Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2002, state and federal authorities began investigation of gang violence in Aurora, Illinois. Defendants were convicted of conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and various combinations of related charges of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, drug distribution, conspiracy to distribute drugs, and unlawful possession of firearms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting challenges to empanelment of an anonymous jury. The court erred under Rule 43 by barring two defendants from trial on the day before trial, rather than on the morning when jury selection began, but the error was harmless; removal was justified by defendants' disruptive behavior. During trial, the court repeatedly asked whether they were willing to attend; they refused to communicate with attorneys and did not watch the live video feed. The defendants knowingly waived their right to be present. The court also rejected challenges to admission of certain eyewitness testimony; to jury instructions on aiding and abetting and defining "pattern of activity;" to the judge's decision to give a Pinkerton instruction at the penalty phase, but not the guilt phase; to provision of partial transcripts to the jury; and to the impartiality of two jurors.

In 2002, state and federal authorities began investigation of gang violence in Aurora, Illinois, centered on the Insane Deuces, as one member had agreed to serve as a confidential informant. Defendants participated in the gang's activities. They were convicted of racketeering conspiracy; some were also convicted of related charges, including narcotics distribution and conspiracy, illegal firearm possession, and assault and murder in furtherance of their racketeering activities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, first rejecting challenges to empanelment of an anonymous jury. The court's error in failing to articulate its reasons was harmless. The court acted within its discretion in denying various motions to severe. The court was not required to hold a hearing on allegations of intra-jury misconduct, in the form of premature deliberation, which arose only after the jury returned its general verdicts as to each defendant. The court also rejected challenges to evidentiary rulings, brought by individual defendants.

Plaintiff filed suit seeking unpaid wages, overtime pay, and accrued vacation pay, after being terminated from her job at hotel, where she worked as a security guard and desk clerk. The district court granted defendants judgment as a matter of law on the vacation pay claim and, in part, on the overtime pay claim. The jury returned a verdict in the defendants' favor on the remaining overtime claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The vacation pay claim was frivolous, plaintiff never earned vacation pay. The court acted within its discretion in denying her motion in limine to prevent defendants from introducing newly disclosed evidence of additional cash payments and in entering judgment on the overtime claim based on a determination that the employer was not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201.

The company made and sold a toy that, when swallowed, made children seriously ill. The product was recalled and removed from store shelves. Plaintiffs, purchasers whose children were not harmed and who did not ask for a refund, challenged the adequacy of the recall and alleged violations of the Consumer Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 2051–89, express and implied warranties, and state consumer-protection statutes. The district court denied class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that plaintiffs' had standing, based on financial harm. There would be serious problems of class action management, apart from differences in state law. Individual notice would be impossible, making it hard for class members to opt out. No one knows who bought the kits or who used them without problems. It would be difficult to determine who would be entitled to a remedy. The per-buyer costs of identifying class members and giving notice would exceed the price of the toys. The principal effect of class certification would be to induce defendants to pay class lawyers enough to make them go away; effectual relief for consumers is unlikely.

Plaintiff claims that defendants are billing aggregators engaged in "cramming" by placing unauthorized charges on telephone bills, arranged unauthorized charges on plaintiff's telephone bill, and were responsible for unauthorized charges on the telephone bills of more than one million Indiana telephone numbers. Defendants produced evidence that plaintiff actually ordered the services in question. Plaintiff argued that the service was not legally authorized if defendants did not possess all customer authorization documentation required by the Indiana anti-cramming regulation, 170 IAC 7-1.1-19(p). That law does not provide a private right of action, but plaintiff argued that defendants' failure to comply proved unjust enrichment and provided a basis for suit under Indiana's Deceptive Commercial Solicitation Act, Ind. Code 24-5-19-9. The district court denied class certification and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The anti-cramming regulation does not apply to these defendants, which are not telephone companies and did not act in this case as billing agents for telephone companies. There was no unjust enrichment and the DCSA does not apply; plaintiff ordered and received services. Common issues do not predominate over individual issues, as required for a class under FRCP 23(b)(3).

