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the court erroneously applied a 4-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) for defrauding more than 50 victims and a claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.

Petitioner brought a "Bivens" action, claiming that prison officials provided him with limited, deficient access to the law library for four months while he was confined in a special unit. He claims that the prison switched to electronic research databases and did not provide instruction, causing him to miss filing dates for an appeal in a case he had filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Although the Seventh Circuit reinstated the appeal in that case, the district court dismissed the Bivens action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that petitioner did not show any prejudice as a result of his limited library access.

Plaintiff, a freight railroad, owned a spur line connecting to a plastics plant, the only shipper located on the spur. Defendant, another railroad, bought the lines, including the spur. The sales contract allowed plaintiff to continue to run trains on the lines being sold and granted plaintiff an exclusive easement to use the spur to serve the plant. Several years later, the plant entered receivership. The receiver sold all assets, including the plant. The buyer continues to manufacture plastics in the plant. Contending that the change in ownership voided the exclusive easement, defendant contracted with the buyer to ship products over the spur, leaving plaintiff with diminished use of the spur. The district court ruled in favor of defendant, reasoning that the contract referred specifically to the plastics company in business at that time. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on the language of the contract in light of extrinsic evidence, and rejected a trespass claim.

Petitioner, convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder and sentenced to 90 years in prison, unsuccessfully sought relief in Illinois state courts then filed a federal habeas corpus petition (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even if trial counsel was ineffective in impeaching a witness, petitioner was not prejudiced, in light of the substantial evidence of guilt. Petitioner could not prove his claim that the prosecution knowingly obtained his conviction on the basis of perjured testimony.

After being diagnosed with fibromyalgia, chronic pain, anxiety, and depression, plaintiff was awarded long-term disability benefits under an employee benefit plan issued and administered by defendant. Benefits were discontinued a little more than 24 months later, when defendant determined that plaintiff had received all to which she was entitled under the plan’s self-reported symptoms limitation. Because plaintiff had retroactively received social security benefits, defendant also sought to recoup equivalent overpayments as provided by the plan. On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court ruling in favor of defendant. The application of the self-reported symptoms clause was unreasonable under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001; the disabling illness, fibromyalgia, is not primarily based on self-reported symptoms, but rather can be based on the verifiable evidence of its manifestations. The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 407(a), does not preclude recovery of any overpayment that resulted from receipt of social security benefits.

The owner of an outdoor amphitheater in a rural area claimed that the sheriff forced him to hire off-duty deputies as a private security force for events and threatened to close the road leading to his property if he did not comply. After giving plaintiff's attorney three tries at producing a complaint that complied with Rules 8 and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that each iteration of the complaint was generally incomprehensible and riddled with errors, making it impossible for the defendants to know what wrongs they were accused of committing. The Seventh Circuit ordered plaintiff's attorney to show cause why he should not be suspended from the bar of the court or otherwise disciplined under Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and directed that a copy be sent to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.