Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Illinois riverboat casinos filed a RICO suit (18 U.S.C. 1961) against racetracks, charging that the owner of two tracks, in cahoots with then-governor, Blagojevich, "bought" statutes requiring casinos to deposit three percent of their revenues to the "Horse Racing Equity Trust Fund" for disbursement to racetracks for use to increase purses and improve the tracks. The district judge issued, then dissolved, a temporary restraining order. The Seventh Circuit reinstated, so that no money is being disbursed, but on rehearing en banc, affirmed. The Tax Injunction Act forbids federal district courts to "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law," if an adequate remedy is available in the state courts, as it is in Illinois 28 U.S.C. 1341. If unlawfulness can be traced to the racetracks, the casinos can seek damages from them. The Act does not bar federal monetary relief, but federal courts cannot freeze the stateâs tax moneys by imposition of a constructive trust. The court extended the TRO for 30 days pending petition for certiorari.

Plaintiff claims that in 2005 county officials told his mobile home park tenants to stop paying rent and vacate. In 2006 the health department obtained a court order to remove the remaining 13 units. Plaintiff claims that he did not appeal because he is bipolar and the county caused him stress. The owner alleges numerous illegal actions in connection with the demolition of the units and that the sheriff refused to investigate. In 2009 and 2010 the district court dismissed claims and amended claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the two-year Indiana statute of limitations. The court rejected claims of fraudulent concealment of conspiracy; the owner did not state facts sufficient to establish post-2007 conspiracy.

A sergeant was asked by town supervisors to investigate charges of "double dipping" against the police chief, who reportedly told the sergeant that he would "get him." The sergeant was acting chief while the chief was on administrative leave. Although independent investigation substantiated the sergeant's report, the chief was reinstated and began to work on retribution, ranging from "slights" to defamatory statements made to cause criminal prosecution. The sergeant took medical leave and did not return to work before the police department was disbanded. The district court granted a motion to dismiss that claimed qualified immunity and that the sergeant's complaint did not adequately allege constitutional violations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in concluding that the sergeant failed to establish good cause for modifying the scheduling order to permit amendment of the complaint. The sergeant failed to respond to "myriad" arguments presented in the motion to dismiss.

Convicted as felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)), defendant was sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Application of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924, was appropriate; the predicate offense of burglary qualified as a violent felony because it involved entry into a building. Evidence from several sources linked the defendant to the gun and was sufficient to support conviction.

Defendant entered an open plea of guilty, without benefit of a plea agreement, for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250. The district court judge sentenced him to 18 months in prison, 20 years of supervised released, and a $100 special assessment fee. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant's plea of guilty to forcible sodomy (Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 925), while serving in the Navy, triggered SORNA. The judge's application of a modified categorical approach to examine a limited amount of additional material (the charging instrument) and classify the conviction as a tier one offense was proper.

For nearly three decades, Chicago had ordinances effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens. In 2008 the Supreme Court struck down a similar District of Columbia law . After Chicago's ban was found to be unconstitutional, the city enacted a Responsible Gun Owner's Ordinance that mandates one hour of range training as a prerequisite to lawful gun ownership, but prohibits all firing ranges in the city. The district court denied an injunction to prevent enforcement. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the challenge has a strong likelihood of success on the merits, that the loss of Second Amendment rights cannot be remedied by an award of damages, and that the city's claim of harm to the public interest was based entirely on speculation. Harm to a constitutional right is not measured by the extent to which it can be exercised in another jurisdiction.

Officers, staking out a suspected drug operation, saw plaintiff (known to them) driving a car, ran a search, and learned that his license was suspended. They later filled out a ticket and obtained a warrant. Three weeks later, officers approached plaintiff at a barbecue at his apartment. Plaintiff asserted that his car was not running at the time of the observation, then started to back away, waving his arms. The officers used pepper spray, twice, several seconds apart, then transported plaintiff to the station. He was acquitted on the driving charges and of resisting a peace officer. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Actions recorded by a video camera showed that a reasonable officer could have believed that petitioner was resisting. His freedom was not actually curtailed until that resistance ended, so the arrest was not wrongful, regardless of the facts underlying the original warrant. It would not have been obvious to a reasonable police officer under the circumstances that application of pepper spray was unlawful.

Responding to a domestic violence call in an apartment building, officers attempted to follow the suspect through the building and encountered plaintiff, mother of the suspect, and searched her apartment. The district court rejected her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Because the officers presented evidence of exigent circumstances, the only question was whether plaintiff had met her burden of showing that the police did not reasonably believe that her son would be found in plaintiff's apartment. The district courtâs instruction on burden of proof correctly and clearly stated the law. A question asked of an officer: "At the time that youâre moving through [the] apartment, did you believe [plaintiff's son] was moving to the rear of the building?" did not call for subjective assessment of reasonableness of officers' actions, given the circumstances.The testimony provided a sufficient basis from which the jury could conclude that the officers reasonably believed that a suspect was behind the door of what turned out to be plaintiff's apartment.

The former Governor of Illinois, in federal prison following convictions for racketeering, mail fraud, tax evasion, and lying to the FBI, filed a collateral attack (28 U.S.C. 2255) after the Supreme Court held in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010), that the honest-services form of the mail-fraud offense (18 U.S.C. 1346) covers only bribery and kickback schemes. The district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that any error was harmless because a reasonable jury could find that Ryan sold his offices to the high bidders.

An African-American salesperson was fired after his white boss concluded that the salesperson violated the company's zero-tolerance employee guidelines by processing a noncommissionable transaction as a commissionable one. The salesperson was reinstated after the customer whose transaction was allegedly botched clarified the type of service he had requested. Shortly after he returned to work, the company made changes to its compensation scheme that the salesperson believed adversely affected his future earnings potential. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981(a) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The employee did not demonstrate a real link between the bigotry and an adverse employment action. A rational jury could not infer from this evidence that the compensation plan was enacted for discriminatory reasons or that the company unlawfully retaliated against the employee.