Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Technical Security Integration, Inc. ("Technical Security") and EPI Technologies, Inc. ("EPI") entered into a Sales Representative Agreement in which EPI agreed to sell Technical Security's products in exchange for commissions. The agreement included a clause requiring disputes to be submitted to mediation, and if mediation failed within 180 days, the prevailing party in any subsequent litigation would be entitled to attorneys' fees. A dispute arose, and EPI demanded mediation, but Technical Security did not respond promptly. EPI then sued Technical Security in state court, where it mostly lost. Technical Security sought attorneys' fees in federal court, which the district court denied, ordering each party to pay its own fees.The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, granted partial summary judgment for Technical Security on the commissions dispute. EPI's remaining claims were dismissed, and the state court denied Technical Security's motion for attorneys' fees, citing a factual dispute. Technical Security then demanded mediation to resolve the fee dispute, but EPI did not respond. Technical Security subsequently sued EPI in the Northern District of Illinois, seeking fees and costs from the state court litigation. The district court granted summary judgment for EPI, concluding that Technical Security had delayed the mediation process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the agreement did not specify a timeline for mediation demands or responses, creating ambiguity. The court held that the district court erred in faulting Technical Security for preventing mediation without considering whether EPI's actions were reasonable. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment for EPI and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the reasonableness of each party's conduct regarding the mediation timeline. View "Technical Security Integration, Inc. v EPI Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

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Lorenzo Johnson ran an online child-pornography scheme, inducing financially desperate women to send him sexually explicit photos of their young children by promising them money. Law enforcement identified Johnson's IP address, social media accounts, and cellphone, leading to a search of his home where they found his phone containing evidence of the crimes and a handgun. Johnson confessed to key details of his scheme in two recorded interviews with FBI agents. A jury found him guilty of conspiracy to produce child pornography, distribution of child pornography, and unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, handled the initial trial. Johnson's requests for new counsel were denied by both the magistrate judge and the district judge. The district judge also denied Johnson's motion for a new trial based on a late disclosure of potential Brady/Giglio evidence, which involved a romantic relationship between two FBI agents. Additionally, Johnson argued that the judge made an improper factual finding at sentencing regarding his causal role in the suicide of one of the women involved in his scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions, holding that the magistrate and district judges appropriately exercised their discretion in denying Johnson’s requests for new counsel. The district judge properly denied Johnson’s motion for a new trial because it was undeveloped and the new information was deemed immaterial. Lastly, the court found that the judge’s comments at sentencing about the co-conspirator’s suicide were part of a holistic assessment of the seriousness of the crimes and did not amount to a factual finding that Johnson was causally responsible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings and Johnson's conviction and sentence. View "U.S. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Bellin Memorial Hospital hired Kinsey & Kinsey, Inc. to upgrade its computer software. Kinsey failed to implement the agreed-upon software, leading Bellin to sue Kinsey in Wisconsin state court for breach of contract and other claims. Bellin also sued Kinsey’s president and a senior product consultant. Kinsey’s insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, provided a defense under a professional liability insurance policy. During the trial, Bellin and Philadelphia Indemnity entered into a partial settlement, resolving some claims and specifying the conditions under which Bellin could collect damages from Kinsey. Bellin prevailed at trial and was awarded damages.The Wisconsin circuit court ruled that the limited liability provision in the Agreement did not apply due to Kinsey’s material breach. The court granted a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim against Kinsey, leaving the question of damages to the jury. The jury awarded Bellin $1.39 million, later reduced to $750,000 plus costs. The jury found Kinsey and its president not liable for intentional misrepresentation and misleading representation.Philadelphia Indemnity filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaration that the state court’s judgment was covered by the insurance policy and that the $1 million settlement offset the $750,000 judgment. The district court ruled for Bellin, concluding that the state court judgment was not covered by the insurance policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the insurance policy covered only negligent acts, errors, or omissions, and the state court’s judgment was based on a breach of contract, not negligence. Therefore, the $1 million set-off provision did not apply, and Bellin could recover the full amount of the judgment. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v Kinsey & Kinsey, Inc." on Justia Law

