Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

City employees accepted early retirement incentives in 2004 while their unions were still negotiating new collective bargaining agreements for 2003-2007. In 2005, after two years of negotiations, the city and unions agreed to make raises retroactive to July 2003, but only for current employees, not for the plaintiff retirees. The district court granted the city summary judgment on federal due process and equal protection claims and a state law breach of express contract claim, but granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their state law implied contract claim and awarded the class $1,773,502 in retroactive pay, plus attorney fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the implied contract claim and otherwise affirmed. Because express contracts, the 1999-2003 CBAs, governed wages, an implied contract claim cannot succeed. Plaintiffs hoped for wage increases, but had no right to them, and there was no evidence that the city made misrepresentations to induce early retirement.

Petitioner, convicted of causing great bodily harm by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of cocaine (Wis. Stat. 940.25(1)(am) exhausted state appeals and filed an unsuccessful petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that the state did not violate petitioner's right to due process when it destroyed the vehicle, which possessed no apparent exculpatory value, in good faith.

An inmate sued, claiming that the prison medical director was deliberately indifferent to his need for eye surgery. He was diagnosed in 2001, with pterygia, a thin film covering the eye, which significantly obstructs his vision and apparently causes itching and irritation. The prison denied requests for surgery. The inmate alleged that there was an unofficial policy of denying off-site care to death row inmates. Medical recommendations were mixed; several doctors recommended the surgery. Following a remand of dismissal of his suit, the inmate got surgery in 2008, and filed a second suit, based on the delay The district court entered summary judgment, in favor of the doctor. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the evidence remains insufficient to eliminate fact disputes. The medical recommendations are enough to create genuine fact disputes that the pterygia had become objectively serious and that the doctor intentionally or with deliberate indifference ignored the condition.

A Polish citizen, who entered the U.S. on a visitor's visa in 1994, overstayed, and allegedly tried to bribe an immigration officer in a 1999 sting operation. Before her removal proceedings began, she married a U.S. citizen, who filed a petition for an alien relative visa. In 2006, after the petition was approved, she applied to adjust her status under 8 U.S.C. 1255. The IJ found her removable, denied her motion to suppress evidence collected in the sting, and decided that she was not entitled to adjust her status. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal and forwarded information about petitioner's attorney to the state disciplinary board. The petition included a single, underdeveloped legal argument: that evidence gathered during the sting should have been suppressed because the operation was an egregious violation of petitioner's right to due process, an argument foreclosed by an earlier case. The court noted its jurisdictional limitations, but stated that the agency's evaluation of the equities was not particularly persuasive and that it would have required more than weak circumstantial evidence that an alien had bribed a federal immigration official.

A gun was discovered on defendant's person after he was pulled over on suspicion of a burglary attempt and ordered out of his vehicle for a protective patdown. Defendant had prior felony convictions, and pled guilty as a felon-in-possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) but appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant did not dispute that officers had reasonable suspicion that he may have been involved in criminal activity, such that an investigative detention under Terry was warranted. The facts known to officers suggested burglary and burglary is the type of offense that likely involves a weapon; the decision to order defendant out of the truck for purposes of a protective frisk was reasonable despite the absence of additional facts suggesting that he in particular might be armed.

Plaintiff began working as a dentist at a facility for jail detainees in 1982. By 2006, Cook County had a budget shortfall of 500 million dollars. It was determined that the facility could provide sufficient care with only one of its five dentists and that the remaining dentist had to have some management experience, and a history of flexibility, productivity, emergent clinical skill, and responsiveness to other physicians' needs. Plaintiff was not selected. Provided with an explanation of the decision, a hearing officer denied an appeal. Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that political considerations infected the decision, in violation of the Shakman decree and 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that the choice to lay her off was predicated on her Caucasian ethnicity and female gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff failed to meet her prima facia burden. The claim did not explain what evidence shows background circumstances of discriminatory conduct. If she had satisfied her prima facie case, the claim would fail because she did not establish that the reasons for the decision were pretextual.

The inmate attended services until the prison cancelled African Hebrew Israelite services. The prison denied his grievance, blaming budget cuts. The Grievance Officer and Department Director upheld the denial on the merits. The inmate filed a pro se 42 U.S.C.1983 complaint against the chaplain and wardens, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, and the Illinois Constitution. The district court dismissed restructured Counts 2 and 3 (discrimination in allocation of religious budget)and entered summary judgment for defendants on Counts 1 and 4 (failure to provide reasonable access to religious materials and to provide group worship services). The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. The grievance gave officials fair notice and an opportunity to address the complaint, so Count 4 should not have been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court’s characterization of Counts 2 and 3 was too narrow a reading of the complaint and led to premature dismissal at the screening stage. Dismissal of Count 1 was appropriate because the inmate only complained of a failure to provide religious services in his grievance, not a failure to provide religious materials, and did not properly exhaust that claim.

Petitioner, age 60, a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. since 1999, pled guilty to aiding and abetting a conspiracy to violate 8 U.S.C. 1328, which prohibits importation of any alien for the purpose of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose. His role involved distributing condoms to what he knew were brothels. The government commenced removal on the grounds that petitioner committed a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and for having procured persons for purpose of prostitution. He conceded removability for a crime involving moral turpitude, but denied removability for procuring persons for prostitution. He claimed eligibility for cancellation of removal under INA 240A(a), which requires that the noncitizen have lawful permanent residence for five years, continuous residence for seven years, and no conviction for what amounts to an aggravated felony. The Immigration Judge denied cancellation. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated the order of removal and remanded. "Importation ... of any alien for the purpose of prostitution," 8 U.S.C. 1328, encompasses conduct broader than "an offense that relates to the owning, controlling, managing or supervising of a prostitution business," INA 101(a)(43)(K)(i), so petitioner's conviction is not properly categorized as an aggravated felony.

Petitioner, born in Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1977. In 1982, he purported to marry an American woman while still married to his wife in Mexico. He was admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 1984. In 1987, petitioner was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance. Removal proceedings were suspended until 2009, when he was apprehended while returning from a trip to Mexico. Petitioner conceded deportability, but applied for waivers of deportation under former sections 241(f) and 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and for suspension of deportation pursuant to former section 244(a)(2). An immigration judge denied the applications; the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. Petitioner was never charged or found deportable based on fraud; he was charged only based on his controlled substance offense and was ineligible for a 241 waiver. He was ineligible for suspension of deportation because his period of continuous physical presence ended with his drug crime in 1987, or, in the alternative, when an Order to Show Cause issued in 1988.

Decedent, on active duty, committed suicide in his barracks. Navy and Department of Defense personnel had been called and arrived at his residence, but did not find the gun they were told he had. They permitted decedent to go to the bathroom accompanied by his friend. Upon entering, he pulled a gun from his waistband and committed suicide by shooting himself. After attempting unsuccessfully to recover from the Navy through administrative procedures, decedent's family brought a wrongful death claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court found the case barred by the Feres doctrine, which provides that "the Government is not liable ... for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Decedent stood "in the type of relationship to the military at the time of his . . . injury that the occurrences causing the injury arose out of activity incident to military service."