Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During a traffic stop in South Bend, Indiana, in February 2021, police discovered that Jose Reyna was in possession of marijuana, methamphetamine intended for distribution, and a loaded handgun with its serial number obliterated. Reyna admitted to dealing drugs and to having intentionally removed the serial number from the firearm. A grand jury indicted him for possessing a firearm with an altered or obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), to which he pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. Shortly before sentencing, Reyna moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(k) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana found good cause to consider Reyna's otherwise untimely motion but denied it on the merits. The district judge ruled that the possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number was not covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and therefore rejected the constitutional challenge at the first step of the Bruen framework. The judge did not address whether the statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(k) de novo. While the appellate court was not persuaded that the challenge could be resolved solely on the text of the Second Amendment, it proceeded to Bruen’s second step, as clarified by United States v. Rahimi. The court concluded that although modern serialization lacks a direct historical analogue, historical practices of marking, inventorying, and inspecting firearms for militia purposes provide a relevant tradition. The Seventh Circuit held that § 922(k) is consistent with the principles underlying this tradition and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Reyna" on Justia Law

In April 2019, a man was arrested by Chicago police officers after he refused to leave the area of an active crime scene despite repeated orders. During his transport to the police station, he declined to wear a seatbelt. While handcuffed in the backseat, he was injured when the transporting officer braked suddenly, causing him to hit his head on the divider. He was later treated for a cut lip. The disorderly conduct charges brought against him were subsequently dropped.The individual brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—specifically, false arrest, state-created danger, excessive force, and failure to provide adequate medical care. He also asserted a state-law claim for malicious prosecution. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on all claims, finding either no constitutional violation or that qualified immunity applied. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on all federal claims, as there was at least arguable probable cause for the arrest and no clearly established constitutional right was violated in the circumstances presented. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, concluding the plaintiff failed to demonstrate malice by the officers, a required element under Illinois law. Thus, judgment for the officers was affirmed in its entirety. View "O'Neal Johnson v Edwards" on Justia Law

While serving a portion of his sentence at the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana, Derek Thomas was repeatedly assaulted by his cellmate, suffering serious physical and psychological harm. Thomas initially sought protective custody after other inmates threatened him due to his conviction as a sex offender. Despite being placed in the Special Housing Unit, he experienced continued threats, food tampering, and was eventually housed with an inmate who violently assaulted and allegedly raped him. Thomas reported these incidents through notes to prison staff and verbally to counselors and psychologists, yet he was not removed from his cell until after the alleged rape. Following his removal, Thomas sought medical and psychological care, but claims his injuries and trauma were not adequately addressed.After filing a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Thomas was allowed to proceed with claims that certain prison officials failed to protect him and were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, both in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment, raising qualified immunity as a defense. Thomas’s counsel did not address qualified immunity in the response to the motion, and Thomas later confirmed reliance on counsel’s submission. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding Thomas’s claims either presented a new Bivens context not recognized by precedent or failed because Thomas did not overcome the qualified immunity defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Thomas’s failure-to-protect claim could not proceed because it sought to expand Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics beyond existing precedent. Regarding the deliberate indifference claim, the court held that Thomas forfeited his opposition to qualified immunity by not raising it in the district court and did not meet the criteria for appellate review of a forfeited argument. View "Thomas v. Carmichael" on Justia Law