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Clarence Lewis, an inmate at Hill Correctional Center, sued various medical staff members, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his health issues, violating the Eighth Amendment. Lewis claimed misdiagnosis and mistreatment of diabetes, COPD, irritable bowel syndrome, and Hepatitis C. He also contended that his grievance about a delay in diabetes medication was not properly addressed.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied Lewis's motions for recruited counsel, stating he could represent himself and obtain relevant documents. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Sood, Dr. Bautista, Nurse Vollmer, and Administrator Lindor, concluding no reasonable juror could find deliberate indifference. The court also granted summary judgment for Dr. Paul, citing claim splitting due to a similar prior lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Dr. Sood, Dr. Bautista, Nurse Vollmer, and Administrator Lindor, finding no reasonable likelihood that recruited counsel would have changed the outcome. The court noted that Lewis's disagreement with his diagnoses and treatments did not constitute deliberate indifference. As for Administrator Lindor, her limited role and the lack of harm from the medication delay further supported the judgment.However, the court vacated the judgment in favor of Dr. Paul, agreeing with Lewis that the district court's application of claim splitting was erroneous. Dr. Paul had raised this defense too late, effectively acquiescing to the claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding Dr. Paul, with the district court advised to reconsider Lewis's request for recruited counsel if the claim proceeds to trial. View "Lewis v Sood" on Justia Law

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Michael Gifford, a beneficiary of the Operating Engineers 139 Health Benefit Fund, sought reimbursement for out-of-network medical expenses incurred during his treatment for a stroke and subsequent brain aneurysm surgery. The Fund denied the claim, stating the services were not provided in an emergency and were not medically necessary. Gifford's wife, Suzanne, appealed the decision, but the Fund upheld the denial after consulting two independent medical reviewers who concluded the surgery was not an emergency and not medically necessary.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the Fund's motion for summary judgment, agreeing that the Fund's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. The court also granted the Fund's motion for a protective order, limiting discovery to the administrative record. The Estate of Michael Gifford, represented by Suzanne, appealed the decision, arguing that the Fund failed to conduct a full and fair review by not considering a surgical note from Dr. Ahuja, which was not included in the administrative record.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the Fund's denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, as the Fund reasonably relied on the independent medical reviewers' reports and the administrative record. The court also found that the Fund was not required to seek out additional information not provided by the claimant. Additionally, the court upheld the district court's grant of the protective order, finding no abuse of discretion in limiting discovery to the administrative record. The court concluded that the Fund provided a full and fair review of the claim, and the denial of benefits was reasonable. View "Estate of Gifford v Operating Engineers 139 Health Benefit Fund" on Justia Law

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Taibian Harris and his cousin Treveon Smith robbed a cell phone store in South Bend during a blizzard. Harris acted as the getaway driver while Smith stole items from the store. Unbeknownst to them, one of the stolen phones was a bait phone that sent GPS signals to the police. The police tracked them to a gas station, and after a brief encounter, Harris led the police on a high-speed chase through snowy, icy streets, running stop signs and red lights. The chase ended when Harris collided with a police car. Both were apprehended after attempting to flee on foot.Harris and Smith were indicted for robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and both pled guilty. The Presentence Investigation Report recommended a two-level enhancement for Harris for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury while fleeing law enforcement. Harris objected, arguing there was no reliable evidence of reckless driving and that no police officer was in actual pursuit. The government called Smith as a witness, who described the high-speed chase in detail. The district court credited Smith’s testimony and overruled Harris’s objection, applying the two-level enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Harris drove recklessly, as his actions met the recklessness standard under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. The court also found that Harris was knowingly fleeing from law enforcement, as evidenced by his erratic driving and attempts to evade police. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the two-level enhancement to Harris’s sentence. View "United States v Harris" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Linda Thompson filed a putative class action against the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (the "Exchange") in Illinois state court, alleging that the Exchange printed her credit card’s expiration date on purchase receipts, violating the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA). The Exchange removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which allows federal agencies to remove cases to federal court. Thompson moved to remand the case to state court, arguing lack of Article III standing, while the Exchange moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied Thompson’s motion to remand and granted the Exchange’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the Exchange, as a federal entity, could remove the case without asserting a colorable federal defense and had an absolute right to litigate in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the Exchange did not need to present a federal defense to remove the case. However, it found that the district court erred in dismissing the suit. The Seventh Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), when a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand the case to state court. The court noted that Thompson’s lack of Article III standing did not preclude state court jurisdiction, as state courts are not bound by Article III constraints. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to remand it to state court. View "Thompson v Army and Air Force Exchange Service" on Justia Law

