Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Quintin Ferguson was sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment for violating 18 U.S.C. §844(i), which involves maliciously damaging or destroying property by fire or explosives. The district court classified him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. §4B1.1(a), which requires the current conviction and at least two prior convictions for felony drug offenses or crimes of violence. Ferguson contested that a violation of §844(i) should not be considered "arson" under §4B1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, initially reviewed the case. The district court concluded that §844(i) is a "crime of violence" and treated Ferguson as a career offender, leading to his 240-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a conviction under §844(i) qualifies as "arson" for the purposes of the career-offender guideline. The court reasoned that the definition of "generic arson" includes the intentional or malicious burning of any property, not limited to burning one's own property to collect insurance. The court affirmed the district court's classification of Ferguson as a career offender and upheld the 240-month sentence. View "United States v Ferguson" on Justia Law

In December 2015, sixteen-year-old Isaiah Taylor was stopped by Milwaukee police officers Justin Schwarzhuber and Jasen Rydzewski while running through his neighborhood to deliver a turkey. The officers frisked him, searched his bag, and detained him in their police car to check for outstanding warrants and recent robberies. Taylor later sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and racial profiling in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted qualified immunity and summary judgment to the officers on Taylor’s Fourteenth Amendment claim and on the Fourth Amendment claim regarding the initial stop and frisk. However, the court denied qualified immunity on the issue of Taylor’s continued detention, sending it to trial. The jury found the officers not liable, and the court denied Taylor’s motion for post-trial relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on Taylor’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, finding insufficient evidence of racial profiling. However, it vacated the summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims related to the initial stop and frisk, concluding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk based on clearly established law. The court also vacated the jury verdict on the continued detention issue, as it was intertwined with the initial stop's constitutionality, and remanded the case for a new trial on all Fourth Amendment claims. View "Taylor v. Schwarzhuber" on Justia Law

James Hulce, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed a putative class action suit against Zipongo Inc., doing business as Foodsmart. Hulce alleged that Foodsmart violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by making unsolicited calls and sending text messages to him, despite his number being on the national do-not-call registry. Foodsmart's communications were about free nutritional services offered through Hulce's state and Medicaid-funded healthcare plan, Chorus Community Healthcare Plans (CCHP).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted Foodsmart's motion for summary judgment. The court found that the calls and messages did not constitute "telephone solicitations" under the TCPA because they were not made for the purpose of encouraging the purchase of services. Instead, the communications were about services that were free to Hulce, with Foodsmart billing CCHP directly.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the calls and messages did not fall within the definition of "telephone solicitation" under the TCPA. The court concluded that "telephone solicitation" requires the initiation of a call or message with the purpose of persuading or urging someone to pay for a service. Since Foodsmart's communications were about free services and did not encourage Hulce to make a purchase, they did not meet this definition. The court emphasized that the purpose of the call must be to persuade someone who makes the purchasing decision to buy the services, which was not the case here. View "Hulce v Zipongo Inc." on Justia Law

