Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, age 62, entered a plea of guilty to attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity (18 U.S.C. 2422(b)), and to attempting to transfer obscene material to a minor (18 U.S.C. 1470) and was sentenced to the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sentencing courts are bound by mandatory minimums. There is a rational basis for treating a cyber offender, who believed he had engaged in sexual activity with a minor, the same as a "real world" offender and for denying such an offender the "safety valve" available to nonviolent drug offenders.That a federal defendant may face harsher punishment than his state counterpart, or vice versa, does not raise equal protection concerns. The sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Indiana police officers attempted to stop a car matching the description of one involved in a road-rage incident. The driver continued to drive, prompting a brief low-speed car chase. He pulled over, after leading the officers through a parking lot where he tossed a plastic bag containing 82 grams of crack into newly fallen snow. Officers obtained a warrant and found more cocaine and a gun in the driver's home. The court rejected a motion to suppress the parking lot cocaine and the driver was sentenced to 360 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although officers did not have probable cause when they first turned on their lights, the seizure did not occur until the driver pulled over, by which time they had probable cause. Sentencing under the guidelines for career offenders was properly based on a prior Indiana conviction for vehicular flight, which qualified as a crime of violence. He was ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) based on amendments to the crack-cocaine guidelines, which the Commission made retroactive effective November 1, 2011.

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States in 1991 without inspection and was eligible for removal 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1227(a)(1)). He married a woman who also lacks legal status. Their three daughters, ages 10-15, are citizens. They are not literate in Spanish and have health problems. In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The immigration judge concluded that removal would not result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the citizen-children. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied review, first holding that petitioner had standing and that it had jurisdiction to consider whether removal would be unconstitutional with respect to the children, but rejecting the claim on the merits.

Plaintiff worked as a sales representative when she became disabled and sought long-term disability benefits under the company's ERISA plan (“the Plan”) after a series of back surgeries. In her suit under 29 U.S.C.1132(a)(1)(B) the district court held that she was ineligible for benefits after the first 24 months; the Seventh Circuit remanded. Having not heard from the Plan for almost five months, plaintiff again filed suit under ERISA, claiming that silence constituted a deemed denial of her benefit claim. A little over a month later, the Plan informed her that it would pay the benefits, moved to dismiss the case as moot. The district court denied the motion, issued a judgment against the Plan for the exact amount it had agreed to pay, and denied plaintiff's motion for fees. The Seventh Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment on the benefit claim, which was moot, and affirmed denial of fees. The district court had jurisdiction over the fee claim, but the plaintiff did not adequately substantiate her request.

Plaintiff was one of the first female custodians hired by the Chicago Public Schools in 1981 and, in 2004, qualified to oversee custodial operations at large school buildings. She clashed with her new boss, who declined requests to work the morning shift and suspended plaintiff without pay three times. Plaintiff filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging gender, race, age, and disability discrimination and retaliation. When she received her right-to-sue letter, she sued her boss and the Board of Education. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that there were material issues of fact for trial. Defendants offered facially nondiscriminatory reasons for the three suspensions, the only relevant employment decisions for purposes of the discrimination claim. A reasonable jury would not have found the reasons pretextual. With respect to a retaliation claim, a notice of disciplinary action and hours restriction could be viewed as adverse employment actions and those actions were close in time to plaintiff's EEOC deposition.

Plaintiffs, evicted from their home following a state court foreclosure judgment, sought relief in federal court. The district court rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly considered the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and concluded that the doctrine applied to only two of the 22 claims: those that claimed injury caused by the state-court judgment of foreclosure, as opposed to injury caused by the defendants’ actions in enforcing the judgment. Plaintiffs offered no evidence of discriminatory motive with respect to their race or disabilities and did not allege specific facts establishing that there were material facts in dispute.

Defendant owned companies forced into Chapter 11 bankruptcy, but was not a debtor in the proceedings. The plan was confirmed and prohibited suits against the bankruptcy professionals and certain litigation against pre-bankruptcy creditors. Years later defendant sued plaintiff, pre-judgment creditors, and the bankruptcy professionals in an Indiana state court, based on Indiana law. The creditors removed the suit to bankruptcy court (28 U.S.C. 1452(a)) rather than asking the bankruptcy judge to enforce his order. The statute authorizes removal of any claim of which that court would have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1334, which confers on the district courts original jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Code, or "arising in or related to cases under" the Code. The bankruptcy judge determined that the suit against the bankruptcy professionals was barred. Defendant filed an amended complaint eliminating all defendants except plaintiff and stating that the only claims arose from alleged violations of confidentiality agreements. The bankruptcy judge ruled that, as amended, the complaint was unrelated to the bankruptcy and ordered the suit remanded to the state court. The district judge affirmed. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the dismissal was not subject to review.

Defendant, the getaway driver, was convicted of armed robbery of a financial institution (18 U.S.C. 2113(a) & (d)), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)), and possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1))and was sentenced to 284 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant waived any challenge to the jury selection process by agreeing explicitly in advance to the procedure used by the district judge. The court rejected challenges to evidentiary rulings that admitted evidence regarding defendant's prior involvement in a fraudulent check-cashing scheme; admitted a recording of a conversation between co-defendants after the robbery; denied defendant an opportunity to cross-examine a witness who identified him in a photographic array; and that prevented use of one of the defense exhibits until after closing arguments had begun. The court also rejected challenges to defendant's sentencing as an armed career criminal.

The three defendants in this consolidated case were Mexican nationals who were living in the United States illegally. At issue was what evidentiary showing must a defendant, charged with being found in the United States after previously having been deported, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), make before a district court was obliged to consider his request for a lower sentence to account for the absence of a fast-track program in that judicial district. The court held that a district court need not address a fast-track argument unless defendant had shown that he was similarly situated to persons who actually would receive a benefit in a fast-track district. Until defendant met these preconditions, his "disparity" argument was illusory and could be passed over in silence. Accordingly, the court concluded that the fast-track arguments made by all three defendants were illusory and could be passed over in silence. Therefore, the court affirmed each sentence; one defendant's sentence, however, was modified to clarify that his participation in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program was voluntary.

Plaintiff sued to recover a "break-up fee" it claimed was owed to it under the letter of intent the parties executed in relation to a negotiated sale of defendants' assets and real estate properties. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that no break-up fee obligation had been triggered. The court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether actual negotiations had terminated and therefore, the court reversed the order of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.