Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hayden, a California resident, obtained a medical marijuana card and purchased high-grade marijuana in California. He mailed it to himself in St. Louis. A coconspirator sold it in Illinois. While surveilling Hayden as part of a larger investigation, DEA agents followed him to different bank branches where he exchanged $18,000 worth of $20 bills, then followed him to his apartment, executed a warrant, and arrested him after finding 995 grams of marijuana and $80,892 cash. He entered a plea. The court noted that the offense involved 10 to 20 kilograms of marijuana and money laundering, but granted a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Hayden had committed the crimes while on supervised release and had a prior drug conviction for which he received 15 years’ imprisonment. The resulting range was 24 to 30 months. Hayden requested leniency, citing a son with health issues who lived with Hayden’s mother, and argued that USSG Amendment 782, which had not taken effect, would lowerhe base offense level. The court imposed a 46-month term, noting that Hayden had been absent from the boy’s life, that there was no sentencing disparity, and Hayden’s high likelihood of recidivism. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Hayden" on Justia Law

A citizen of Mexico, Duarte entered the U.S. without inspection in 2000. In 2011, after he was acquitted of heroin trafficking, DHS issued a Notice to Appear. Duarte did not appear. A removal order issued. Duarte claimed he was unaware of the notice. The IJ reopened proceedings. Duarte applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that he had cooperated with the U.S. DEA and feared retribution from the Zeta drug cartel. At the hearing, Duarte denied the DEA story, but claimed that the threats stemmed from his escape, after the cartel held him for ransom in 1996. Duarte submitted an affidavit from a friend in Mexico about phone calls from suspected cartel members warning that Duarte would face retribution. The IJ denied asylum and withholding of removal. Duarte on appeal that he was targeted for persecution because of his “membership in the particular group of successful business[men],” under extortionate attacks by cartels. The BIA held that Duarte failed to preserve the issue, but considered testimony and determined that the cartel detained him for money rather than to persecute him on any basis recognized by law. Duarte did not submit evidence to suggest torture at the hands (or with the acquiescence) of government actors. The Seventh Circuit denied review. View "Duarte-Salagoza v. Holder" on Justia Law

Sykes pleaded guilty to participation in a bank fraud scheme, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment. The district court determined that her total offense level was 23 and that her criminal history category was III, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 57 to 71 months. The court applied two enhancements, holding that Sykes could reasonably have foreseen, and thus was responsible for, the scheme’s entire intended loss amount of $653,417 (14-level enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(H)) and that a two-level enhancement was warranted under USSG 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), because Sykes’s offense involved “sophisticated means.” The court rejected her submission that her family circumstances as sole caregiver to her children justified a below-guidelines sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court was correct in its determination that the evidence supported the 14-level enhancement; did not clearly err in its estimation of the factual record; was correct in its view that the fraudulent scheme involved sophisticated means; and adequately took into account Sykes’s family circumstances in imposing sentence. View "United States v. Sykes" on Justia Law

The class action suit, filed about 19 years ago, claimed that a defined‐contribution ERISA pension plan in which the employer matched contributions made by its employees was partially terminated, requiring vesting. After a previous remand, the district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant and awarded $64,000 in costs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. When a pension plan is terminated, the rights of the participants in the plan vest in full; none of the money contributed by the employer to the individual employees’ retirement accounts is returned to the employer. Full vesting is required in the case of partial as well as total terminations, 26 U.S.C. 411(d)(3)(A). The district judge had to decide whether the series of reductions in the number of plan participants should be considered a single partial termination. The judge determined that there was no plan; decisions to sell particular subsidiaries were made sequentially, based on economic conditions in the particular market in which each operated. View "Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan" on Justia Law

Bell sued attorney Ruben and his firm, alleging that they negligently and fraudulently mismanaged her trust, causing a loss of $34 million. Before arbitration, Ruben filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Bell filed an adversary complaint opposing discharge of Ruben’s fraud-based debt to her, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A), (4). The bankruptcy judge granted Ruben a discharge of his other debts, but not of that fraud debt. Ruben’s liability insurance did not cover fraud. Bell settled her negligence claims against Ruben and all claims against the other defendants in arbitration. The arbitration panel ruled, with respect to the fraud claim, that “damages proven to be attributable to the actions of [Ruben] have been compensated,” but ordered Ruben to pay administrative fees and expenses of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) totaling $21,200.00 and that compensation and expenses of the arbitrators, advanced by Bell, totaling $150,304.54 would be borne by Ruben. AAA rules, which governed the arbitration, provide that expenses of arbitration “shall be borne equally” unless the parties agree otherwise or the arbitrator assesses expenses against specified parties. Ruben refused to pay. The bankruptcy judge entered summary judgment in favor of Ruben. The district court reversed, in favor of Bell. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Ruben v. Bell" on Justia Law