In early 2018, law enforcement in Quincy, Illinois, investigated reports from multiple confidential sources that Ryan Douglas was selling methamphetamine and cocaine. Police conducted several controlled buys, including one in April 2018 where Douglas, driving a black BMW, sold methamphetamine to a confidential source after visiting a residence at 1726 N. 16th Street. Based on these events, police obtained a warrant to search the house, where they found cash (including buy money), drug paraphernalia, and other items. Douglas was arrested after a traffic stop, and police later obtained a second warrant to search his iPhone, which revealed incriminating text messages.A federal grand jury indicted Douglas for distribution of methamphetamine. He moved to suppress evidence from both the house and phone searches, arguing that the warrants lacked probable cause—specifically, that there was insufficient connection between the house and his alleged drug activity, and that no fair probability was shown that evidence would be found on his phone. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, finding probable cause, and, alternatively, that the officers had acted in good faith. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois adopted this recommendation and denied the motion. Douglas entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to 84 months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether suppression was warranted. The court declined to decide whether the warrants were supported by probable cause, holding instead that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The court concluded that the officers reasonably relied on the warrants issued by neutral judges, and Douglas failed to show that reliance was unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "USA v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Lester Crowder, a former building inspector for the City of Harvey, Illinois, was approached in 2018 by Dennis DeZutter, an FBI informant posing as a strip club manager interested in opening a new club. Crowder met with DeZutter several times, accepting $13,000 in payments while promising to “streamline” the permitting process and suggesting the money would be distributed to city officials. These meetings were arranged via phone and text, which were recorded by the government as part of its investigation.A grand jury indicted Crowder on five counts of violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), for using a cell phone to promote or facilitate bribery in violation of Illinois law. Each count corresponded to an interstate communication arranging a meeting where Crowder accepted or agreed to accept money. At trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the jury was instructed on the elements of a Travel Act violation and the definition of bribery under Illinois law. The instructions did not include the statutory requirement that the defendant be “not authorized by law” to accept the property, which both parties agreed was a legal question for the court, not a factual one for the jury. The jury found Crowder guilty on all counts, and the district court denied his motions for acquittal and sentenced him to 14 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find Crowder guilty, that Crowder waived any objection to the jury instructions regarding the omitted element, and that the Illinois bribery statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Crowder" on Justia Law

A probation officer with the Cook County Juvenile Probation Department alleged that her supervisors created a racially hostile work environment, culminating in her termination for performance issues and insubordination. She cited several workplace incidents, including the enforcement of a no-children-in-the-workplace policy, reprimands related to her work product and interactions with colleagues, and a 2016 meeting where the department director, while reading from a document, said the N-word in front of African American employees (an incident the plaintiff learned about secondhand). The plaintiff’s children occasionally waited in her office after school, and she was reminded of the policy prohibiting this practice. She also disagreed with supervisors over the content of reports submitted to the court, and she was ultimately terminated after an internal investigation found repeated insubordination and issues regarding her communications with clients and the court.The plaintiff first challenged her termination through union arbitration but lost. She then brought a lawsuit under Title VII in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that her employer subjected her to a race-based hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, concluding that the incidents cited, even when considered together, were not sufficiently severe or pervasive as required by Title VII, nor did the plaintiff demonstrate that the alleged harassment was based on race.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff did not present evidence of harassment that was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment, nor did she establish that the alleged conduct was based on race. The court also found no error in the exclusion of late-disclosed witness testimony. The judgment for the employer was affirmed. View "Jones v. Das" on Justia Law

While detained at the Hancock County Jail in Indiana, Nicholas Zemlick underwent an elective abdominal surgery. Following his return to the jail, he developed an abdominal infection, experiencing worsening symptoms over several days. Jail medical staff monitored and treated him, ultimately prescribing antibiotics and arranging for a hospital transport after a nurse expressed concern about his condition. Zemlick underwent emergency surgery, recovered, and returned to the jail, where his wound continued to heal without further complications.Zemlick filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the Hancock County Sheriff and two jail officers, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. He also brought a Monell claim, asserting that the Sheriff failed to ensure adequate medical resources and training at the jail. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal claims, finding no genuine dispute of material fact and relinquished jurisdiction over state-law claims. Zemlick subsequently settled with the medical staff defendants, leaving only the claims against the Sheriff and two officers for appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The appellate court held that the individual defendants did not violate Zemlick’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, either because the claims failed on the merits or because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as their conduct was not clearly established as unlawful. Regarding the Monell claim, the court found Zemlick’s theories were waived under district court procedures and unsupported by the record. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Zemlick v. Burkhart" on Justia Law

