Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was outside his fenced yard when officers arrived to execute a warrant; a bystander yelled "police" and he ran. An officer used his taser and found a gun was found on the ground under the defendant. After accepting a conditional plea of guilty as felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922, 924), the defendant appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the search was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant and that there was no need to address whether the defendant was within the curtilage of his home. The affidavit was based on statements from two informants, with whom the officer had worked in the past, that they had seen cocaine in the house; the officer personally observed activity consistent with drug trafficking. The execution was reasonable; there was no need to announce because the bystander had done so.

After a fire at a discount mall, the insurer declined to defend negligence suits by tenants and sought a declaration that the losses fell within a policy exclusion for damage to "property in the care, custody, or control of the insured" because the mall was closed at the time of the fire and tenants did not have access. The district court entered an order to allow the insurer to appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. That the trial magistrate and parties referred to a final Rule 54(b) order does not make it so; there are numerous other claims pending, such as duty to indemnify and bad faith, the resolution of which is tied to the duty to defend issue.

Purchasers of common stock brought a class action alleging violations of federal securities laws; the case settled for $190,000,000. The same underlying facts resulted in an action by employees and former employees under ERISA; the company's 401(k) profit-sharing plan claimed a share of the settlement. The district court rejected the claim and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although individual plan participants did not purchase publicly-traded stock, the plan itself did so and is not excluded from the class definition of persons who purchased publicly traded common stock. The definition does, however, exclude any âaffiliateâ of the company and the plan is an affiliate. Plan administrators are either directors of the company or appointed by directors.

The city requires that potential mayoral candidates obtain 12,500 signatures from registered voters within 90 days in order to be placed on the ballot. The district court denied an injunction to prevent enforcement of the rule. The Seventh Circuit, noting that the election has passed, held that the issue is moot and does not fall within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception.

As part of the cleanup of PCBs in Wisconsin's Fox River, the EPA filed suit against de minimus potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9601). The district court approved a settlement and other PRPs appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the government's estimate of fault was supported by the record and accounted for all sources of PCB discharge. The district court properly approved the settlement before making a divisibility determination.

The doctor was convicted of conspiring to defraud the government and Medicare fraud (42 U.S.C. 1320a) for accepting a salary from the hospital in return for referring patients and sentenced to 72 months imprisonment followed by two years of supervision and to payment of $497,204 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not err in refusing to admit substantive reports from meetings or the minutes of the meetings, although it allowed the government to use the minutes to establish the doctor's non-attendance at meetings. The doctor was allowed to argue that certain reports concerning his services were made and tendered during the meetings. Upholding a jury instruction, the court stated that nothing in the Medicare fraud statute implies that only the primary motivation for remuneration is to be considered and that the conviction is valid even if the payments were, in part, compensation for services. Findings concerning the level of loss supported the sentence.

The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) ordered the company to remedy certain conditions at its solid waste dump in Goshen; the company moved the operation to Elkhart. Following complaints, IDEM found violations and entered into an agreement with the company. The company did not honor the agreement and IDEM filed suit. After their attempt to intervene in the state court suit was limited, residents filed suit under the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act (RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6901), specifically differentiating their claims from those in the state suit. IDEM subsequently filed a second state suit. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that, excepting violation claims concerning âCâ grade waste that were part of the first IDEM lawsuit, the plaintiffs met the requirements of RCRA for bringing a citizen suit, so abstention should not apply to deny them a right created by Congress. While a citizens' violation action may not âbe commencedâ if the EPA or state agency âhas commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action,â the citizens' suit went beyond the scope of the first IDEM suit. The RCRA suit complements and does not conflict with state efforts.

The petitioner, born in Germany in 1957, was admitted as a lawful permanent U.S. resident in 1961. In 1990 he entered a plea of guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. He was discharged from parole in 1993; 14 years later the Department of Homeland Security issued a notice to appear. An immigration judge found the petitioner ineligible for waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(c) and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. A waiver must be denied if the alien is deportable on a ground that does not have a statutory counterpart in section 212 of the Act; an aggravated felony involving sexual abuse of a minor has no statutory counterpart. It is irrelevant that he could have been charged differently and may have believed, when he entered his plea, that he was eligible for waiver. The court rejected due process and equal protection arguments.

The defendant, convicted of child molestation in 1990, failed to register as a sex offender when he was released from prison in 1994, although registration was required by Indiana law. When he was released from prison in 2004, following conviction for theft, he signed an acknowledgement of the requirement and registered. He re-registered when he moved his residence within Indiana, but failed to notify either Indiana or South Carolina authorities when he moved to South Carolina, in violation of the 2006 Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2251. The defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty and was sentenced to 27 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution. Although parts of the state registration law have been declared invalid, the defendant was required to register in South Carolina. The Act only punishes conduct occurring after its enactment; it simply creates new legal obligations.

The defendant, convicted of financial crimes involving his operation of an insurance brokerage, was sentenced to serve 121 months, ordered to pay $841,527 in restitution, and (following a remand) ordered to forfeit $15 million plus his interest in the racketeering enterprise. In 2010 the Supreme Court decided Skilling v. United States, limiting the "honest services fraud" theory to apply only to a defendant involved in either bribery or a kickback scheme. The defendant appealed the inclusion of "honest services" fraud in jury instructions at his trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the jury would have convicted the defendant without the instruction, but remanded for consideration of whether an honest services conviction affected sentencing.