Maurer visited a Speedway gas station convenience store near her home. It was where she regularly purchased gasoline. After parking in front of the store, Maurer walked along the sidewalk to its front entrance. A permanent retail display, which housed windshield wiper fluid at the time, sat on the sidewalk to the left of the double door entrance and narrowed the adjacent walking area to a width of 24 inches. As Maurer approached, she saw the display, stepped around it, and walked down the narrowed length of sidewalk. As she neared the end of the narrowed path she rolled her ankle off the sidewalk curb and fell, seriously injuring her shoulder. In her injury suit, the district court granted a motion in limine, excluding as evidence of a municipal ordinance which Maurer sought to introduce to prove Speedway had notice that its retail display created an unreasonably dangerous condition by narrowing the adjacent walkway. A jury ruled in favor of Speedway. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Speedway had no reason to anticipate that Maurer would not discover the condition and protect herself against it just as every other customer apparently did nor did Speedway fail to exercise reasonable care. View "Maurer v. Speedway, LLC" on Justia Law

MileagePlus, United’s frequent flyer program, rewards customers with free flights and seat upgrades. Its Rules have always allowed United to change the terms of the program unilaterally, without notice. In 1997 United announced a new Million-Mile Flyer status: Lifetime Premier Executive status. “Mileage Plus members who have earned a total of one million paid flight miles on United will retain the benefits and privileges of Premier Executive status for life.” After merging with Continental, United changed the status levels and moved the Million-Mile Flyers from Premier Executive status to the new system. United decided that the Premier Gold level was equivalent, but Gold customers receive only a 50% bonus on miles flown, not 100%, and do not have regional and system-wide upgrades that Million-Mile Flyers previously received. Lagen enrolled in MileagePlus in 1993 and became a Million-Mile Flyer in 2006 after switching his airline loyalty from British Airways. He sued for breach of contract under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2)(A). The district court granted United summary judgment, finding that no rational trier of fact could conclude that United had a distinct Million-Mile Flyer program that was not part of MileagePlus, subject to unilateral change. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Lagen v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

After the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs determined Evans was no longer competent to manage his veterans’ benefits, it appointed his daughter as the federal fiduciary. The VA later terminated her appointment and appointed the Greenfield Banking Company. Evans’s wife and daughter filed suit asserting breach of fiduciary duty and conversion by the Bank and sought creation of a constructive trust. The complaint alleges that the Bank complied with the terms of its obligations to the VA as federal fiduciary but that doing so meant it breached its fiduciary duty to Evans. The complaint did not claim misuse of funds, mismanagement depriving him of the use of any funds, embezzlement, or the like. The daughter was apparently not fully reimbursed for expenditures she made on behalf of Evans while pursuing a guardianship in state court. Evans died in 2012. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the complaint is really a challenge to a federal fiduciary appointment and to veteran benefits distribution and, as such, not within the court’s jurisdiction. View "Stump v. Greenfield Banking Co," on Justia Law

Cano, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without authorization in 2002. He pled guilty in Wisconsin state court in 2011 to operating a vehicle to flee or elude a police officer. About a year later, the Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear and charged him with inadmissibility as a person present without being admitted or paroled and as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Cano conceded removability. He later sought reconsideration of the immigration judge’s determination that he is removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and he requested cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The immigration judge concluded that the Wisconsin conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, so Cano was not eligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. Citing the statute’s requirement that to be convicted a person must “knowingly” flee or attempt to elude an officer after receiving an officer’s signal, the court found the Board’s determination reasonable. Knowingly fleeing or attempting to elude an officer is an act wrong in itself and therefore a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Cano v. Holder" on Justia Law

Clark entered a credit union wearing a two‐tone baseball hat and sunglasses, walked out, and got into his blue Ford Crown Victoria. Days later, a man fitting Clark’s description robbed a bank wearing a two‐tone baseball hat and sunglasses and left in a blue Ford Crown Victoria. Authorities arrested Clark. A magistrate judge found that Clark waived his right to counsel for proceedings before that court. The district court reconsidered on the government’s motion and questioned Clark about proceeding pro se. Clark decided against self‐representation, was convicted, and argued that the district court infringed on his Sixth Amendment rights by improperly reconsidering an issue already decided by the magistrate. The Seventh Circuit rejected the claim, noting that the magistrate’s ruling was limited to Clark’s initial appearance and that the addition of DNA evidence gave the court reason to question whether Clark understood the risks of going pro se. The credit union evidence was properly admitted for a non‐propensity purpose, to establish Clark’s identity. Expressing discomfort with the introduction of a video and witness testimony to characterize Clark’s actions as “casing” the credit union, the court characterized any errors in introducing more than a photo and failing to weigh the probative and prejudicial values of the evidence on the record as harmless. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law