Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The employee began work at the university in 1989 and was the only African-American working in her department when racially charged discord erupted. In 2005, she began filing complaints about her coworkersâ offensive conduct, which included the use of racial epithets, references to the Ku Klux Klan, veiled threats of physical harm, and other unpleasant conduct. In 2006 she filed two complaints with the EEOC for race discrimination and, later, retaliation. After getting her right-to-sue letter, she filed in a range of federal and state discrimination claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that she did not establish employer liability on the hostile work environment claim or put forth sufficient facts to support her retaliation claim under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e). The university promptly investigated each complaint and the employee, who was promoted and got a raise, did not suffer a materially adverse employment action.

In 2008 defendant was recorded selling both crack and powder cocaine to a cooperating defendant and an undercover officer. He entered a conditional plea of guilty and received the 10-year minimum sentence, but appealed denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the crack-powder disparity codified at 21 U.S.C. 841(b), which punishes crack cocaine offenses 100 times more severely than powder cocaine offenses, violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The sentencing scheme survives rational basis review because there is at least some evidence that crack cocaine is more dangerous than powder. The court also applied rational basis review to a claim of disparate impact on African-Americans and found no intent to discriminate. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which effectively reduced the disparity to punishing crack offenses 18 times more severely, does not apply.

In 2008 the Supreme Court held that a federal enclaveâs ban on operable handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment. At the time, Chicago and Oak Park had ordinances similar to the one invalidated. The plaintiffs challenged those laws, and, in 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and the Seventh Circuit and held that the Second Amendment applies to states and municipalities as a matter of due process. The municipalities repealed their ordinances within days and the district court dismissed the suit and held that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties for purposes of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Plaintiffs achieved a decision that alters the legal relationship between the parties. Although the district court never entered judgment in their favor, the Supreme Court decision gave the plaintiffs "everything they needed."

The inmate, placed in the most restrictive disciplinary segment of the prison for 240 days due to misconduct in another segment, filed suit. On remand, after the Seventh Circuit held that the case did implicate a constitutional "liberty" interest, the inmate provided no evidence of how conditions in the disciplinary segment differ from conditions for the general population. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the inmate had the burden of proof in the civil proceedings.

In 1993 a hip-hop group released a track that contains a segment of plaintiff's 1969 song. The district court dismissed plaintiff's 2003 copyright suit. Under the Copyright Act, sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972 are not subject to copyright protection, but may be protected by state law (17 U.S.C. 301(c)). The court denied a motion to amend and awarded $321,995.25 in attorneyâs fees and $10,620.53 in costs. A new claim, filed in state court, was removed to federal court and dismissed as res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trial court correctly denied the motion to amend, based on the undue delay between the plaintiff's notice of the defects in his claim and the motion. The fact that the material was not under copyright did not deprive the court of jurisdiction and the second complaint was properly dismissed.

In 1995, 14 years of applications and appeals, an ALJ found that the mine worker was entitled to black lung benefits, dated to 1981. The award was reversed in 1996. In 2000 the Seventh Circuit held that denial of a 1981 claim did not preclude the award and remanded. In 2001 an ALJ again awarded benefits. The company initiated proceedings for modification and refused to pay. In 2003 an ALJ denied the petition for modification; in 2004 the benefits review board reversed. The company, by then liquidated in bankruptcy, withdrew. The issuer of a surety bond, was notified, but did not intervene. The ALJ declined to hold the proceedings in abeyance. In 2008 a successor insurer filed a motion for conditional intervention in the modification proceedings. An ALJ granted the motion and the modification. In 2009 the miner died and the review board affirmed the modification, terminating benefits. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The modification proceeding should have been dismissed when the company ceased to be a real party in interest to serve as the proponent of modification, and the surety, which might have served as a real party in interest in support of modification, failed to seek timely intervention.

A suit by a school district employee, terminated after absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit remanded claims under the FMLA and for breach of contract. The parties entered a settlement agreement. After the superintendent for the district took his own life, the employee challenged the agreement and refused to sign the agreement. The district court dismissed the entire case and a motion for sanctions against the employee is pending. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The oral settlement, agreed-to in the presence of a magistrate, is valid; the fact that the employee was unaware that the superintendent was under investigation for child molestation does not amount to concealment of a fact material to this case. The employee's refusal to comply with court orders to sign the agreement left the court with little choice but to dismiss her claims, causing forfeiture of a substantial settlement.

When the plaintiff left the company, the parties entered an agreement about how the company would handle requests for references. In a suit alleging breach, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the company and awarded $173,232 in attorney fees. On remand a jury returned a general verdict that the company did not breach the agreement and the court awarded $522,527 attorney fees and costs and expenses in the amount of $40,493.64. On a second appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trial court properly allowed the company to argue waiver. Jury instructions concerning waiver, agency, breach, and damages were within the court's discretion. The award of fees was commercially reasonable and not inequitable.

Petitioner, a native of Syria, entered the U.S. on a fiance visa, but did not marry within 90 days. More than a year after her visa expired, she conceded removability and sought asylum as a Christian, subject to persecution in a Muslim country. The immigration judge denied the petition as untimely and found that she did not establish a clear probability that she would be persecuted; the BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. An alien must apply for asylum within one year of arrival unless the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either changed circumstances which materially affect eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a); courts have no jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's determination. The denial of the petition to withhold removal was supported by substantial evidence.