Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An employer that withdraws from an underfunded pension plan must cover its share of the shortfall, 29 U.S.C. 1381, 1391. After concluding that Allega had withdrawn, the Central States Pension Fund sent it a bill for about $375,000. The employer has 90 days to ask a pension plan to review its decision.. If the plan adheres to the original decision or does not act within 120 days, the employer has another 60 days to seek arbitration. For Allega, the last day was July 16, 2013. On July 9 Allega sent the Fund a letter demanding arbitration. It followed up on July 29 with a notice to the American Arbitration Association.: The AAA’s rules require that notices go to both the pension administrator and the AAA. The Fund has adopted those rules, but Allega did not notify the AAA within the statutory time limit. The district court concluded that Allega had waited too long to seek arbitration and must pay withdrawal liability as the Fund calculated it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Fund’s failure to act within 120 days on a request for reconsideration tolled the time to seek arbitration. View "Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Pension Fund v. Allega Concrete Corp." on Justia Law

The Anderson Indiana Police Department received a tip from White that her previous housemate Boswell, a convicted felon, was in possession of firearms available for purchase. ATF agents planned a sting operation, involving White as the buyer, equipped with an audio and visual recorder on her person, and accompanied an agent outfitted with an audio recording device. At trial, Boswell chose to take the stand and admitted to having a number of felony convictions, including two Florida battery convictions, an Indiana aggravated battery conviction, a conviction for dealing in stolen property, and a conviction for conspiracy to introduce marijuana into a prison facility. Boswell denied ever possessing any guns. On cross-examination, the government confronted Boswell with the audio recordings made incident to the sting operation. Boswell denied that it was his voice on the recordings. The court permitted the government to ask Boswell about a tattoo of a firearm (a revolver) that he had on his neck. Boswell was charged with being a felon in possession of two firearms (two revolvers). The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act to 235 months. View "United States v. Boswell" on Justia Law

JM Leasing purchased a brand‐new semi‐truck from PACCAR in 2007. Approximately four years and 3,000 miles later, JM concluded that the truck was a lemon and sought a refund from PACCAR under Wisconsin’s Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. 218.0171.1 PACCAR agreed to refund the purchase price, but a dispute arose over reimbursement of a $53.00 title fee and escalated into a debate over the “reasonable allowance for use” to which PACCAR was entitled . Ultimately JM won an interest‐bearing judgment of $369,196.06, plus $157,697.25 in attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting PACCAR’s claims that it complied with all relevant provisions of the Lemon Law and that the district court erred in calculating pecuniary loss. View "James Michael Leasing Co. v. Paccar, Inc." on Justia Law

Taylor-Novotny sued her former employer, Health Alliance Medical Plans under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000. She contended that Health Alliance failed to accommodate her multiple sclerosis as the ADA required, discriminated and retaliated against her based on her disability, interfered with her FMLA rights, and discriminated against her based on her race. She also asserted a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for Health Alliance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Taylor-Novotny did not establish that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA and did not meeting Health Alliance’s legitimate expectations for punctuality and accountability. Her failure to meet Health Alliance’s legitimate expectations also foreclosed her race discrimination claim. With respect to her ADA failure-to-accommodate claim, she did not establish that the additional accommodation that she sought was reasonable. The evidence was insufficient to form a convincing mosaic suggesting that Health Alliance retaliated against her because she sought accommodations for her multiple sclerosis. Health Alliance never denied Taylor-Novotny FMLA leave. View "Taylor-Novotny v. Health Alliance Med. Plans, Inc." on Justia Law

Rockford Narcotics Unit Detective Jimenez obtained a warrant to search the upper apartment at 1522 Clifton for cocaine and narcotics paraphernalia. The affidavit stated that a “concerned citizen” called in that “1522 Clifton … is dealing drugs.” Weeks later, police received a complaint from Ibarra, who stated that Ibarra’s granddaughter had knocked on the rear door of that building, looking for her mother (Love). Kelly answered, holding a gun and with Love behind him, warned, “call the police, I’ll shoot them too.” Officer Kennedy visited the residence. Love came to the rear door and denied that she was there against her will. Kennedy saw Love descend interior stairs. Days later, Jimenez used a confidential informant to make a controlled purchase of crack cocaine from Kelly. Executing the warrant, officers forcibly entered through the rear door, climbed to the upper door, announced their presence, and forced entry. Jimenez then realized that Kelly lived in a rear two‐story unit . Officers continued the search. Noticing that a vent cover had been removed, officers went to the basement, walked through an unlocked door to the front, heard items drop, disassembled ductwork and recovered a handgun and crack cocaine. Officers discovered marijuana, crack cocaine, and drug paraphernalia upstairs. Kelly was charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress; probable cause supported the warrant and the search did not exceed its scope. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law

