Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three individuals carried out an armed robbery targeting customers at a Chicago convenience store, J&J Food and Grocery. The incident involved robbing a person just outside the store’s vestibule and several customers inside, all at gunpoint. The store, which operates around the clock but limits access to a vestibule in the evenings, temporarily shut down after the robbery for police investigation, resulting in lost business for approximately thirty to sixty minutes. The robbers did not attempt to steal from the store itself or make demands of its employees.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over the trial and ultimately convicted the defendants of Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 924(c)(1)(A). The defendants moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that their actions did not affect interstate commerce as required by the Hobbs Act, since they robbed customers rather than the store. The district court denied this motion, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the convictions de novo and affirmed. The court held that the temporary closure of J&J due to the robbery constituted at least a “realistic probability” of affecting interstate commerce, satisfying the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional requirement. The court also rejected the defendants’ claim that the jury could have convicted them solely based on robbing the customer outside the store, finding that the jury was not presented with separate legal theories for inside and outside robberies. As the Hobbs Act convictions were upheld, the related firearm convictions were affirmed as well. View "United States v. Demus" on Justia Law

The defendant traveled multiple times to the Philippines, where, according to the government, he solicited minors between the ages of eleven and seventeen to perform sex acts in exchange for money, gifts, and food. He was indicted on seven counts of traveling in foreign commerce to engage in sexual activity with minors and seven counts of sex trafficking of a minor. During his change-of-plea hearing, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of sex trafficking of a minor, confirming that he understood the plea agreement, was satisfied with his counsel, and entered the plea voluntarily. Afterward, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he felt pressured to sign the agreement the morning of the hearing and that taking the anxiety medication Clonazepam had impaired his cognition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw. The district court found that neither the plea colloquy nor the evidence supported the defendant’s claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary; it relied on his in-court statements, his demeanor, and written admissions in the plea agreement. The district court denied the motion to withdraw his plea.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion. It found the defendant’s own statements and conduct during the plea hearing, as well as the signed plea agreement, adequately demonstrated that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The court also determined that the defendant’s evidence regarding the effects of his medication was insufficient to justify withdrawal. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Stenson" on Justia Law

Three employees at different Illinois schools declined to receive the COVID-19 vaccine, citing religious beliefs, after the Illinois Governor issued an Executive Order requiring school employees to either vaccinate or undergo weekly testing. The schools, in compliance with the Executive Order and state agency guidance, offered weekly testing as an accommodation for those claiming a religious exemption to vaccination. The employees refused the testing, asserting that submitting to it violated their moral consciences, and were either placed on unpaid leave or terminated.The employees filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Emergency Use Authorization Act, and the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act. Each employer moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court dismissed the Title VII claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to identify a religious belief that was violated by the testing requirement. The court also dismissed the Emergency Use Authorization Act claim, holding there was no private right of action, and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. The employees appealed only the dismissal of their Title VII claim and, for the first time on appeal, raised a claim under the Illinois Public Health Code.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Title VII because they did not allege a religious objection to testing; their objections were based on personal moral conscience, not religious belief. The court further held that Title VII does not require an employer to accommodate religious beliefs when doing so would cause the employer to violate the law. The court also found that any argument under the Illinois Public Health Code was waived. View "Bowlin v. Board of Directors, Judah Christian School" on Justia Law