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Correctional officers at an Illinois state prison brutally beat inmate Larry Earvin, who later died from his injuries. Todd Sheffler and two others were charged with various federal crimes related to the killing and its cover-up. After a mistrial, Sheffler was retried and found guilty by a jury.In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Sheffler was convicted on five counts, including conspiracy to deprive civil rights, deprivation of civil rights, conspiracy to engage in misleading conduct, obstruction-falsification of documents, and obstruction-misleading conduct. Sheffler argued that there was no reasonable likelihood that his incident report and interview with state police would reach federal officials, challenging his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1519. He also contended that the district court erred in ruling he breached a proffer agreement and allowed a biased juror to sit on his trial. Additionally, he claimed prosecutorial misconduct during the rebuttal closing argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported Sheffler’s convictions, as it was reasonably likely that his false statements would reach federal officials, given the severity of the crime and the cooperation between state and federal authorities. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Sheffler breached the proffer agreement by making false statements during FBI interviews. Furthermore, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in handling the juror bias issue or in denying Sheffler’s motion for a new trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Sheffler’s motion for a new trial and upheld his convictions. View "USA v Sheffler" on Justia Law

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William Manery filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Indiana state court against Lieutenant Jason Lee and other defendants, alleging that Lee used excessive deadly force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Lee moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity, but the district court denied the motion, citing genuine issues of material fact.The district court acknowledged that Lee knew Manery was wanted for serious crimes and believed he was armed and had threatened "suicide by cop." However, the court found that factual disputes about the threat level at the time Lee fired his weapon precluded summary judgment. The court assumed, without deciding, that Lee might have violated Manery's constitutional rights but concluded that the issue of whether the law was clearly established was intertwined with these factual disputes, necessitating a jury's resolution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that Lee accepted Manery's version of the facts for the appeal. The court emphasized that qualified immunity protects officers unless they violate clearly established rights that a reasonable officer would know. The court found that the cases cited by Manery did not clearly establish that Lee's use of deadly force was unreasonable under the specific circumstances. Given the rapidly evolving situation and the information Lee had, the court concluded that a reasonable officer in Lee's position would not have known that using deadly force was a violation of Manery's rights.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Manery v Lee" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Rights
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Edward Bachner filed fraudulent tax returns for three years, inflating his income and tax withholdings to claim unwarranted refunds. The IRS detected the fraud and imposed civil penalties. Bachner petitioned the United States Tax Court for a redetermination but did not attend the trial, which resulted in the Tax Court sustaining the penalties. Bachner and his wife, Rebecca, who filed joint tax returns, appealed the Tax Court’s judgment.The Tax Court rejected the Bachners' arguments that the IRS’s notice of deficiency was invalid, that the limitations period had expired, and that the IRS had ignored certain procedures. The court also dismissed their claim that they had not underpaid taxes, as well as their assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Tax Court accepted the IRS’s evidence and sustained the fraud penalties against Edward.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Edward had standing to appeal but dismissed Rebecca from the appeal due to her innocent-spouse status. The court held that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to review the IRS’s determinations based on the penalties listed in the notice. The court also upheld the Tax Court’s imposition of fraud penalties, explaining that Edward’s fraudulent overstatement of withholdings constituted an underpayment of taxes under the relevant Treasury Regulations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision to sustain the penalties against Edward and dismissed Rebecca from the appeal. View "Bachner v CIR" on Justia Law

Posted in: Tax Law