Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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The case involves Songie Adebiyi, a former Vice President of Student Services at South Suburban College in Illinois, who was terminated in 2019 due to alleged performance issues. Adebiyi claimed that her termination was in retaliation for filing a charge with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. She sued the college and its president, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to the college and its president, ruling that Adebiyi failed to show a causal link between her charge of discrimination and her termination. The court found that the evidence did not support Adebiyi’s retaliation claim. Adebiyi appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing her Title VII retaliation claim and abused its discretion when it denied her motion to amend the complaint and seek more discovery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's finding that Adebiyi failed to demonstrate a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment action. The court found no evidence of pretext in the college's reasons for termination or suspicious timing between Adebiyi's filing of her EEOC and IDHR charge and her termination. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Adebiyi's motion to file an amended complaint and take additional discovery. View "Adebiyi v. South Suburban College" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute between Zhen Feng Lin, a food delivery driver who was severely injured in a car accident, and his employer's insurance company, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. After the accident, Lin received a settlement from the at-fault driver's insurance company, and workers' compensation benefits from his employer's insurance carrier, Hartford Fire Insurance Company. Lin later sought additional recovery under his employer's underinsured motorist policy with Hartford Accident.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Lin and Hartford Accident had not entered into a "settlement agreement" as defined by the insurance policy. As a result, the court ruled that the policy limits should be reduced by the amount Lin received in workers' compensation benefits. The court also agreed with the district court that Lin should be credited for the amount he paid to settle the workers' compensation lien.Additionally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lin's counterclaims for bad faith and breach of contract. The court found no plausible claim supporting the argument that Hartford Accident unreasonably delayed settling Lin's claim. Lin's request for statutory penalties for Hartford Accident's purported delay in handling his claim was also denied.Finally, the court denied both parties' motions for sanctions. Lin's appeal was deemed frivolous in part, but the court exercised its discretion not to impose sanctions. View "Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Lin" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal from Bulk Transport Corp. against Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension Fund and its Trustees. The dispute originated from two collective-bargaining agreements between Bulk Transport and Teamsters Local 142, active from 2003 to 2006. The Union insisted that Bulk Transport apply one such agreement, the Steel Mill Addendum, to non-steel mill work (LISCO work), which Bulk Transport initially did, subsequently making pension contributions on behalf of the LISCO workers. However, when Bulk Transport lost the LISCO contract, they ceased these contributions, leading to the Pension Fund assessing a withdrawal liability of about $2 million under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA).After arbitration, Bulk Transport paid but demanded a review of the decision. The district court agreed with the arbitrator's ruling that Bulk Transport had adopted the Addendum by conduct, and thus the Pension Fund was entitled to the withdrawal liability. The district court also denied Bulk Transport's request for a refund.The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision. It held that the written agreement, not the practice or conduct, should dictate the terms of pension contributions to multi-employer plans. The written agreement in this case did not cover the LISCO work, and the court rejected the argument that Bulk Transport's conduct altered the substantive terms of the agreement. The court held that the writings were conclusive and that employers and unions could not opt-out of the requirements orally or through their course of conduct. The court affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees for the Pension Fund and remanded the case with instructions to order the Pension Fund to repay the withdrawal liability it collected from Bulk Transport. View "Bulk Transport, Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local 142" on Justia Law

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The case involves Janay Garrick, a former instructor at Moody Bible Institute, who alleged sex discrimination and other Title VII violations. Garrick claimed that she was subjected to hostile treatment due to her gender and the Institute's religious beliefs. Moody argued that her suit was barred by Title VII’s religious exemptions and the First Amendment doctrine of church autonomy. The district court denied Moody's motion to dismiss in part, leading to Moody's appeal.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that it could only review a small class of interlocutory orders under the collateral order doctrine, and Moody's appeal did not fit within this class. The court found that the district court's denial of Moody's motion to dismiss was not conclusive, did not resolve important questions separate from the merits of the case, and would not effectively be unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.The appellate court also emphasized that Moody's defense, based on the doctrine of church autonomy, was not separate from the merits of Garrick's gender discrimination claims. Furthermore, the court noted that Moody's argument that it would experience irreparable harm without immediate review was unavailing, as the district court could limit discovery to instances of discriminatory treatment not implicated by Moody's religious beliefs. The court concluded that religious autonomy to shape and control doctrine would not be threatened by the further progression of Garrick's lawsuit. View "Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute" on Justia Law