Two individuals each purchased a Mercedes-Benz vehicle that included a subscription-based system called “mbrace,” which provided various features through a 3G wireless network. When newer cellular technology rendered the 3G-dependent system obsolete, both customers asked their dealerships to replace the outdated system at no charge, but their requests were denied. Subsequently, they filed a class action lawsuit against Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Mercedes-Benz Group AG, asserting claims including breach of warranty under federal and state law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, considered Mercedes’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, based on the arbitration provision within the mbrace Terms of Service. The district court found in favor of Mercedes, concluding that the plaintiffs were bound by an agreement to arbitrate their claims. Since neither party requested a stay, the court dismissed the case without prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they had not agreed to arbitrate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Applying Illinois contract law, the appellate court determined that Mercedes had provided sufficient notice of the arbitration agreement to the plaintiffs through the subscription activation process and follow-up communications. The court found that Mercedes established a rebuttable presumption of notice, which the plaintiffs failed to overcome, as they only stated they did not recall receiving such notice, rather than expressly denying it. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had assented to the agreement by subscribing to the service and thus were bound by the arbitration provision. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Jim Rose v Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of Indiana University, who began as an intern and was promoted to an online instructional designer, was terminated after sending a series of emails to senior university officials. These emails escalated an internal funding issue that had already been resolved by her supervisor and included accusations of mismanagement against her supervisors. Her conduct was considered insubordinate and a breach of professional protocol. The employee, who had taken multiple periods of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and requested accommodations for mental-health conditions, alleged that her termination was in retaliation for exercising her statutory rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the university and individual defendants on all claims, concluding that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find in the employee’s favor. The plaintiff appealed but pressed only her retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the FMLA, arguing that the district court applied the wrong causation standard and that the evidence should allow her claims to proceed to trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and determined that, although the district court applied an incorrect “sole” causation standard rather than the proper “but-for” standard for retaliation claims, the outcome remained the same under the correct law. The appellate court held that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff’s protected activity caused her termination. The court found that the termination was based on unprofessional conduct, not on her FMLA leave or requests for accommodation. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. View "Shirk v. Trustees of Indiana University" on Justia Law

A fatal collision occurred near Sycamore, Illinois, when a tractor-trailer driven by an agent of Deerpass Farms Trucking, LLC-II struck a vehicle operated by Patrick J. Brennan, resulting in Brennan’s death. Deerpass Trucking, an interstate motor carrier, leased the tractor from Deerpass Farms and hauled a trailer owned by Conserv FS, Inc. Both the tractor and trailer were covered by commercial auto liability insurance: Great West Casualty insured the tractor, and Nationwide Agribusiness insured the trailer. After Brennan’s estate filed a wrongful death suit in state court, both insurers agreed their policies covered the entities involved but disputed which policy had to pay first for defense and liability costs.Great West filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to resolve the payment priority dispute. Great West argued its policy provided only excess coverage, not primary, and further claimed its excess coverage was “excess over” Nationwide’s excess coverage. Nationwide counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that Great West’s coverage was primary. Applying Illinois law, the district court held that both policies were excess and that the insurers must share costs proportionately according to their policy limits. The court found the relevant lease and indemnity agreements did not render Great West’s coverage primary and rejected both parties’ alternative arguments about payment priority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that both Great West’s and Nationwide’s policies provide excess coverage and that neither is “super excess” to the other. The court found no basis in Illinois law to recognize a distinct “super excess” tier and ordered the insurers to share costs proportionately to their coverage limits. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Great West Casualty Co. v Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization dedicated to election integrity, along with two individual members, filed administrative complaints with the Wisconsin Elections Commission, alleging that the Commissioners themselves had failed to properly enforce certain aspects of federal election law regarding voter-ID requirements and management of voter registration lists. The Commission, citing ethical concerns about adjudicating complaints against itself, declined to review the complaints on their merits but suggested alternative remedies, such as referral to a district attorney or appeal to a state court. Dissatisfied, the organization and its members filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, seeking to compel the Commission to address their complaints under federal law.The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that neither the organization nor its members had Article III standing because they failed to show a concrete injury. The plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint, but upon doing so, the district court again dismissed the action, finding that their alleged injuries were intangible and insufficient to establish standing under federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that alleged procedural violations of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) did not constitute a concrete injury in fact necessary for Article III standing, as there was no historic or common-law analog for suing the government merely for failing to follow statutory procedures. The court further determined that HAVA did not create a private right of action enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiffs’ claims of organizational or associational standing were inadequately supported. The Seventh Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Millis" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after being indicted on multiple charges related to mail fraud, theft from an employee benefit plan, and filing false tax returns, repeatedly chose to represent herself rather than accept legal counsel. The charges stemmed from her actions following her grandmother’s death: she continued to receive and conceal pension payments that should have stopped, and she prepared fraudulent tax filings for herself and others, keeping a portion of the illicit refunds.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over the trial. Throughout the proceedings, the district court made extensive efforts to inform the defendant of her constitutional right to counsel, the risks and disadvantages of self-representation, and the complexity of the charges. The court appointed standby counsel, but the defendant persisted in her wish to proceed without representation and consistently rejected the assistance of counsel, including private and standby counsel. Despite her refusal to participate actively in her trial—declining to make arguments, cross-examine witnesses, or present evidence—the jury convicted her on all counts.Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court should have forced her to accept counsel and that her waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing or voluntary. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the record as a whole and determined that, despite the absence of a formal Faretta hearing, the totality of circumstances demonstrated that the defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court carefully examined whether she understood her options and the consequences of self-representation. Concluding that the district court had not erred, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. The holding is that a defendant’s waiver of counsel is valid if the record as a whole shows the waiver was knowing and voluntary, even without a formal hearing. View "USA v Salley" on Justia Law

