Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Dr. Alan Braid, a Texas OB/GYN, admitted in a Washington Post editorial to performing an abortion in violation of the Texas Heartbeat Act (S.B. 8). This led to three individuals from different states filing lawsuits against him under the Act's citizen-suit enforcement provision, seeking at least $10,000 in statutory damages. Facing potential duplicative liability, Dr. Braid filed a federal interpleader action in Illinois, seeking to join the claimants in a single suit and also sought declaratory relief to declare S.B. 8 unconstitutional.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Dr. Braid’s suit, citing the Wilton-Brillhart abstention doctrine due to the existence of parallel state-court proceedings. The court reasoned that the Texas state courts were better suited to resolve the issues, particularly given the unique enforcement mechanism of S.B. 8. The district court also questioned whether Dr. Braid had a reasonable fear of double liability but ultimately found that it had jurisdiction before deciding to abstain.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the district court had jurisdiction over the interpleader action but concluded that abstention was appropriate under the Colorado River doctrine, which allows federal courts to defer to parallel state-court proceedings in exceptional cases. The court emphasized that the Texas courts were better positioned to resolve the complex state-law issues and that abstention would avoid piecemeal litigation and conflicting judgments. The court also noted that the Texas courts could adequately protect Dr. Braid’s rights and that the federal suit appeared to be an attempt to avoid the state-court system. View "Braid v. Stilley" on Justia Law

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Best Inn Midwest, LLC (Best Inn) owned and operated a hotel in Indianapolis, Indiana, which faced numerous issues, including health code violations and criminal activity. In 2017, Best Inn purchased a commercial property insurance policy from Ohio Security Insurance Company (Ohio Security). The policy excluded coverage for vandalism if the building was vacant for sixty consecutive days or more. Best Inn filed a claim for vandalism to air conditioning units on the hotel’s roof, which Ohio Security denied, citing vacancy. Ohio Security requested information about the hotel's occupancy, which Best Inn failed to provide, leading Ohio Security to file a suit seeking a declaration that the policy did not cover the claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted Ohio Security's motion for summary judgment on Best Inn's counterclaim for bad faith. The court found that Best Inn had failed to comply with discovery requests and court orders, leading to a sanction declaring the hotel vacant during the relevant period. This finding was based on Best Inn's repeated failure to provide requested documents and information, despite numerous attempts by Ohio Security to obtain them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions and declaring the hotel vacant. This declaration meant that the insurance policy did not cover the vandalism claim, and thus, Ohio Security was entitled to summary judgment on Best Inn's bad faith counterclaim. The appellate court concluded that the sanctions were appropriate and proportionate to Best Inn's conduct, and there were no remaining disputes as to any material fact. View "Ohio Security Insurance Company v Best Inn Midwest, LLC" on Justia Law

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Pierre Robinson and Derrick Swanson, members of the Evans Mob gang in Chicago, were charged with murdering rival gang members to enhance their status within the gang. Swanson entered a cooperation agreement and pleaded guilty, while Robinson went to trial. At Robinson's trial, his cousin Anise, who had previously identified him as the shooter in a recorded statement and grand jury testimony, claimed memory loss and could not identify him in court. The district court admitted her prior statements as evidence. Robinson was convicted by a jury after a four-day trial.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Robinson was convicted of murder in aid of racketeering and sentenced to life in prison. Swanson, who cooperated with the government, received a 30-year sentence and five years of supervised release. Swanson's sentence included a condition allowing probation officers to search his workplace, which he contested as inconsistent with the oral pronouncement of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Robinson argued that the admission of Anise's statements violated his Confrontation Clause rights and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court held that Robinson had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Anise, thus satisfying the Confrontation Clause. The court also found that Robinson's counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Swanson's challenge to his supervised release condition was rejected, as the written judgment did not contradict the oral pronouncement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgments. View "United States v. Swanson" on Justia Law

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A minor, B.D., through his guardian, sued Samsung SDI, a South Korean battery manufacturer, after one of its batteries exploded in his pocket in Indiana. Samsung SDI moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the district court granted. The court found that Samsung SDI had not purposefully availed itself of the Indiana forum through sales of individual batteries, as the battery was purchased through an unauthorized transaction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially denied Samsung SDI's motion to dismiss, concluding that B.D. made a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. However, upon remand for further jurisdictional discovery, the district court granted Samsung SDI's renewed motion to dismiss, reasoning that B.D. failed to show that Samsung SDI purposefully availed itself of the Indiana forum.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Samsung SDI purposefully availed itself of the Indiana forum through an end-product stream of commerce by selling batteries to sophisticated customers, who then incorporated them into products available in Indiana. However, the court found a disconnect between Samsung SDI's purposeful contacts with Indiana and B.D.'s lawsuit, which stemmed from a consumer purchase of an individual battery. This disconnect precluded the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Samsung SDI. The court emphasized that the unilateral actions of third parties made individual batteries available to Indiana consumers, not Samsung SDI's deliberate actions. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "B.D. v. Samsung SDI Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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Hammond Power Solutions, a manufacturer of electric transformers, purchased commercial liability insurance policies from National Union Fire Insurance Company and Illinois National Insurance Company from 2017 to 2022. These policies included an exclusion for claims arising from "radioactive matter or any form of radiation." In 2022, two individuals sued Hammond Power, alleging harm from electromagnetic field (EMF) radiation emitted by transformers near their apartment. The central issue was whether the insurers were obligated to defend and indemnify Hammond Power in this lawsuit.The case was initially filed in a New York state court, and Hammond Power requested defense and indemnification from the insurers, who denied coverage based on the radiation exclusion. Hammond Power then filed a suit in state court seeking a declaration of coverage and alleging breaches of duty to defend and good faith. The case was removed to the Eastern District of Wisconsin, where both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers, concluding that the exclusion for "any form of radiation" unambiguously included EMF radiation, thus precluding coverage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The court affirmed the district court's ruling, agreeing that the exclusion's language was unambiguous and applied to EMF radiation. The court held that the insurers had no duty to defend or indemnify Hammond Power for the claims arising from EMF radiation exposure, as the policy clearly excluded coverage for any form of radiation. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hammond Power Solutions, Inc. v National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg" on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law
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Lisa Johnson and Gale Miller Anderson, former Amazon warehouse employees, alleged that Amazon violated federal and Illinois wage laws by not compensating them for time spent in mandatory pre-shift COVID-19 screenings. These screenings, which included temperature checks and symptom questions, took 10-15 minutes on average and were required before employees could clock in for their shifts. Johnson and Miller Anderson argued that this time should be compensable as it was necessary for their work and primarily benefited Amazon by ensuring a safe workplace during the pandemic.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed their claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL). The court found that the FLSA claims were barred by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA), which excludes certain pre-shift activities from compensable time. The district court also concluded that the IMWL claims failed because it assumed the IMWL incorporated the PPA’s exclusions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the IMWL incorporates the PPA’s exclusions for compensable time. The court noted the lack of Illinois state court decisions directly addressing this issue and found the arguments from both parties plausible. To resolve this important and unsettled question of state law, the Seventh Circuit decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court, seeking a definitive answer on whether the IMWL includes the PPA’s limitations on pre-shift compensation. The court stayed further proceedings pending the Illinois Supreme Court's decision. View "Johnson v. Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

