Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A 1998 amendment to the plan effectively penalized lump-sum distributees by voiding their future interest credits, in violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1054(c)(3). Participants who had received lump sum distributions filed suit in 2007. The district court held that the claims accrued when the plaintiffs received their distributions and that some claims were barred by the six-year state limitations period. The court ordered recalculation of the distributions for the other plaintiffs using a modified version of a method proposed by defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The distributions were the final step of a clear repudiation of the participantsâ entitlement to anything different and triggered the running of the limitations period; prior communications about the amendment were simply "hints." The plan fiduciaries were not entitled to deference with respect to the recalculation of benefits; the district court must determine how to calculate awards.

Defendant was charged with four counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), in connection with two burglaries. He was acquitted of the two charges stemming from the first burglary, but convicted of possessing the gun stolen in the second burglary and of possessing a magazine containing ammunition that was in his car when he was arrested. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly admitted testimony that defendant stated that anyone who informed on him would "end up in the ground" under the principle that a defendantâs attempts to intimidate witnesses are probative of consciousness of guilt. Testimony that defendant had jokingly pointed a handgun at a witness in the parking lot was probative of his possession of the gun. Restriction of cross-examination concerning a witness finding drugs in her car did not prevent questioning that might have revealed bias. The court properly gave the jury a constructive possession instruction.

Defendant was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), while subject to a domestic abuse injunction. On remand for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) because defendant had three convictions for violent felonies, the court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 360 months after hearing that he had sent an ex-girlfriend pipe bombs and abused other women. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant moved to vacate (28 U.S.C. 2255), claiming ineffective assistance and that he had located a discharge certificate restoring civil rights he lost with a conviction for reckless endangerment that would render the conviction uncountable for ACCA purposes. The government concluded that the certificate was fake and charged defendant with perjury and corrupt influence. Defendant moved to amend his motion, to contend that an escape conviction should not have been considered a violent felony and that treating reckless endangerment as a violent felony was improper, without reference to his original claims. The district court dismissed the original motion and the motion to amend and denied a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the motion to amend was not a successive petition over which the district court lacked jurisdiction.

Defendant was convicted of using a gun to intimidate a witness. 18 U.S.C. 1512, 924(c). Immediately before the sentencing hearing, the government produced statements placing that witness, the star witness against defendant, at the scene of a murder for which he was never charged. Defendant moved for a new trial, claiming a "Brady" violation in that the witness had a motive to tailor his testimony in the governmentâs favor. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit vacated. On remand, the court held a hearing and made findings concerning the belatedly disclosed evidence and concluded there was no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the jury had been apprised of the murder evidence during trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly found that evidence of additional sources of bias would have been cumulative of impeachment efforts and was immaterial for purposes of Brady. The evidence at issue was not significantly different from the other evidence used to impeach the witness, including charges of conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, drug trafficking, drug possession, distribution, and use of firearms in furtherance of drug endeavors.

A real estate broker received money for contracting work never completed, used false addresses in invoices from companies that did not exist, submitted loan applications with inflated incomes and account balances, and forged documentation. At trial on charges of wire fraud, aiding and abetting and conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 2, 371, and 1343), witnesses used the words "fraud" and "misrepresentation." The district court directed acquittal on aiding and abetting and conspiracy charges and sentenced defendant to 71 monthsâ imprisonment and payment of $2,360,914.51 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction. The testimony of the lay witnesses could have been helpful and did not amount to legal conclusions about intent or "de facto" instructions to the jury. Defendant would not have been acquitted had the court struck the sporadic, repeated use of two words with potential legal baggage in otherwise appropriate testimony. The court vacated the sentence. The district court erred in considering transactions underlying dismissed counts as relevant conduct without making sufficient findings regarding the number of victims and in ordering defendant to pay restitution to victims not clearly harmed by conduct in her counts of conviction.

Defendant, charged with attempted murder, encountered the victim at the courthouse, shot him, and was charged with a second attempt. At trial, defendant's attorney testified about talking to the victim on the day of the shooting. After the testimony, the judge questioned defendant, who indicated that he wanted to continue being represented by the attorney. After his conviction, defendant exhausted Illinois state court appeals and post-conviction remedies. A 2007 federal petition for habeas corpus was dismissed. The district court held that defendant did not raise the issue of waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel. Defendant filed a pro se motion, which was rejected as a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b), because it asserted new claims of errors in the conviction but was not based on new facts or law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, treating the conflict-free counsel issue as preserved. Defendant's attorney's performance did not likely fall below an objectively reasonable standard, did not confuse the jury, and did not prejudice the defense.

After a five-week trial, four defendants were convicted of various drug crimes. Although the government's star witness had testified to a defendant's participation in events that occurred in 2003,the defendant was in prison from 2002 until 2005. Defense counsel attempted to confront the witness with the dates of incarceration, but the government objected, stating, "Thatâs not true." More than a week later, the government stipulated to the dates of incarceration, but referred to the testimony in closing arguments. The district court granted a new trial, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record fully supported that the testimony was false; that the government was on notice, before the testimony, that there were problems and even relied on the testimony in closing arguments; and that the testimony was not "mere surplusage."

Plaintiffs' predecessors bought their Wisconsin land from the federal government in 1882-1884 and the railroad obtained an easement to cross the land by condemnation. The railroad abandoned the easement in 1980 by obtaining ICC permission and removing tracks. More than 20 years later, the county, wanting to construct a snowmobile trail, claimed that the land reverted to county ownership by virtue of a law enacted in 1852. The district court ruled in favor of the county. The Seventh Circuit reversed, first rejecting the county's claim that only the federal government had standing to challenge non-compliance with conditions of the 1852 law. When an easement is abandoned, rights ordinarily revert to the fee owner and, under the applicable laws, plaintiffs acquired any right-of-way a year and a day after the abandonment. The county was aware of the abandonment and considered buying the easement from the railroad at that time, but "waited a quarter of a century and then claimed a right to obtain the right of way for nothing."

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to removing and disposing of asbestos in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) while replacing an apartment building heating system. He claimed that he had not known that asbestos was harmful and reserved his right to appeal the meaning of "knowingly," as used in the statute. He was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, three years of supervised release, $12,765 in restitution, and a $100 special assessment fee. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that an "as applied" vagueness challenge to the statute was not a challenge to the court's jurisdiction and was barred by the plea. Having already admitted guilt of the substantive crime and affirmed the underlying facts of the conviction, the defendant cannot re-argue the facts on appeal and challenge the statute as vague in application.

The Clean Air Act prohibits national and state officials from making changes that cause air quality to deteriorate in parts of the country that have yet to attain the required standard, 42 U.S.C. 7410(l), 7515. In 2002 the EPA changed the rules that determine when polluters need permits to modify existing facilities and what restrictions they carry. The EPAâs models project that the new approach will have neutral or beneficial effects on aggregate emissions; environmental groups disagree and challenged the EPA's approval of Wisconsin's plan that implements the 2002 changes. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the petition. Noting that the same arguments have been made in the past, the court stated that, as in 2002 and 2005, the models supply substantial evidence for the EPAâs decision and show that it is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Opponents have no better evidence.