Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Meade wrote a letter to the League for Innovation in the Community College about her employer, Moraine Valley Community College. Meade, an adjunct faculty member, alleged that poor treatment of adjuncts harmed students. She signed the letter as president of the adjunct faculty union. Two days later, Moraine Valley fired Meade, sending her written notice explicitly citing Meade’s letter. A few weeks later, the college warned Meade that it would regard her further presence on campus as criminal trespass. Believing that Moraine Valley retaliated against her for exercising her right to freedom of speech and violated her due process rights, Meade sued the college under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, reasoning that Meade’s letter did not address matters of public interest and could not serve as the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. It rejected Meade’s due process claim for lack of a cognizable property interest in her employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Meade may not pursue a due process claim based on the deprivation of a liberty interest, but pleaded enough to go forward on the theory that the college deprived her of a protected property interest. She also stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation.View "Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

In 2009, Illinois State Police Officer Zeigler pulled over Mordi’s vehicle. A trained dog discovered drugs in the car. Zeigler arrested Mordi, took him to the station, and left him in an interrogation room. Other officers interviewed Mordi. Mordi is a Nigerian national. Nigeria and the U.S. are parties to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Convention. Mordi told Zeigler that his name was Nigerian, but Mordi does not recall mentioning that he was a Nigerian national. Zeigler listed Mordi’s place of birth as Nigeria, but asserts that he was unaware of Mordi’s citizenship. Mordi did tell the interviewing officers about his citizenship. Immigration and Customs Enforcement filed a detainer notice and federal authorities took over the prosecution. Mordi was represented by a federal public defender, who was aware of his nationality. Mordi pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and is serving a sentence. At no point during criminal proceedings was he informed about his right under the Convention to have the Nigerian consulate notified about his status. He did not learn about the Convention until a year later, from another inmate. He wrote to the Nigerian consulate, but did not follow through. Mordi instituted, but dismissed, habeas proceedings, arguing ineffective assistance. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied summary judgment motions by Zeigler and the interviewing officers, based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the specific legal principle on which this case turns was not clearly established.View "Mordi v. Zeigler" on Justia Law

