Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant sold crack to a confidential informant; the FBI captured the negotiations and transactions, which occurred in defendant's car, on audio recordings. Agents also conducted visual and video surveillance of the controlled buys, but because of gaps, they did not actually see and the video recordings do not show money and drugs changing hands. The informant-buyer was not a witness at trial. Defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and sentenced to concurrent terms of 125 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence was easily sufficient to sustain the convictions. There was no Confrontation Clause violation; two challenged recorded statements involving the buyer were offered for context, not for their truth. The FBI agents' testimony about the recordings was not unfairly prejudicial. here. Even if a comment by one of the agents about "two big ones" was improper expert opinion, the admission of this small bit of testimony did not qualify as plain error.

A special education support teacher sued the school district and administrators under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that her constitutional rights were violated because she was ordered to a room with an autistic fourth-grade student even though he was known to be violent and should have been previously transferred to an alternative school. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the district's actions were flawed and short-sighted, but do not "shock the conscience" as required to maintain a substantive due process claim.

Defendant was convicted of distributing cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)). Conspiracy to distribute charges against his girlfriend were dropped and she was convicted of obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(1)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court properly denied a motion to suppress. The affidavit accompanying the warrant application contained information from four confidential informants tying defendant's cocaine dealing at various locations over the course of two years; one of the informants conducted a controlled buy shortly before the warrant was executed. The court acted within its discretion in declining to give a special credibility instruction with respect to a witness who testified in hope of avoiding possession charges. The prosecutor's misstatement of the quantity of cocaine, in opening statements, was not prejudicial. Destruction of cocaine by the girlfriend qualified as obstruction of justice under language added by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, "record, document, or other object" the jury could reasonably believe that she foresaw that any contraband discovered in the search would be used against her and defendant in official proceedings.

Petitioner's claim for Social Security disability insurance benefits (42 U.S.C. 423(a)(1)(E)) and supplemental security income payments after suffering serious injuries in a motorcycle crash were denied by the Social Security Administration. An ALJ also denied the claim after conducting a hearing, finding that petitioner could perform a significant number of jobs. The district court the denial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence that petitioner is qualified to work in positions that are available in substantial numbers.

The company previously gave retirees credit toward their share of health care costs, based on unused sick-leave. Union workers could take that sum in cash or put it toward the premium. Executives who quit before retirement, or decided not to participate in the plan, did not receive any other form of compensation for unused leave. It had value only as a credit toward retirement health-care costs. In 2008 the company amended the plan and stopped paying any part of retirees' health-care costs. Money for employees who could have taken their balances in cash is put in an account administered by the health-care plan. Retirees, including executives who never had an option to take balances in cash, plus one who had that option but elected to leave the money on deposit, filed suit under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1081. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to the company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The company, which did not take anything out of the plan, but simply reduced the amount it would pay in, reserved the right to amend its health-care plan. It is a business decision, not a legal question, whether to use that authority to retirees’ detriment.

Responding to complaints about a party, officers arrived and attempted to quiet and disperse the crowd of nearly 100 attendees, mostly of Mexican descent. Tension escalated. A full-blown melee ensued. Officers and civilian were injured and seven people were arrested. Party-goers filed suit against 17 officers and the town under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for use of excessive force, false arrest, and deprivation of equal protection, and under state law for battery, malicious prosecution, hate crimes, and evidence spoliation. The 78 plaintiffs pursued different claims against various combinations of individual named officers, unidentified officers, and the town. After a six-week trial, the jury returned sizable verdicts in favor of 23 plaintiffs against six individual officers and the town. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that the judgment appeared to permit 13 plaintiffs to recover twice for the same injury on state-law claims, once from the individual officer and again from the town. As a result of confusing jury instructions and an improper special verdict form, the judgment did not reflect that the town's liability for the state-law claims against its officers was based on respondeat superior and was joint and several. The court rejected plaintiffs' challenges to evidentiary rulings.

Defendants were convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1346) for participating in a fraudulent scheme to obtain mortgage loans. The scheme involved: recruiters, who enlisted buyers to buy properties with fraudulently obtained funds; financiers, who provided funds to buyers to facilitate the transactions; administrators, who bought fake documents to enable buyers to obtain mortgages; loan officers, who prepared fraudulent applications and sent them to lenders. Between 2003 and 2005, the group acquired more than 70 properties for which lenders provided $7.2 million in loans. Most of the properties went into foreclosure, resulting in losses to the lenders of $2.2 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The use of the term "straw buyer" in the confession of a nontestifying co-defendant did not obviously refer to the defendant and violate his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under the "Bruton" doctrine. The court properly applied a "sophisticated means" sentence enhancement and gave an "ostrich" instruction concerning defendant's knowledge.

After two years of contributing to a multiemployer pension plan established under a collective bargaining agreement, the company closed the covered facility, triggering withdrawal liability. The union notified the company of its liability under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001, as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. 1301-1461, and set a 20-year schedule requiring payment of $652 per month. The union sent another letter, months later, saying that it had miscalculated monthly payments, but not the underlying withdrawal liability, and advised the company to increase monthly payments to $978. The company timely paid the original amount, but refused to pay the revised sum. The company requested arbitration, but after a finding that it was not required to pay the higher amount in the interim, withdrew. The district court dismissed the union's suit based on the calculation. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded without reaching the statutory interpretation issue, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A plan may correct perceived errors in calculation and revise an assessment as long as the employer is not prejudiced. At that point the exhaustion provisions of the MPPAA apply to the revised assessment as they would to the original.

American citizen-civilians alleged that they were detained and illegally tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006 and released from military custody without being charged with a crime. At the time they worked for a privately-owned Iraqi security services company. Plaintiffs sought damages and brought a claim to recover personal property that was seized. The district court denied motions to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts supporting Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility for the alleged torture and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings. The law was clearly established in 2006 that the alleged treatment was unconstitutional. No reasonable public official could have believed otherwise. A "Bivens" remedy is available for alleged torture of civilian U.S. citizens by U.S. military personnel in a war zone. The court noted that U.S. law provides a civil remedy for aliens who are tortured by their own governments. Claims by aliens, alleging torture by U.S. officials, are distinguishable. The Administrative Procedure Act's "military authority" exception precludes judicial review of military actions affecting personal property in a war zone.

After the company announced a plan to outsource positions, it arranged for the new vendor to accept applications from its employees. Two targeted employees applied for positions within the company, rather than pursuing employment with the new vendor, but were not hired. A third employee stayed with company, but claimed that the company has paid him less than he deserves because it has never promoted him. Plaintiffs attribute these adverse employment actions to their supervisor's bias against Hispanics. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant company on claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, but affirmed on the pay discrimination claim. The district court improperly discounted the plaintiffs’ strongest evidence and erred in its analysis of the failure-to-hire claims under Title VII, by basing its decision on the lawful treatment of at least one Hispanic employee.