Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At jury selection in a criminal trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike the only two African-American members in the venire. The defendant was convicted. The Seventh Circuit remanded for findings under the third step in the analysis under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986): the prosecutor's credibility in offering a race-neutral reason for the strike (step two). The district court must make an independent credibility determination concerning the prosecutor's race-neutral reason that one juror "appeared agitated and also frustrated" throughout voir dire. A judge may consider a variety of factors in making a credibility determination, but may not assume that a prosecutor of the same race as a juror would not engage in discrimination against that juror simply because of their shared race.

Defendants ran the township trustee's office, which provides various social services. They defrauded the office by taking substantial payments for work they did not perform, deposited checks made out to the office into their personal bank accounts. They were convicted of two counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1346). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While evidence of mailing was circumstantial, based on usual office practice, it was sufficient. The 2010 Supreme Court decision in Skilling v. U.S. did not mandate acquittal; even if honest services fraud is erased from the picture, the jury would have convicted defendants on a monetary fraud theory. The jury was properly instructed on both theories.

Based on her part in billing Indiana Medicaid for ambulance service while running a car service to take patients to medical appointments, defendant was convicted of Medicaid fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, and conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government, 18 U.S.C. 371. She was sentenced to 33 months in prison and to pay restitution of $846,115. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Data relating to time-stamping of bills, which may have established that multiple people submitted bills, was not concealed; the government simply failed to extract (before trial) information to which it and the defense had access. Even if the data was "Brady" material, it would not have changed the outcome. The judge did not err in telling the jury that a scheduled witness was ill without saying that the witness had refused treatment.

After prevailing in a suit for social security disability benefits, plaintiff asked for attorney's fees of $25,200 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A). The district judge awarded $6,625, cutting the hours from 112 or 116 to 53, adopting objections made by Social Security Administration lawyer, and the hourly rate from $225 to the rate specified in the statute $ 125. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that the Social Security Act provides for awarding a "reasonable fee" for representation in the administrative proceeding and in a successful appeal, 42 U.S.C. 406(a)(1), but the EJA does not provide for "market rate" and creates a presumptive ceiling of $125. The district court did not consider the special circumstances and factors that may be considered under the Act.

Two computer programs hold the registered trademark "CONDOR." After the district court entered summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a trial was required on a confusion-in-trade allegation, but held that the state university was immune from federal jurisdiction. On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit reversed itself, citing the doctrine of waiver by litigation conduct and again rejected summary judgment.The state is not entitled to assert sovereign immunity over the counterclaims.

Two computer programs hold the registered trademark "CONDOR." After the district court entered summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a trial was required on a confusion-in-trade allegation, but held that the state university was immune from federal jurisdiction. On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit reversed itself, citing the doctrine of waiver by litigation conduct and again rejected summary judgment.The state is not entitled to assert sovereign immunity over the counterclaims.

After prevailing in a suit for social security disability benefits, plaintiff asked for an award of attorney’s fees of $25,200 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). The district judge cut the amount to $6,625, adopting objections made by the Social Security Administration’s lawyer to hours spent on tasks and hourly rate. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, rejecting both the attorney's attempt to justify the fee and the court's reasoning.

Wisconsin inmates challenged the state's Inmate Sex Change Prevention Act, Wis. Stat. 302.386(5m), which prevents the state Department of Corrections from providing transgender inmates with certain medical treatments. The district court ruled in favor of the inmates. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the medical consequences and concluding that the policy violated the Eighth Amendment.

Drivers, employed by the concrete company, were represented by the union and went on strike after their collective bargaining agreement expired. The company announced that it no longer recognized the union as the drivers' representative and contacted the drivers directly to employ them individually on new terms. A few resigned from the union and returned to work. The strike settled and more returned, on terms less favorable than the previous agreement. The union filed charges with the NLRB. The district court issued an injunction under section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), ordering the company to stop certain unfair labor practices pending a final decision by the NLRB. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The concrete company does not qualify under section 8(f) as an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry, that would not be subject to some unfair labor practice restrictions in section 8(a) and would be entitled to withdraw recognition from the union. The court properly found the company's practices to be destructive to the union’s organizational efforts and that the union had established irreparable harm.

Davis learned that the government was suspending sale of new 30-year bonds.The information was embargoed until 10 AM. He passed the information to traders, who bought futures contracts with an eight-minute head start and reaped profits. The brokerage settled SEC charges. PPP sought to represent a class of traders who held short positions in futures when the brokerage took the long side. The district judge concluded that such a class would be unrelated to trading that occurred during eight minutes of October 31, 2001 and denied certification. Investors, all of whom held short positions during the eight minutes, filed their own suit. The court dismissed because the two-year limitations period (7 U.S.C. 25(c)), had expired, rejecting an argument that claims did not accrue until the SEC filed its complaint. Meanwhile PPP's proposal for a reduced class was rejected. PPP accepted an offer of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. The court rejected PPP's proposal to continue the suit. The investor suit plaintiff sought to intervene as class representative. The district court denied that motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. With respect to the limitations period, the court noted when the investors were aware of their harm. There cannot be a class action without a viable representative and there was no such representative involved in the appeal.