Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner entered the U.S. from Mexico in 1971, and became a lawful permanent resident in 1977. In 2003, she was indicted for mail fraud in connection with a staged accident insurance scheme; loss to the victims exceeded $10,000. On advice of counsel, she pled guilty and was sentenced to four years’ probation. An alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The government initiated removal proceedings after petitioner unsuccessfully applied for citizenship. She sought to have her conviction overturned and filed a motion for a writ of coram nobis, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to inform her that a guilty plea could lead to removal. While the motion was pending, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). The court concluded that Padilla did not announce a new rule and did apply to the case and vacated the conviction. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court has defined the concept of an old rule narrowly, limiting it to holdings so compelled by precedent that any contrary conclusion must be deemed unreasonable; Padilla announced a new rule. That numerous courts had failed to anticipate the holding, though not dispositive, is strong evidence that reasonable jurists could have debated the outcome.

Defendant, convicted of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)), was sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support conviction and the sentence. Introduction of evidence of defendant's prior drug sales to an informant was probative of intent and did not prejudice defendant's substantial rights.

An informant alerted law enforcement that defendant planned to rob an armored car. The FBI opened an investigation and recorded meetings at which the informant and defendant spoke about the planned robbery. On the day of the planned robbery, defendant and the informant met near the proposed robbery location. Defendant provided stolen license plates. After defendant was convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and aiding and abetting the attempted robbery (18 U.S.C. 1951), the district court applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), which applies "if a firearm was brandished or possessed." The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support conviction. The district court acted within its discretion in declining to give a missing witness instruction and in allowing defendant's prior conviction and alleged criminal activity into evidence. The missing witness, the informant, was physically available and was not prevented by the government from testifying and defendant "opened the door" to information about past activities. Defendant is liable for the informant's possession of the weapon in preparation for the offense.

Defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography and attempting to entice a minor to engage in a sexual act (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2422(b)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trial court acted within its discretion in: denying a motion to suppress; admitting evidence regarding prior online chats with individuals who purported to be minors; and denying requested jury instructions. Defendant had been arrested and was seated in a police car when an officer asked where he lived before reciting Miranda rights; there was no evidence that the officer was seeking an admission and there is no precedent that revealing one's residence during booking, thereby identifying a place to search, was sufficient to invoke Miranda. Defendant consented to the search of his residence. The district court should have given explicit reasons for its conclusion that prior evidence was not unfairly prejudicial rather than making reference to another similar case, but any error was harmless in light of abundant evidence.

In 2004, defendant spent approximately $38,000 on home repairs for a Chicago alderman, a crucial player in defendant's attempt to have industrial property rezoned for commercial and residential development. Defendant also convinced business associates to donate, at his expense, to the alderman's aunt's congressional campaign. During an investigation, defendant fabricated an invoice for the home repairs, purportedly sent from his general contractor to defendant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed convictions for bribing a local official (18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)); exceeding federal campaign contribution limits through straw-man donations (Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1),441f & 437g(d)(1)(A)(ii)); and endeavoring to obstruct justice (18 U.S.C. 1503(a)). The government was not required to establish a specific quid pro quo of money in exchange for a legislative act. The district court acted within its discretion in holding an adversarial in camera hearing to determine the existence of the crime-fraud exception. Section 441f unambiguously proscribes straw man, as well as false name, contributions.

A jury, composed entirely of women, acquitted petitioner on state law charges of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse but found him guilty of unlawful sexual contact with a 15-year-old girl. After exhausting state remedies, he unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. On petitions for habeas corpus claiming ineffective assistance, federal courts defer to counsel's reasonable choices and to the state court's evaluation of that issue 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The state court found that the acquittal on one count demonstrated that defendant was not prejudiced by his lawyer's striking of male jurors and assumed that, because the lawyer had a strategic reason for his actions, his performance was not constitutionally inadequate. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating that "Intentionally violating the Constitution by discriminating against jurors on account of their sex is not consistent with, or reasonable under, prevailing professional norms," but concluded that the error did not merit reversal. It was not outside the boundaries of reasonable differences of opinion, given the state of the law at the time, for those courts to predict that the Supreme Court would apply a harmless-error standard even to intentional Batson violations like the one in this case.

The Union claimed that the company breached the operative collective bargaining agreement by closing a manufacturing plants, after it had secured various concessions from the Union and sought damages and specific performance under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185. The district court entered judgment for the company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the concessions did not require the Paris facility to be kept open beyond the expiration of the bargaining agreement. Although the "mid-term" agreement, containing the concessions, did not have an expiration date, it would not be reasonable to read it as requiring that the plant be kept open indefinitely.

Defendant, involved in cocaine distribution, provided assistance to investigators to implicate others in exchange for a favorable plea agreement. That agreement required the government to recommend a sentence about half as long as defendant faced under a mandatory minimum sentencing provision. After the district judge accepted the agreement, which contained a waiver of right to appeal, the prosecution and defense continued to negotiate the sentence because of disputes about defendant's criminal history and continuing to test positive for use of opiates. She never moved to withdraw her plea and the agreed-upon sentence of 60 months was imposed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, declining to consider whether the government acted in bad faith in not fulfilling an agreement to amend the original plea agreement. The plea agreement contained a waiver of her right to appeal and she never sought to withdraw her plea.

Companies filed suit, alleging that an employee engaged in a collusive trading scheme in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Under section 9(a) of the Act, a private plaintiff must plead that: a series of transactions in a security created actual or apparent trading in that security or raised or depressed its market price; scienter; the purpose of the transactions was to induce the security's sale or purchase by others; plaintiffs relied on the transactions; and the transactions affected plaintiff's purchase or selling price. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The complaint adequately stated with particularity the circumstances constituting the securities fraud, and the economic loss impact on the plaintiffs as a result of the fraud and satisfied the pleading requirements of FRCP 9(b).

Plaintiff filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) based on three arrests: one for disorderly conduct for his attempts to dissuade a city employee from towing his car; a second, months later, for theft of lost or mislaid property after he got into another spat with a city employee, who was trying to tow his vehicles; a third arrest, more than a year later, was for criminal trespass to state-supported land, and followed his release from police custody after another arrest, not challenged in this case. None of the challenged arrests resulted in prosecution. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that there was probable cause for the arrests, but stated that the Chicago police did not emerge "untarnished."