Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, Green County's chief juvenile-intake worker from 1997-2008, alleged that Green County (county) deprived her of a property interest in her job without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, where the county Board of Supervisors removed the juvenile-intake position from the auspices of the circuit court and created a new juvenile-intake position within the Human Services Department. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The court concluded that the evidence indicated that the county reorganized to save costs and, had the county reorganized merely to terminate plaintiff's employment, its decision to rehire her for the new position would be inexplicable. The court also concluded that because nothing in the record suggested that saving money was a pretext for something else, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the county eliminated plaintiff's court-attached juvenile-intake position in conjunction with a legitimate governmental reorganization. Therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to due process and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago and a named police officer, bringing three state law and two federal claims on the allegedly unlawful search of plaintiffs' apartment. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting the officer's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and, if the district court erred in its service of process determinations, whether the district court's grant of the City's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) should be reversed. The court held that the district court did not err in determining that plaintiffs had not served the officer within the 120 day period where the officer's summons, which plaintiffs directed to the Chicago Police Department Headquarters, care of the Superintendent, was returned unserved because serving an individual's employer or other putative agent was not sufficient for service on the individual. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to extend the period in which plaintiffs could serve the officer and therefore, affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' suit.

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, petitioned the court for review of the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. At issue was whether petitioner's second conviction for domestic battery qualified as a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) and thus was an aggravated felony prohibiting him from applying for cancellation. The court held that convictions for domestic battery for causing bodily harm to petitioner's wife was a crime of violence in light of LaGuerre v. Mukasey and United States v. Upton. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review.

Inmates filed a class action lawsuit claiming that the Indiana Department of Corrections violated their First Amendment Rights by prohibiting them from advertising for pen-pals and receiving materials from websites and publications that allow persons to advertise for pen-pals. The prohibition was enacted in response to an investigation of the link between pen-pal correspondence and inmate fraud. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the IDOC. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs conceded that preventing prisoners from developing relationships with outsiders in order to defraud them by inducing financial contributions is a legitimate governmental objective. The prohibitions are reasonably related to that objective; viable alternative means of communication are available.

The warden at the prison where plaintiff worked suspended him pending discharge and recommended termination after concluding that plaintiff had sexually harassed a female subordinate and had lied about the matter. An independent state agency responsible for hiring and firing unionized employees then had 30 days to act on the recommendation. Instead of objecting, plaintiff resigned and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claiming that the firing was because he is black. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff had no direct evidence of race discrimination and did not show that the stated reasons for termination were pretextual.

Defendant, a gang member, was convicted with others on multiple charges. He was sentenced to three concurrent life terms of incarceration on racketeering charges (18 U.S.C. 1962) with a consecutive term of 57 years (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)), for using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense or crime of violence.. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Noting credibility issues, the court rejected a Fifth Amendment claim that defendant was questioned in violation of his Miranda rights. Rejecting a Sixth Amendment claim, the court stated that the mere filing of a federal criminal complaint does not trigger the right to counsel and, in any case, defendant never asserted his rights. Defendant waived an argument that counts related to possessing firearms with obliterated serial numbers and the circumstances surrounding his arrest (his decision not to go quietly) were misjoined with the other gun-related, drug-related, and racketeering offenses. There was no error in sentencing.

Plaintiff found a $20 parking citation on his windshield and initiated a class action, claiming that the inclusion of personal information, such as his driver's license number, address, and weight, violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which generally makes it unlawful to disclose personal information contained in a motor vehicle record. The district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the citation did amount to a "disclosure," the Act includes an exception for service of process.

An inmate filed suit against guards (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming that they used excessive force against him in an altercation. After the altercation a disciplinary board found the inmate guilty of "Assaulting Any Person, Dangerous Disturbances, Insolence, and Disobeying a Direct Order," based on officers' statements that the inmate was belligerent and punched an officer repeatedly in the face and head before being handcuffed. He did not challenge the ruling. The district judge dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. A civil rights suit cannot be maintained by a prisoner if a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply that his disciplinary conviction had been invalid, but the inmate can remain "agnostic" about the findings in the disciplinary proceeding. The inmate's factual assertions about the incident are in tension with the disciplinary findings. Because the inmate was proceeding pro se, the judge could have disregarded allegations in which the inmate denied those findings; could have warned the inmate to delete those allegations; or could have dismissed, without prejudice, with an explanation and consideration of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(5)(B). The guidelines sentencing range was 360 months to life; the statutory minimum sentence was 180 months; he was 44 years old when sentenced. The judge found that defendant, who had molested a child, was unlikely to avoid future offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant did not effectively argue diminished capacity; evidence of his upbringing and low IQ did not explain his desire for child pornography or eliminate his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or reduce his ability to avoid those acts.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to advertising child pornography, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1), agreeing to a comprehensive waiver of appellate rights. Defendant signed a statement: "I acknowledge that . . . the Court is required to order restitution . . . I agree to the entry of a Restitution Order for the full amount of any victims' losses in this case as determined by the Court." The requirement of restitution arises under the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act, 18 U.S.C. 2259(a), (b). Defendant challenged the district court's order of approximately $500,000 in restitution to one of his victims, a child depicted in pornography in his possession. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the restitution order falls within the scope of the appellate waiver in the plea agreement.