Atlanta Gas Light Company and Southern Company Gas contracted with United States Infrastructure Corporation (USIC) to locate and mark gas lines in Georgia. In 2018, USIC failed to mark a line, leading to a gas explosion that seriously injured three people. The injured parties settled with USIC but not with Atlanta Gas Light. After being sued in Georgia state court, Atlanta Gas Light sought defense and indemnification under USIC’s excess liability policy issued by Navigators Insurance Company, claiming status as an additional insured. Navigators denied coverage, asserting Atlanta Gas Light was not an additional insured for these claims because they were based solely on Atlanta Gas Light's conduct.Before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Atlanta Gas Light sued Navigators for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and bad faith. The district court dismissed claims related to Navigators’s conduct prior to USIC’s primary policy exhaustion but allowed the breach of contract claim to proceed. On summary judgment, the district court ruled that Atlanta Gas Light was an additional insured under the excess policy and denied Navigators's motion as to breach of contract. The court entered final judgment for Atlanta Gas Light, and both parties appealed aspects of the ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that, under Indiana law and the policies’ language, Atlanta Gas Light was an “additional insured” because its liability in the underlying suits arose, at least in part, from USIC’s acts or omissions. The court also held that Navigators had no duty to defend or indemnify Atlanta Gas Light before the primary policy was exhausted, and that Navigators’s denial of coverage, based on a nonfrivolous interpretation of the policy, did not constitute bad faith or breach any fiduciary duty. View "Atlanta Gas Light Company v Navigators Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Nicholas Giovannelli, a United States Army veteran, was photographed in Afghanistan in 2009. The image appeared on a Department of Defense website and was later downloaded and licensed by Stocktrek Images to Posterazzi, which produced posters featuring Giovannelli’s likeness. These posters were sold online through retailers including Walmart, Pixels, Amazon, and Posterazzi. Giovannelli only learned of the commercial use of his image in 2020, when a friend discovered the posters online. Experiencing renewed PTSD symptoms, Giovannelli sued the companies for violating the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, which prohibits using a person’s identity for commercial purposes without consent.The lawsuits were removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and severed due to misjoinder. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Giovannelli’s claims were barred by the Act’s one-year statute of limitations. Each district judge—Edmond E. Chang, LaShonda A. Hunt, and Jeffrey I. Cummings—granted summary judgment for the defendants, citing Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership, where the Illinois Appellate Court held that the limitations period starts when the photo is first published, not when the plaintiff discovers the use.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied de novo review. The court held that, under Illinois law and Blair, the single-publication rule governs claims under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act—so the statute of limitations begins at first publication. The court found no basis for applying the discovery rule, and the exception for “hidden, inherently undiscoverable, or inherently unknowable” publications did not apply since the image was publicly accessible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district courts’ judgments, finding Giovannelli’s claims time-barred. View "Giovannelli v Stocktrek Images, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who robbed a bank in Wilmette, Illinois, taking about $7,900 and subsequently purchasing a car with the stolen money. Days later, police approached him while he was in the car with his three-year-old daughter. Upon learning he had an outstanding warrant, the defendant fled, leading police on a high-speed chase. He lost control of the car in snowy conditions, abandoned both the vehicle and his unrestrained daughter in freezing temperatures, and was apprehended soon after.A grand jury indicted the defendant for bank robbery under federal law. He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. At sentencing, the presentence report recommended enhancements for reckless endangerment and career offender status, based on his conduct during the flight from police and four prior bank robbery convictions. The defendant challenged these enhancements, arguing his actions did not constitute recklessness and that his prior offenses were not crimes of violence. He also argued that his drug addiction and personal circumstances were mitigating factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court held that federal bank robbery, including robbery by intimidation, is categorically a crime of violence under the guidelines. It also affirmed the reckless endangerment enhancement, citing the substantial risk created to others, especially the defendant’s young daughter. The court rejected arguments for resentencing under retroactive guideline amendments, finding they did not affect the defendant’s sentence. Additionally, it found no error in the district court’s consideration of prior presentence reports and affirmed the reliability of the information considered. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Gaines" on Justia Law