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James Reilly, a deputy in the Will County Sheriff's Office, alleged that his employer and Sheriff Michael Kelley retaliated against him for criticizing Kelley during a 2018 election campaign by not promoting him to sergeant. Reilly filed his complaint over two years after his eligibility for promotion expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was untimely. The district court agreed, granted the motion to dismiss, and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Reilly then requested the district court to set aside its judgment and allow him to amend his complaint, but the court denied this request, applying a heightened standard and requiring extraordinary circumstances for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had mistakenly applied a heightened standard to Reilly's Rule 59(e) motion instead of the liberal standard for amending pleadings. The appellate court concluded that Reilly's proposed amended complaint stated a plausible claim for relief and that he had not pled himself out of court based on the statute of limitations. The court noted that Reilly's claim could not be conclusively determined as time-barred at this stage and that the defendants could raise the statute of limitations defense later in the case on a more complete factual record.The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Reilly to proceed with his amended complaint. View "Reilly v Will County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

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Several rail carriers challenged a Final Rule issued by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) that allows a railway shipper or receiver to request a "reciprocal switching agreement." This agreement requires a rail carrier with a monopoly over a certain rail line to compete with another carrier for specific rail traffic. The carriers argued that the Final Rule exceeded the STB's statutory authority under the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, which grants the agency authority to prescribe reciprocal switching. They also contended that aspects of the Final Rule exceeded the Board's ancillary powers and were arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the record.The STB issued the Final Rule after a notice-and-comment period, aiming to address service performance issues of Class I rail carriers, which were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Board held a hearing in April 2022 and required several Class I carriers to submit service recovery plans. Subsequently, the Board proposed new regulations to improve service by increasing competition, leading to the Final Rule. The rule establishes procedures for shippers or receivers to request reciprocal switching agreements if the incumbent carrier fails to meet certain performance standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Final Rule exceeded the STB's statutory authority because it did not require a finding of inadequate service by the incumbent carrier before prescribing a reciprocal switching agreement. The court emphasized that the Staggers Rail Act requires such a finding to determine that a reciprocal switching agreement is "in the public interest." Consequently, the court granted the petition, vacated the Final Rule, and remanded the case to the STB for further proceedings. View "Grand Trunk Corporation v STB" on Justia Law

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David Bourke, a disabled employee of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), was granted a reserved parking space near his workplace to accommodate his disability. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the VA implemented new measures that required employees to enter through designated entrances for screening, which made Bourke's reserved parking spot unusable. The VA offered Bourke an alternate parking space near Building 1, which included a secluded storage area for his mobility scooter. Bourke declined this accommodation, fearing his scooter could be stolen, and sued the VA under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the VA. The court found that the alternate accommodation offered by the VA was reasonable and that there was no significant risk of Bourke's scooter being stolen. The court also rejected Bourke's argument that the VA could not alter his accommodation in response to changing circumstances, such as the pandemic.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the VA's alternate accommodation was reasonable, as it allowed Bourke to perform his job functions while complying with COVID-19 prevention measures. The court noted that an employer is not required to provide the specific accommodation requested by an employee, but rather a reasonable one. The court also found that the VA's actions did not violate the Rehabilitation Act, as the alternate accommodation was sufficient to meet Bourke's needs during the pandemic. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the VA. View "Bourke v. Collins" on Justia Law

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Michael Lairy petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that he did not qualify for the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) mandatory 15-year sentence and that his counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue. The government did not address the merits of Lairy’s claims but argued that they were raised after the statute of limitations had expired. The district court denied his petition, rejecting Lairy’s arguments that the government forfeited the statute of limitations defense, that he was actually innocent of ACCA, and that he was entitled to equitable tolling.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held that Lairy’s petition was untimely and that the government did not forfeit the statute of limitations defense. The court also found that Lairy’s claim of actual innocence did not apply because it was a legal, not factual, argument. Additionally, the court denied Lairy’s request for equitable tolling without conducting an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court’s evaluation of forfeiture and actual innocence. However, the appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting equitable tolling without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of the petition and remanded the case to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling. The court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "Lairy v. United States" on Justia Law