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This case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit by plaintiffs John Brooks and Gregory Simmons against the City of Pekin and four of its employees. Brooks, a former police lieutenant who developed sleep apnea, claimed that the City violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by failing to reasonably accommodate his condition, discriminating against him, and retaliating against him for raising complaints. Simmons, a former police officer, alleged retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for reporting sexually harassing comments made by his former boss. The district court had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court found that Brooks failed to show that the City had not offered him reasonable accommodations for his sleep apnea. The Court also ruled that Brooks could not establish disparate treatment because he failed to identify similarly situated employees who received more favorable treatment. Furthermore, Brooks was unable to prove retaliation because he lacked evidence that the City's reason for disciplining him was pretextual.Regarding Simmons, the Court found that he could not establish a claim for retaliation under Title VII because the inappropriate comments made about him were not because of his sex and were not severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment. Moreover, Simmons could not show that his termination was due to his complaints against his former boss. The Court also noted that the district court did not err in denying the plaintiffs' request to amend their summary judgment response. The Court declined the City's request to impose sanctions on Brooks and Simmons, reasoning that their appeal was not frivolous. View "Brooks v. City of Pekin" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff, Candice Martin, represented herself and the estate of her deceased husband, Rodney Martin. The defendants were Goodrich Corporation and PolyOne Corporation, both of which Rodney had worked for. Rodney had been exposed to a hazardous chemical, vinyl chloride monomer (VCM), during his employment and was later diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver, a disease allegedly linked to VCM exposure.The case revolved around the interpretation and application of the Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (ODA), which provides compensation for employees who contract diseases through their employment. The Act also has an exclusivity provision, which restricts employees from seeking compensation outside of the statutory scheme.The plaintiff argued that her claim was not subject to the ODA's exclusivity provisions due to an exception introduced by the Illinois legislature in 2019, which allows claims to proceed outside the ODA if they would be barred by any period of repose or repose provision. The defendants argued that this exception did not apply in this case, as Rodney's exposure to VCM had occurred decades prior to the enactment of the exception.Due to the complexity of the statutory provisions and the implications of their interpretation, the Court of Appeals decided to certify three questions to the Illinois Supreme Court. The questions pertained to whether a specific provision of the ODA constituted a period of repose, whether the 2019 exception applied retrospectively, and whether the application of this exception to past conduct would violate the due process protections of the Illinois Constitution. View "Martin v. Goodrich Corporation" on Justia Law

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The case involves an appeal by Marianne Wayland against her former employer, OSF Healthcare System. Wayland alleged that OSF violated her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by failing to adjust performance expectations to reflect her reduced hours while she was on approved medical leave, and subsequently firing her. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of OSF, concluding that it fired Wayland for justifiable reasons based on her performance.Wayland appealed this decision arguing that there was a genuine dispute of material fact over the amount of approved leave she took. The Circuit Court agreed, finding that if Wayland's testimony about the amount of leave she took is believed, a jury could find that OSF unlawfully failed to adjust its performance expectations by properly accounting for her leave when evaluating her.The Circuit Court also noted that a jury could potentially find that OSF interfered with or retaliated against Wayland's use of leave by holding her to the same standards as when she worked full time, and then firing her for falling short. It found that there was sufficient evidence to raise a genuine question about whether OSF's reasons for firing Wayland were pretextual, highlighting that OSF did not tell Wayland that poor performance would lead to discharge and set goals that were potentially impossible to meet.The Circuit Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wayland v. OSF Healthcare System" on Justia Law

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In the case at hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed an employment discrimination case. The plaintiff, LuzMaria Arroyo, a military reservist, brought a lawsuit against her employer, Volvo Group North America, LLC, alleging discrimination based on her military status and her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After a jury ruled in Arroyo's favor and awarded her $7,800,000 in damages, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Volvo on Arroyo’s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim, and ordered a new trial on the remaining Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) claim, where the jury found for Volvo. Arroyo appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Arroyo was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA as she failed to comply with Volvo's attendance policy, an essential job function. Arroyo's positive job performance reviews did not negate her violation of the attendance policy. The court also found no conflict with its previous decision in Arroyo I, which had reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Volvo on the ADA and USERRA claims.Further, the court upheld the district court's decision for a new trial on the USERRA claim. The court agreed that the jury’s verdict as to the ADA claim was influenced by passion and prejudice that also tainted the jury’s determination of USERRA liability. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude evidence of Arroyo’s PTSD in the new trial, as PTSD alone was not sufficient to raise a cognizable discrimination claim under USERRA. View "Arroyo v. Volvo Group North America, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff, Alexis Wells, sought to hold her employer, The Freeman Company, liable for sexual assault committed by a fellow employee, Timothy Vaughn. Wells asserted that the company should be held responsible under Title VII, the Indiana Wage Payment Statute, and various tort theories. The court, however, affirmed the district court's ruling that Wells was an independent contractor, not an employee, which meant that Freeman's conduct was not tortious and Vaughn's actions could not be attributed to Freeman. The court applied the Knight factors, which analyze the "economic realities" of a work relationship, to determine whether a worker is an employee for purposes of Title VII. The court concluded that most of these factors pointed towards Wells being an independent contractor. Thus, her claims under Title VII and the Indiana Wage Payment Statute failed. The court also dismissed Wells' state law claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED), concluding that Freeman's pre-litigation conduct was not so outrageous as to be regarded as "atrocious," and that Vaughn's conduct was outside the scope of his employment, respectively. Therefore, the court could not hold Freeman vicariously liable for Vaughn's actions. View "Wells v. Freeman Company" on Justia Law

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Jeffrey Bruno, a veteran firefighter with the Kankakee Fire Department, sued Mayor Chasity Wells-Armstrong, James Ellexson, the Human Resources Director for the City of Kankakee, and the City of Kankakee, alleging discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). Bruno suffered a severe cardiac event in 2017 and upon his return to work was promoted to Deputy Chief. However, in 2019, he was denied a raise and presented with an employment contract that tied additional compensation to his enrollment in college courses. When Bruno requested the removal of this education condition, citing his heart condition as a barrier to attending classes, his request was denied. After signing the contract, Bruno retired and initiated legal proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, which had granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court concluded that Bruno's request to remove the education condition was not a request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, as it would not impact his ability to perform his job. The court also rejected Bruno's claim of disparate treatment, as his argument of pretext was contradicted by the evidence. Bruno's ADA retaliation claim also failed because his identified protected activity was not protected under the ADA. As Bruno's IHRA and indemnification claims were dependent on his ADA claims, these too were rejected. View "Bruno v. Wells-Armstrong" on Justia Law