Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lightspeed operates online pornography sites and sued a defendant, identified only Internet Protocol address, which was allegedly associated with unlawful viewing of Lightspeed’s content, using a “hacked” password. Lightspeed identified 6,600 others (by IP addresses only) as “co‐conspirators” in a scheme to steal passwords and content. Lightspeed, acting ex parte, served subpoenas on the ISPs (then non‐parties) for the personally identifiable information of each alleged coconspirator, none of whom had been joined as parties. The ISPs moved to quash and for a protective order. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the ISPs. Lightspeed amended its complaint to name as co‐conspirator parties the ISPs and unidentified “corporate representatives,” alleging negligence, violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030 and 1030(g), and deceptive practices. Lightspeed issued new subpoenas seeking the personally identifiable information. The ISPs removed the case to federal court. The district judge denied an emergency motion to obtain the identification information. After several “changes” with respect to Lightspeed’s lawyers, the court stated that they “demonstrated willingness to deceive … about their operations, relationships, and financial interests have varied from feigned ignorance to misstatements to outright lies … calculated so that the Court would grant early‐discovery requests, thereby allowing [them] to identify defendants and exact settlement proceeds.” After granting Lightspeed’s motion for voluntary dismissal, the court granted attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. 1927, stating that the litigation “smacked of bullying pretense.” Failing to pay, the lawyers were found to be in civil contempt and ordered to pay 10% of the original sanctions award to cover costs for the contempt litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Duffy v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1994, Maranda exposed himself to a six‐year‐old girl, then exposed himself to a drive-through window cashier and attempted to pull her into his car. He pleaded guilty to public indecency and was sentenced to home confinement. Months later, Maranda molested a six‐year‐old. He was released from state prison in 1998 and downloaded child pornography. He was arrested, and pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced him to 40 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. In 2002, Maranda was released and began serving of supervision. In 2005, he was arrested on an allegation that he molested a nine‐year‐old. He pleaded guilty to aggravated domestic battery. The court revoked supervised release and sentenced him to another 30 months in prison and two years of supervised release. Maranda’s sentence was to expire on March 16, 2008, but the government filed a petition under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 4248, which authorizes detention of a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released. His release was automatically stayed. His hearing occurred more than four years later. The district court ruled that Maranda was not subject to commitment. He was released in 2012; days later, he began receiving phone calls from another convicted sex offender in violation of a release condition. His probation officer petitioned for a second revocation of supervised release. Maranda moved to dismiss, arguing that supervised release began on the day imprisonment ended. The district court rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Read together, the supervised‐release provision, 18 U.S.C. 3624(e), and the stay‐of‐release provision in the civil‐commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. 4248(a), establish that he was not “released from imprisonment” while awaiting the outcome of his civil commitment proceedings. View "United States v. Maranda" on Justia Law

Employers that withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans must pay their share of the shortfall. They can seek recalculation of the plans' assessment within 90 days, 29 U.S.C. 1399(b)(2)(A), and within another 60 days, may invoke a process that the Act calls arbitration, though it is neither contractual nor consensual. Central States Pension Fund concluded that US Foods has withdrawn in part and assessed liability in 2008 and in 2009. US Foods timely requested arbitration of the 2009 assessment, but did not timely seek arbitration of the 2008 assessment. In the Fund’s suit to collect the 2008 assessment, US Foods asked the court to order the arbitrator to calculate the amount due for 2008 and 2009 jointly. The court ruled that US Foods had missed the deadline for arbitral resolution of the 2008 assessment. US Foods appealed, relying on 9 U.S.C.16(a)(1)(B), which authorizes an interlocutory appeal from an order “denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed”. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. An order declining to interfere in the conduct of an arbitration is not an order “denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed” under section 16(a)(1)(B). View "Cent. States SE & SW Areas Pension Fund v. US Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former laborer, applied for social security disability benefits, claiming he was unable to work a full 40-hour week because of acute lower back pain that radiates into his right leg. He has had various treatments and takes several medications such as oxycodone and percocet. His application was denied; the Appeals Council and district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that the administrative law judge was likely mistaken in believing that one physician’s report refuted the findings of the other physician. What was relevant was not the cause of the pain and numbness but the severity of these symptoms and whether they disabled plaintiff from working full time. Both physicians diagnosed radiculopathy. If the administrative law judge remains skeptical of the claim, he can order a further examination of the plaintiff by a qualified physician instructed to offer a medical opinion (if possible) on the plaintiff’s physical ability to engage in full-time work. The court stated references to the credibility of the applicant are “a recurrent feature of the government’s defense of denials of social security disability benefits” that constitutes “professional misconduct and if it continues we’ll have to impose sanctions.” View "Hanson v. Colvin" on Justia Law