Kevin Brooks, an inmate at a federal prison camp, suffered from appendicitis, which was misdiagnosed by medical personnel as constipation and COVID-19. Despite his worsening condition, he was not sent to a hospital for over ten days, resulting in a ruptured appendix and peritonitis. Brooks eventually recovered but experienced severe pain during the ordeal. He filed a lawsuit seeking damages from five federal employees, three of whom treated him and two who were supervisors.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Brooks's suit, ruling that it presented a new context to which the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics does not extend. The court reasoned that Brooks's case differed from previous Bivens cases, particularly Carlson v. Green, due to the duration of his medical issue and the involvement of supervisory personnel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's reasoning. The Seventh Circuit held that Brooks's claim did not present a new context, as it was similar to Carlson v. Green, where a prisoner alleged constitutionally inadequate medical care. The court found that the distinctions made by the district court regarding the duration of the medical issue and the involvement of supervisors were not sufficient to create a new context. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against the two supervisors but vacated the dismissal of claims against the three treating personnel, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Brooks v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Gayratjon Gulomjonov, a native of Uzbekistan, entered the United States in October 2016 on a visitor visa and later obtained a student visa valid until January 2019. He overstayed his visa and was placed in removal proceedings in November 2019. Gulomjonov conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) due to his conversion to Catholicism, claiming he would face religious persecution if returned to predominantly Muslim Uzbekistan.The immigration judge found Gulomjonov’s asylum application untimely, as it was filed more than one year after his arrival. The judge determined that his conversion to Catholicism, which occurred no later than April 2019, did not excuse the delay, as he did not apply for asylum until ten months later. The judge also denied his claims for withholding of removal and CAT protection on the merits, finding insufficient evidence of a pattern or practice of persecution against Catholics in Uzbekistan. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the immigration judge’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Gulomjonov’s petition in part and denied it in part. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the factual determination regarding the date of Gulomjonov’s conversion. The court also upheld the validity of the regulation requiring asylum applications to be filed within a reasonable time after a change in circumstances. Additionally, the court found that the evidence did not compel a different conclusion regarding the denial of withholding of removal and CAT protection. The court concluded that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and denied the petition for review. View "Gulomjonov v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Denise Evans was diagnosed with a ureteral injury shortly after undergoing a hysterectomy on August 14, 2019. She filed a negligence lawsuit in state court against the surgeon and associated medical entities. The surgeon was employed by a federally-funded health center, and the Attorney General certified that he was acting within the scope of his employment, allowing the United States to substitute itself as the defendant under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The government removed the case to federal court and requested dismissal due to Evans's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court dismissed the claims against the government without prejudice and remanded the claims against the non-governmental defendants to state court.Evans then exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was received on September 23, 2021. After HHS failed to render a final disposition within six months, Evans filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting medical negligence. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the claim was barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Evans contended that the Westfall Act’s savings provision and the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Westfall Act’s savings provision does not apply when the United States substitutes itself as a party under § 233(c) of the PHSA. The court also found that equitable tolling was inapplicable, as Evans did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances preventing her from timely filing her claim. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evans's lawsuit. View "Evans v United States" on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement between the Teamsters Union and Quality Custom Distribution guaranteed that the top 80% of senior employees would receive at least 40 paid hours per week. During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, many Starbucks stores in or near Chicago closed or reduced their hours, resulting in senior employees averaging only 30 hours a week. The Union demanded that the employer make up the difference, but the employer refused, citing an exception for Acts of God.The dispute was taken to an arbitrator, who ruled in favor of the Union. The arbitrator determined that while epidemics might be considered Acts of God, the reduction in work was primarily due to the Governor of Illinois' orders, which were not Acts of God. The employer then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to nullify the arbitrator's decision. The district court judge declined to nullify the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that as long as the arbitrator interprets the contract, the award must stand. The arbitrator had interpreted the contract's "Act of God" clause, concluding it did not cover the Governor's orders. The court emphasized that judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to ensuring the arbitrator interpreted the contract, not whether the interpretation was correct. The court also noted that the employer's conduct in the litigation process imposed unnecessary costs and ordered the employer to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. View "Quality Custom Distribution Services LLC v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 710" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC, and affiliates, sought to build and operate interstate electricity transmission lines in Indiana. An Indiana statute granted incumbent electric companies the right of first refusal to build and operate new interstate transmission facilities connecting to their existing facilities. Plaintiffs argued that this statute violated the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) Commissioners from enforcing the statute.The IURC Commissioners and several intervening defendants appealed the injunction. They argued that the IURC did not enforce the rights of first refusal and that the injunction would not redress plaintiffs' injuries. The district court had found that plaintiffs had standing because it believed the IURC enforced the rights of first refusal and that an injunction would prevent MISO from recognizing the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing. The court concluded that the IURC had no relevant responsibilities for enforcing the challenged statute and that any genuine redress would have to operate against MISO, a non-governmental entity not party to the lawsuit. The court noted that MISO had made clear it would not respond to the preliminary injunction as plaintiffs and the district court expected. The court also rejected a dissenting opinion's novel theory of standing, which was not presented by plaintiffs or adopted by the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc." on Justia Law

A tenured professor at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Law, Jason Kilborn, included an expurgated racial slur in a law school exam question. This led to an investigation by university officials, who found that Kilborn had created a racially hostile environment and violated the university's nondiscrimination policy. Consequently, Kilborn was suspended from teaching until he completed a diversity training program and was denied a two percent raise. Kilborn sued several university officials, alleging violations of his constitutional rights to free speech and due process.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Kilborn's federal claims with prejudice, finding that his speech was not constitutionally protected. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. Kilborn appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the dismissal of Kilborn's First Amendment retaliation claim, concluding that his speech was constitutionally protected under the Supreme Court's decisions in Connick v. Myers and Pickering v. Board of Education. The court found that Kilborn's speech addressed matters of public concern and that the university's actions could be seen as pretextual. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Kilborn's remaining federal claims, including his compelled speech and procedural due process claims. The court also vacated the dismissal of Kilborn's state law claims for further consideration by the district court. View "Kilborn v. Amiridis" on Justia Law

Eural Black, the defendant, sought a sentence reduction under the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the First Step Act's anti-stacking amendment. Black was serving a 40-year sentence, 30 years of which were due to stacked § 924(c) convictions. The First Step Act, passed in 2018, restricted the stacking of sentences under § 924(c), but Congress made this amendment nonretroactive. In 2024, the United States Sentencing Commission amended a policy statement to allow prisoners serving unusually long sentences to seek reductions due to changes in the law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Black's motion, relying on the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Thacker, which held that the First Step Act's anti-stacking amendment is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. Black appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court reaffirmed its holding in Thacker, stating that the anti-stacking amendment cannot be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction, even when combined with other factors. The court found that the Sentencing Commission's policy statement in § 1B1.13(b)(6), which allowed for such consideration, exceeded its statutory authority and conflicted with the First Step Act. Consequently, the court held that Black was ineligible for a sentence reduction based on the anti-stacking amendment and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v Eural Black" on Justia Law