Antonio Carrazco-Martinez was investigated by federal authorities for his alleged involvement in a drug trafficking operation with ties to Chicago and Mexico. Law enforcement, after obtaining judicial warrants, used a cell-site simulator to locate his new phone and a closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera to monitor activity in the garage of a stash house. The investigation led to his indictment for conspiracy to distribute narcotics and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. Carrazco-Martinez sought to suppress evidence obtained from both the cell-site simulator and the CCTV camera, arguing that their use was unlawful, but these motions were denied.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Carrazco-Martinez’s motions to suppress, applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for both the cell-site simulator and the CCTV camera warrants. The court found that the government’s warrant applications were not misleading and that the warrants were neither so lacking in probable cause nor so deficient in scope as to invalidate reliance on them. At trial, the court also overruled Carrazco-Martinez’s objection to a jury instruction (Instruction 28), which stated that the government did not have to prove the specific quantity of drugs alleged, only a measurable quantity, to establish guilt. The jury convicted him on both counts, and his post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial were denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that Carrazco-Martinez failed to rebut the presumption of good faith regarding both warrants. It further held that the challenged jury instruction, when read with the accompanying instruction, correctly stated the law, as drug quantity is a sentencing factor rather than an element of the charged offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Carrazco-Martinez" on Justia Law

This case arises from a contract dispute related to a broader multidistrict antitrust litigation involving alleged price-fixing in the sale of broiler chickens. The parties, a meat producer and a commercial purchaser, engaged in settlement negotiations to resolve the purchaser’s antitrust claims across three cases (Broilers, Beef, and Pork) for a total of $50 million. The negotiations included email exchanges where the purchaser appeared to accept a settlement offer, but several terms—including compliance with a judgment sharing agreement, assignment data, a “most favored nation” clause, and allocation among cases—remained unresolved. The purchaser had obtained litigation funding, which required consent from the funder for any settlement.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the producer’s motion for summary judgment in 2023 but later granted the producer’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The court found that the parties had agreed to the essential material terms: the $50 million payment and release of claims. It relied on draft settlement agreements, despite their lack of signatures, to memorialize agreement on additional terms. The court rejected arguments regarding laches and jurisdiction and subsequently granted summary judgment to the producer, concluding its obligations had been fulfilled by payment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. It held that no binding settlement agreement existed as of the purchaser’s “We accept” email because several material terms remained open and unresolved at that time. The court found that, under Illinois law, mutual assent to all material terms is required for a binding contract, and the parties had continued to negotiate those material terms for months after the email exchange. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Carina Ventures LLC v. Pilgrim's Pride Corporation" on Justia Law