Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Conley pled guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and was held in custody in Chicago’s Metropolitan Correctional Center while awaiting sentencing. During the early morning hours of December 18, 2012, Conley and his cellmate, Banks, escaped from the MCC. The men sawed through the bars in their narrow cell window and removed a section of concrete from the wall surrounding it. They fashioned a rope out of bed sheets, crawled through the opening, and scaled 17 floors down the side of the building to the ground. Conley was at large for 17 days before he was captured after an exhaustive manhunt for Conley. When officers found and approached him, Conley provided a false name and ran from the officers. Conley pled guilty to the escape and was given a 41-month sentence, to be served consecutively to his sentence for bank robbery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court relied on the wrong provision of U.S.S.G. 5G1.3 in imposing a consecutive, as opposed to a concurrent, sentence and that even if the court applied the proper provision, the 41-month consecutive sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Conley" on Justia Law

After his acquittal by a jury on burglary charges, Saunders-El sued members of the Rockford, Illinois police department, alleging that they planted his blood at the crime scene in an attempt to frame him. His complaint included a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim that by fabricating evidence, the officers offended his due process rights, and state law claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers, reasoning that fabricating evidence does not violate a defendant’s due process rights and cannot support a section 1983 action; such an allegation must instead be brought as a state law claim for malicious prosecution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on different grounds. A criminal defendant’s due process rights may be violated—actionable by way of 42 U.S.C. 1983—when the evidence against him is fabricated. However, due process is not implicated when, as here, the defendant is released on bond following his arrest and acquitted at trial. The rule cannot be circumvented simply by reframing such an allegation as a Brady claim: alleging that the police officers who supposedly fabricated the evidence failed to reveal their misconduct to the prosecution. View "Saunders-El v. Rohde" on Justia Law

When Ameriprise Financial fired Renard, a financial adviser, for violation of the franchise agreement between the two, Ameriprise claimed that Renard owed it $530,000 on loans made to help Renard build his franchise. Renard disagreed. Ameriprise initiated arbitration under the agreement, which provides that Minnesota law governs, except “all issues relating to arbitrability,” are “governed by the terms set forth in [the] agreement, and to the extent not inconsistent with this agreement, by the rules of arbitration of” the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. Wisconsin arbitrators rejected Renard’s counterclaims and awarded Ameriprise most of what it sought. Renard filed suit to vacate the award. The court confirmed the award and required Renard to pay additional interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Renard’s argument that Ameriprise’s counsel procured the award through fraud and that the arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law and Minnesota tort law. His showing was far short of the high standard needed to upset the outcome of an arbitral proceeding. The panel did not issue a written opinion, so it was not clear how it reached its conclusions, but nothing suggested that it strayed so far that the “manifest disregard” standard was triggered. View "Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Jones, a United Airlines flight attendant, was fired for misconduct. He sued his union, claiming that because of racial animus and his complaints about discrimination, the union had not fairly represented him, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 2000e-2(c), 2000e-3(a). As part of a settlement, the union agreed to challenge his discharge before the System Board of Adjustment. Jones agreed to dismiss his lawsuit with prejudice. The settlement does not provide for continuing federal court jurisdiction. Both signed a stipulation of dismissal (FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)). Two weeks later, Jones filed his first pro se submission: a two-sentence request to discharge Jones’s recruited lawyer and to return his suit to the district judge. Next, he asked that his lawsuit be reinstated and that a “default judgment” be entered against the union, although it was pursuing a grievance, as promised. Finally, Jones submitted his “motion to establish court’s jurisdiction.” The magistrate to whom the case had previously been assigned rejected all three for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, reasoning that Jones’s submission was not part of the litigation covered by the parties’ consents, so the magistrate did not have authority to issue a dispositive ruling. Jones was bringing a new lawsuit. The magistrate could dispose of that new action only if assigned by a district judge and the parties furnished new consents. View "Jones v. Asso'n of Flight Attendants-CWA" on Justia Law