Plaintiff suffered a heart attack when police searched her apartment and arrested her during a drug raid. She claims that police unreasonably seized her by denying a request for aspirin and refusing to call an ambulance and conducted an unreasonable search by not giving her sufficient time to respond when they knocked and announced, but used a battering ram after 15 seconds. The district court granted summary judgment on the aspirin claim, citing qualified immunity, reasoning that there was no clearly established right to over-the-counter drugs during arrest. After trial on the ambulance and entry claims, the court entered directed verdict for the village; the jury delivered a verdict for the officer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the aspirin and ambulance issues should have been treated as a single claim, but that the error was harmless. The request for aspirin was inconsequential, given that police called an ambulance promptly when notified that plaintiff was suffering chest pains. Without the aspirin claim, plaintiff had no evidence linking a municipal policy or custom to any constitutional violation. The judge acted within her discretion in barring expert testimony about the 15-second wait and testimony that a reasonable police officer would call an ambulance.

When plaintiffs left their jobs, they did not receive notices describing how to extend their health insurance coverage within the period prescribed by statute (COBRA notices). Responding to solicitation from a lawyer, they became named plaintiffs in a proposed class action seeking damages from and statutory penalties against their former employer. The district court declined to certify the class and, on consideration of the individual claims, denied the request for statutory penalties and one of the plaintiffs' requests for damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly denied class certification because it found the proposed class counsel inadequate to represent the class, based on observations about counsel's diligence, respect for judicial resources, and promptness. Denial of statutory penalties under 29 U.S.C. 1132 was appropriate; there was no evidence of an administrator's bad faith (such as misrepresentations or willful delay in response to requests for information) or gross negligence. The district court was within its discretion in denying damages as compensation for expenses, where there was no evidence to indicate that the expenses were incurred as a result of the failure to provide timely notice of COBRA rights.

The company decided to voluntarily terminate its qualified plan under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, but after going through initial statutory steps, realized that it would be too expensive and formally withdrew from the process. During the process, the company amended its plan to provide that if the plan terminated, employees could keep working at the company while still receiving the annuities the company purchased for them. The amendment was made in anticipation of the final step of the statutory termination process, which requires the purchase of private annuities for plan beneficiaries. Employees sued. The district court found that plaintiffs’ ability to receive an annuity while still working is not a protected right under ERISA or the plan's own terms, which protect beneficiaries from amendments that decrease "accrued benefits." The Seventh Circuit affirmed. ERISA only protects certain benefits, and those relevant here are all tied to benefits available at retirement. In any event, the ability to receive an annuity while still working was contingent on the plan terminating, which did not occur.

In 1993 defendant was convicted of growing 228 marijuana plants and was sentenced to 120 months in prison and 8 years of supervised release. In 2009, days before supervised release was to end, he was arrested while tending 52 marijuana plants. The government sought to revoke supervised release and he entered a plea. The district judge sentenced him to 30 months in prison on the new charge and, consecutively, to 34 months for violation of supervised release, minus four months for time he had served in a related state case; so the length of the sentence actually imposed was 60 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district judge failed to explain why the term of reimprisonment recommended in the Sentencing Guidelines, 12-18 months, would be insufficient punishment (U.S.S.G. 7B1.4), though the statutory maximum is three years. The Sentencing Guidelines now are non-binding, but, whatever the precise standard of review, the sentencing judge must consider the statutory sentencing factors.

A developer was required to make public improvements to be turned over to the city and, in 2006, obtained bonds to ensure performance, as required by ordinance. Work began, but the subdivision failed and subcontractors filed mechanics' liens. The developer notified the city that three foreclosures were pending and recommended that it redeem the bonds. The insurer refused to pay. The city did not follow up, but a subcontractor sued, purporting to bring its case in the name of the city for its own benefit. The subcontractor contends that it should be paid out of the proceeds of the bonds. The case was removed to federal court. The district court dismissed, finding that the subcontractor did not have standing to assert claims on the bonds because it was not a third-party beneficiary to the bonds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on the language of the contract.