For the second time, Croft sought the Seventh Circuit’s approval to pursue a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, relying primarily on the 2012 Supreme Court decision, Miller v. Alabama, that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentences of mandatory life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders. Because he was 17 when he committed murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault, Croft argues that his sentence of natural life imprisonment without parole for the murder is unconstitutional under Miller. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition, stating that even if it were to hold that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review, Miller is inapplicable to Croft’s case. Life sentences for murder are discretionary under Illinois law, a critical difference from the situation presented in Miller, which considered only “mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles.” The sentencing court explicitly stated that it had considered the presentence report, which discussed Croft’s age. The appellate court underscored the discretionary nature of Croft’s sentence when it reviewed the ample justifications supporting it, including the fact that Croft’s crimes were among the most brutal the court had ever seen. View "Croft v. Williams" on Justia Law

Whitaker, formerly employed by Milwaukee County, alleged that she was discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 when the county failed to accommodate her disability by refusing to extend her period of medical leave, refusing to transfer her to another position, and then terminating her for reasons related to her disability. The district court granted the County summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s conclusion that the complaint impermissibly went beyond the scope of the EEOC charge and that the County was not her “employer” under the statute. Although Milwaukee County was Whitaker’s official employer and was responsible for her compensation, it had no involvement in the principal decisions that she claims violated the statute and no authority to override those decisions, made by the State Department of Health Services. With respect to whether the County is liable for any of its own actions,. Whitaker’s allegations on these matters were outside the scope of her EEOC charge, and, therefore, not subject to judicial consideration. View "Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cnty." on Justia Law

Duckworth borrowed $1,100,000 from the State Bank of Toulon. The security agreement said that Duckworth granted the Bank a security interest in crops and farm equipment. The promissory note referred to the security agreement. The security agreement said that it secured a note “dated December 13, 2008.” There was no promissory note dated December 13. Both the December 15 promissory note and the security agreement were prepared by the Bank’s loan officer. Duckworth filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Bank filed adversary proceedings. The bankruptcy court held that the mistaken date in the security interest did not defeat the security interest and that the security agreement of December 13 secured the note of December 15. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Bank. District courts affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Bank was not entitled to use parol evidence against the bankruptcy trustee to correct the mistaken description of the debt to be secured, so the security agreement did not give the lender a security interest in the specified collateral that could be enforced against the trustee. View "Covey v. State Bank of Toulon" on Justia Law

Velazquez, indicted in 2008 on charges related to a fraudulent investment scheme, violated his bond just prior to his scheduled trial date and remained a fugitive for six months. Velazquez was apprehended and entered a plea of guilty to a single count of mail fraud. Despite pleading guilty and thereafter being continuously in custody, Velazquez refused to be brought to court for seven consecutive hearings in the case. Finally, pursuant to a “drag order,” marshals forcibly brought Velazquez to court. Velazquez sustained injuries in the process. The district court declined to enter another drag order, and Velazquez refused to appear for sentencing. The district court denied his retained lawyer’s motion to withdraw as counsel and sentenced Velazquez in absentia. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred during the sentencing hearing by denying counsel’s motion to withdraw, finding Velazquez to be voluntarily absent, and failing to consider Velazquez’s cooperation as a basis for a reduced sentence. View "United States v. Velazquez" on Justia Law

Widmar worked as a plant manager for 16 years. The company’s National Manufacturing Manager, Roberts, terminated Widmar’s employment in November 2009, claiming that the company was unsatisfied with Widmar’s performance. Widmar alleges that the company unlawfully terminated him because of his age, and then defamed him by speaking ill of his work performance to others. The district court granted the company summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Widmar’s factual assertions suffered from several deficiencies, including failure to assert his ability to perform is position in general View "Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp." on Justia Law