Williams’s convictions and sentences (480 months) were affirmed in 2000. His collateral attack, 28 U.S.C. 2255, failed. His most recent effort, a “Motion to Correct Record” asks the district judge to revise the presentence report to show that he is not a career offender and to resentence him. The district court denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. Williams argued that Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 allows courts to correct clerical errors at any time. The Seventh Circuit rejected an appeal. Rule 36 does not authorize a challenge to the substance of judicial decisions. Nor does the presentence report contain a clerical error. Whether the author accurately understood the nature of one of Williams’s convictions is a substantive matter. Defendants who disagree with PSR contents must object before or at sentencing, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(1), (i)(3). Williams raised the issue indirectly at sentencing but did not ask for a correction under Rule 32 and did not appeal the matter. The district court properly treated this as a section 2255 motion, so that Williams needs a certificate of appealability, which he has not sought. His brief did not identify a substantial constitutional question, as required for a certificate. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Bailey pled guilty in 2011 to distributing crack cocaine and agreed to a prison sentence of 240 months. The agreement allowed Bailey to seek to modify his sentence if Congress or the Supreme Court determined that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 should apply to cases like his. The district court accepted the plea. Bailey did not appeal. In 2012 the Supreme Court decided Dorsey v. United States, holding that the FSA should apply where the crimes were committed before the FSA took effect but sentence was imposed after it took effect. The time for direct appeal had expired. In 2013 Bailey moved for a reduced sentence. The district court denied relief using a form order designed for motions under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), which authorizes reductions of sentences when the Sentencing Commission has retroactively amended a relevant guideline. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to proceed under 28 U.S.C. 2255 by vacating his sentence and holding a new sentencing hearing, The parties negotiated Bailey’s sentence under the impression that he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years. It is now clear that he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Miller, an African-American male, worked as a cook for Hospitality’s Sparx Restaurant. Miller became assistant kitchen manager and was a satisfactory employee. On October 1, 2010, Miler discovered racially offensive pictures at the kitchen cooler. Miller lodged a complaint. Two employees admitted responsibility. The manager agreed that the posting was a termination-worthy offense, but one offender was given a warning and the other was not disciplined. Soon after Miller’s complaint, supervisors began to criticize Miller’s work performance. Sparx fired Miller on October 23, 2010. The EEOC filed suit on Miller’s behalf under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), 3(a). Before trial, Sparx had closed and Hospitality had dissolved. The court concluded that successor corporations could be liable. The jury awarded $15,000 in compensatory damages on the retaliation claim. The EEOC sought additional remedies. The district court denied the front-pay request but awarded Miller $43,300.50 in back pay (and interest) plus $6,495.00 to offset impending taxes on the award; enjoined the companies from discharging employees in retaliation for complaints against racially offensive postings; and required them to adopt policies, investigative processes, and annual training consistent with Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to both successor liability and the equitable remedies. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. N. Star Hospitality, Inc" on Justia Law

For 13 years Sklyarsky worked as a custodian at a Chicago office building, through different employers. In 2010, new supervisors began disciplining Sklyarsky. He complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights that the company was treating him unfairly because of his Ukrainian national origin. Sklyarsky was fired in 2013, and after exhausting administrative remedies, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 2000e-2, e-3, e-5(f).1 During discovery Sklyarsky, an experienced pro se litigant, concluded that the building’s management company had been involved in the discrimination and sought leave to join it as a defendant. Judge Kocoras denied that motion, telling Sklyarsky that Means-Knaus had “nothing to do with the employment contract” and that, if he wanted to sue MeansKnaus, he would have to file a separate action. Sklyarsky did that. Judge Gottschall, assigned to the new suit against Means-Knaus, screened Sklyarsky’s pro se complaint and dismissed it sua sponte, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), finding that the doctrine of claim preclusion foreclosed a separate suit. Judge Kocoras refused to reconsider and entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any procedural missteps were harmless. View "Sklyarsky v. Harvard Maint., Inc." on Justia Law

Barta was friends with Buenrostro, who was an associate of Medrano. Medrano had dealings with a man purporting to be a health care consultant (Castro) who told Medrano he could, in return for payment of a bribe to a corrupt county official, obtain contract approval from Los Angeles County for the purchase of medical bandages by its hospital system. “Castro” was actually an undercover FBI agent and there was no corrupt official. Medrano recruited Buenrosto and Barta. Though the sting continued for many months, Barta spoke with Castro four times. The Seventh Circuit reversed Barta’s conviction for conspiracy to commit bribery, stating that Barta was entrapped as a matter of law. The government conceded that Barta was not predisposed to commit the crime. To overcome Barta’s entrapment defense, therefore, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no government inducement. It failed to do so. During its undercover operation the government employed repeated attempts at persuasion, including fraudulent representations, promises of reward “beyond that inherent in the customary execution of the crime,” and pleas based on need, sympathy, or friendship. The cumulative effect of these tactics directed at Barta amounted to inducement. View "United States v. Barta" on Justia Law

A woman of Sudanese extraction, the plaintiff worked in Jeffboat’s shipyard in Jeffersonville, Indiana as a welder from 2006 until she was laid off in 2011. She had been u a welder first class, doing the most difficult and dangerous jobs, such as overhead welding and welding in confined spaces. In a two-week period in June 2011, the plaintiff, who had on 12 previous occasions sought first aid for work-related injuries, experienced two more such incidents, becoming dizzy and nauseous while welding in confined spaces. Jeffboat demoted her to welder third class, reducing her pay from $21.10 per hour to $15.69 per hour. The plaintiff claimed that the company demoted her in retaliation for her having complained to the EEOC the previous February that the company was discriminating against her because of her sex and national origin. She was subsequently laid off, but the layoff was part of a general reduction in force based on seniority and a few months later she was notified that she was being recalled. She failed to reply within the deadline and never returned to work. Her discrimination claims were rejected. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting plaintiff's lack of evidence View "Ani-Deng v. Jeffboat" on Justia Law