Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff claimed gender discrimination and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, retaliation in violation of Title VII, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, retaliatory discharge in violation of Illinois law, and violations of the Fair Labor Standards Acts, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1. A jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages, overtime damages, and lost wages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time of filing. In addition to claims based on sexual harassment, the complaint alleged that plaintiff was fired for filing a police report concerning the assault. Discharge for filing a police report is an Illinois common law tort without reference to the duties created by the state Human Rights Act, and therefore not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state Human Rights Commission.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of possession with the intent to distribute less than five grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base and two counts of distributing less than five grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base and his above-guidelines sentence of 180 months incarceration. The district court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's 2005 conviction for cocaine possession; there was no unfair prejudice and the 2005 conviction was sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be relevant. The court properly admitted, with an appropriate limiting instruction, evidence of the crimes that had led a police officer-witness to believe defendant was eligible for a career offender sentencing enhancement. The use of the term "career offender" did not violate his substantive rights.

A citizen of Illinois brought suit against several non-Illinois companies and one Illinois company, alleging failure to warn with respect to side effects of Yazmin birth control pills. The defendants removed to federal court, claiming improper joinder. The district court dismissed the Illinois pharmacy owner, restoring diversity, and dismissed the suit after the plaintiff abandoned the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the "learned intermediary doctrine" and reasoning that the pharmacy had no duty to warn, absent knowledge of a particular susceptibility. The "common defense" exception does not serve as a basis for remand because the plaintiff alleged that the other defendants concealed information.

After a stake-out, officers pulled defendant's car over in Indiana for traffic violations and found a loaded handgun registered in Illinois. An inventory search following arrest for possession of a handgun without the requisite license revealed bags of crack cocaine. Defendant retained counsel (Wiener), who never filed an appearance; Wiener asked Oppenheimer, unknown to the defendant, to serve as secondary counsel. Oppenheimer missed several deadlines, including one for a motion to suppress. Continuances were denied; defendant attempted to fire Oppenheimer and informed the court of his dissatisfaction. The court denied a continuance to retain a new attorney, so Oppenheimer represented defendant at trial. Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell cocaine and possession of a firearm used in drug trafficking and sentenced to 180 months incarceration. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choosing. The court acted arbitrarily in not considering all the circumstances; although Oppenheimer was at fault with respect to many late filings, there was no evidence that the defendant was attempting to delay the trial.

An Indiana medical transport company executed a software licensing agreement with the plaintiff to replace its dispatch and billing software. The software did not work as the Indiana company expected, so it attempted to exercise an option to terminate the agreement. Plaintiff sued and the Indiana company counter-claimed fraud. A magistrate dismissed the fraud claim and awarded plaintiff damages on the breach of contract claim and attorney's fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decisions on fraud and breach of contract, but vacated the damages award and remanded. A party is not required to disclaim every departure from earlier proposals made during negotiations to avoid liability for fraud; there was no termination option. The plaintiff terminated the contract by locking the software, so the computation of damages was incorrect. The court ordered reconsideration of attorney fees, noting that the contract language did not appear to allow fees for defense of the fraud claim.

The wife of a deceased coal miner argued that her claim for black lung benefits should be remanded to the administrative law judge (ALJ) because sect. 1556 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010) revived a presumption under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901, that was not available when the ALJ denied benefits. The presumption states that if a miner was employed for 15 years or more in underground coal mines and other evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, there is a rebuttable presumption that such miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, that his death was due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his death he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. The presumption did not apply to the miner's claim, filed in 2001. The Seventh Circuit remanded, rejecting the coal company's arguments concerning due, process, retroactive application and unconstitutional taking.

The company filed an objection to a flyer, distributed on the eve of an election. The hearing officer found that the flyer contained a misrepresentation of the law, but did not interfere with the employeesâ ability to make a free choice and recommended that the Board certify the union. After the union was certified it filed a claim under 29 U.S.C. 158 (a). The Board issued an order requiring the company to bargain. The Seventh Circuit granted an order of enforcement. The board correctly certified the union; findings that the flyer was not a forgery and that its misleading language did not justify setting aside the election were supported by substantial evidence.

A default judgment entered against the defendant, for failure to pay loans from the Department of Agriculture. On the day before property was to be sold at auction, the defendant filed a bankruptcy petition. The judge lifted the stay. The $322,000 proceeds from the sale were inadequate to pay the debt and the government has a deficiency judgment. The trial court denied a motion to set aside the sale and a request for an opportunity to redeem. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the property has transferred to the buyers, who are not parties to the litigation, and their interests are secure, the case is not moot. The sale price, which was below the $513,000 appraisal price, did not "shock the conscience" so as to be invalid under Wisconsin law.

In 1995 the city gave an examination for positions in its fire department and rated applicants on a scale between highly qualified and not qualified, based on scores. "Qualified" applicants were told that they were unlikely to be hired. From 1996 through 2001, the city hired random batches from the well-qualified pool. In 1997 a person in the qualified pool filed a charge of discrimination, claiming disparate impact on African-American applicants (42 U.S.C. 2000(e)). After receiving right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, applicants filed a class action in 1998. After a trial, the court rejected a business necessity defense and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On remand, after the Supreme Court held that most of the claims were timely, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city conceded that the cut-off score in the ranking system had a disparate impact, so each "batch" hiring had a similar impact. While hiring according to a list, perhaps hiring highest scorers first, might have served a business necessity, the random selection of batches amounted to repeated "use" of a tool that created disparate impact.

The tenant appealed an eviction order. The appeals court reversed, finding that the management company had not given notice required by state law. One member of the state appellate panel opined that the company violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The tenant sought damages in federal court. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the management company is not a debt collector under the Act. The company is an agent of the building owner and "obtained" an interest a debt when it was given the right to collect the tenant's rent, before she fell behind on payments.