Welton buys, sells, and rents residential real estate and, from 1994-2001, maintained a collateralized line of credit with the NBI. In 2002, NBI declined to extend that line of credit and gave him 90 days to pay off the account. Initially, Welton was unable to make payments, but by 2006 he reached an agreement with NBI. Under that agreement, Welton sent monthly checks to NBI. Those checks were never cashed. In 2007, realizing the checks remained uncashed, Welton sent a certified check in the amount of the uncashed checks. Keely, NBI’s Vice President, contacted Indianapolis Police Officer Anderson to initiate a criminal investigation. After meeting with Keely, Anderson submitted an affidavit in support of probable cause charging Welton with theft and fraud on a financial institution. Welton was arrested, processed, and released. After a trial in 2011, Welton was found not guilty. In 2013, Welton filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that several of Anderson’s statements were knowingly false and that Keely provided many of the statements, resulting in a malicious prosecution and denial of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Welton’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim was foreclosed by circuit precedent; that there is no constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable cause and that bare allegations of “fundamental unfairness” were insufficient to implicate the Due Process Clause.View "Welton v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Hennessy, a car parts manufacturer, beset by asbestos-related personal injury claims, sought coverage by National Union. The companies entered into a cost sharing agreement in 2008. As claims occurred, Hennessy asked National Union to indemnify its settlement and defense costs. To resolve their differences about what was owed, Hennessy demanded arbitration under the agreement, which instructs arbitrators to apply Illinois law. Hennessy filed suit under the Illinois Insurance Code 215 ILCS 5/155(1), which provides that, in cases involving vexatious and unreasonable delay, the court may award reasonable attorney fees, other costs, plus an additional amount. Hennessy claimed that National Union’s delays in providing coverage were vexatious and unreasonable. The district judge declined to dismiss, acknowledging a provision that “the arbitrators shall not be empowered or have jurisdiction to award punitive damages, fines or penalties,” but expressing a belief that Hennessy’s claim arose under statutory law rather than under the cost-sharing agreement. National Union appealed under 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(1)(A), (B), the Federal Arbitration Act. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Hennessy waived any right to ask the arbitrator to award punitive damages, fines, or penalties for an allegedly unreasonable delay. Having submitted a dispute to arbitration that explicitly excludes a particular remedy, a party cannot sue in court for that remedy.View "Hennessy Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2005 Greene and his wife had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and obtained a discharge from all their debts except federal student loan debt of $207,000. As part of the bankruptcy case they sought an order that the Department of Education cancel their debt on the ground that having to repay it would inflict undue hardship. The Greenes claimed that the statute of limitations prohibited collection of their loans, penalties and interest on the loans were caused by the DOE’s negligence, and the loans should be discharged as reparations for slavery and discrimination.” The Seventh Circuit rejected the undue hardship defense on the ground that “the Greenes initiated this case and the DOE has not counterclaimed or sought any judgment … there is no actual controversy.” In 2010 the Department began to garnish Greene’s wages and he sought an injunction. The DOE counterclaimed. The district court ordered Greene to pay the debt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that DOE’s counterclaim was not barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or failure to make a compulsory counterclaim in the bankruptcy proceeding.View "Greene v. U.S. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Zuppardi slipped and fell on the floor of a Wal-Mart store. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, finding that Wal-Mart had not caused the puddle and did not have actual or constructive notice of the puddle before Zuppardi’s fall, and denying Zuppardi’s motion to strike Wal-Mart’s reply for submitting a declaration in bad faith and violating a district court local rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The declaration was not a bad faith filing and the district court was within its discretion in deeming certain facts admitted and in determining that the local rule did not prevent Wal-Mart from replying in the manner it did.View "Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009 defendant was sentenced to 24 months in prison, to be followed by 3 years of supervised release, as a felon in possession of a gun. After his 2011 release, he failed to submit to drug tests, to attend substance-abuse treatment sessions, and to report to his probation officer. The judge sentenced him to five months in prison plus an additional 30 months of supervised release. In 2012 the probation officer reported that he had twice tested positive for marijuana. The judge ordered 45 days of home confinement with electronic monitoring. After defendant had missed several drug tests, the judge ordered him to enroll in a mental health treatment program. In 2013, the probation officer advised the judge that defendant had committed five traffic offenses in one day. The judge revoked supervised release, imposing a five-month sentence of imprisonment with two more years of supervised release. He was released in October 2013 and in April 2014 his probation officer advised the court that defendant had again used marijuana and violated rules of the halfway house where he lived. Although the recommended custody range was 5 to 11 months, the government asked for 15 months. Counsel noted that defendant now had three small children and that prior employers would be glad to rehire him after his release. The judge sentenced him to 15 months with no more supervised release. The Seventh Circuit suspended decision pending supplemental briefing to determine whether the judge predetermined the sentence based on prior proceedings.View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Hinds, with four coconspirators, obtained about 300 counterfeit credit and debit cards. The conspirators’ names were embossed on the front of the cards, but the cards were linked to accounts held by other account holders. They made illegal purchases in four states, rented a car, and booked hotel rooms. Hinds entered an open plea of guilty to conspiracy to use counterfeit devices, possession of forged securities, and conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(1)-(b)(2), 472, 1344, and 1349. The district court sentenced Hinds to imprisonment for three concurrent terms of 30 months, at the bottom of his calculated guideline range, applying a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i) (production or trafficking), as recommended in the presentence report. Hinds argued there was no evidence that he actually produced or trafficked the fraudulent credit and debit cards. The district court found the offense involved “the production or trafficking of counterfeit devices,” ordered Hinds to pay restitution of $21,818.89, and imposed special conditions of supervised release requiring him to pay a portion of his court-ordered substance abuse treatment and drug testing and requiring him to submit to suspicionless searches and seizures. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the enhancement, but remanded the special conditions.View "United States v. Hinds" on Justia Law

Smith was indicted for conspiring to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846, purchasing a vehicle with currency derived from an unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. 1957; concealing information with the intent to defraud the Social Security Administration, 42 U.S.C. 1383(a)(3); and making false statements on applications for food stamps, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). He signed a proffer agreement and pleaded guilty to each of those charges. After a sentencing and forfeiture hearing, the district court imposed a forfeiture order that included the forfeiture of eight parcels of real property. The government claimed these parcels were proceeds from his illegal activities. Smith contended that, in determining that the properties were subject to forfeiture, the district court had relied improperly on statements that he had made during proffer discussions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in admitting testimony about Smith’s proffer statements. Its determination that the eight properties were subject to forfeiture as proceeds of his drug trafficking was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In the alternative, the properties were clearly subject to forfeiture as substitute assets.View "USA v. Kerry Smith" on Justia Law

After being caught in a 2011 ATF sting operation out of a Milwaukee warehouse, Wamiq was convicted of four counts of knowingly shipping, transporting, receiving, possessing, selling, distributing, or purchasing contraband under the Cigarette Trafficking Act (CCTA). The same jury convicted Khan, who acted independently of Wamiq, of three counts under the CCTA, 18 U.S.C. 2342(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence. The court also upheld the forfeiture orders and Wamiq’s sentence, rejecting Wamiq’s challenges to the court’s findings as to the loss amount caused by Wamiq’s unlawful conduct and Wamiq’s acceptance of responsibility.View "United States v. Wamiq" on Justia Law