In 2003 defendant, a member of the “Concord Affiliated” Gary street gang, was convicted of two counts of having distributed at least 50 grams of crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Although the jury acquitted him of conspiracy, the judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had been a member of the conspiracy and reasoned that the sales of crack by the other members, to the extent that those sales had been reasonably foreseeable, constituted “relevant conduct” and a correct basis for calculating the guidelines sentencing range. Determining that defendant had foreseen sales “way in excess of” 1.5 kilograms of crack (the then-threshold quantity for the highest base offense level (38)) sentenced defendant to 360 months. The judge also remarked that defendant was more likely than not involved in murders in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2005. Defendant later moved for a sentencing reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) based on the retroactive lowering of the base offense level for offenses involving crack. The district judge denied the motion, ruling that defendant had been responsible for the sale of at least 16.9 kilograms. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the lower court misunderstood the meaning of “relevant conduct.” The possible significance of the murders remains an unresolved issue. View "United States v. Davison" on Justia Law

In 2005, General Warehouse, an employer obligated to contribute to the Central States Pension Fund on behalf of certain employees ceased to have an obligation to the Fund, which led to a complete withdrawal, incurring withdrawal liability of $1,262,568. Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1301(b)(1), if a withdrawing employer is unable to pay in full, a pension plan can recover the deficiency jointly and severally from any other business under common control with the withdrawing The Fund sued to collect from General Warehouse, GEOBEO and other businesses under common control. The parties entered into a consent judgment, acknowledging that the named defendants were jointly and severally liable. The Fund then initiated an action to add the defendants to the group of business entities from which it can collect. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding “overwhelming evidence” that the entities were under common control. View "Cent. States, Southeast SE & SW Areas Pension Fund v. CLP Venture LLC" on Justia Law

Based on a tip that Gutierrez was involved in drug trafficking, officers went to his home with a certified narcotics canine and knocked at the front door. They saw movement inside, but no one answered the door. The officers had the dog examine the door for the scent of narcotics, and he alerted. After knocking for 15 minutes, the officers forcibly entered and secured the home, but did not search. An officer swore out an affidavit, relying on the dog’s positive alert, and returned with a search warrant. The ensuing search revealed 11 pounds of methamphetamine in Gutierrez’s home. A few months later, the Supreme Court held that the use of a drug-sniffing dog on an individual’s porch is a Fourth Amendment search. Gutierrez pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum, 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that under the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Davis v. United States, the evidence should not be suppressed if “binding appellate precedent specifically authorize[d]” the officers’ conduct at the time they acted. Seventh Circuit precedent did authorize the officers’ conduct. View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

A strike against the hotel began in 2003, but apparently escalated in 2008, when the union pursued a more aggressive strategy. It began engaging in secondary activity by targeting organizations that had made arrangements to reserve large blocks of rooms or space at the hotel, in the hopes that they would cancel their plans and pressure the hotel to end the strike. The union would send delegations, consisting of striking hotel workers and union staff in groups of two-10 people, to the stores and offices of potential hotel patrons. The hotel claims that these delegations violated 29 U.S.C. 187(a) and 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) by coercing the customers into cancelling their agreements to book rooms. Although the strike ended in 2013, the hotel sought damages for past activity. At the close of discovery, the district court granted the union summary judgment, finding that the union’s conduct was not coercive, and that barring it as a matter of federal labor law would raise important free speech concerns. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded for a trial regarding whether certain of the union’s actions were coercive, whether any such coercive conduct damaged the hotel, and if so, to what extent. View "520 S. MI Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1" on Justia Law

In 2000, Marr’s father founded Equipment Source, which sold used forklifts. Marr managed sales and daily operations, advertising online and selling online or by phone. In 2002, his father opened a merchant account at Palos Bank, to process credit card transactions, with Marr as a signatory. Marr sold forklifts that he never owned or possessed. Customers would contact Marr to complain that they received an invoice and notice of shipment, and that Equipment Source charged the credit card, but that the forklift never arrived. While Marr gave varying explanations, he rarely refunded money or delivered the forklifts. Customers had to contact their credit card companies to dispute the charges. The credit card company would send notice of the dispute to Palos Bank, which noticed a high incidence of chargebacks on Equipment Source’s merchant account and eventually froze the company’s accounts. Its loss on Equipment Source’s merchant account was $328,881.89. In 2003, the FBI executed a search warrant at Equipment Source’s offices and Equipment Source ceased doing business. Eight years later, the government charged Marr with six counts of wire fraud. At trial, the government presented testimony from 14 customers who paid for forklifts but never received them; two bank employees who dealt with chargebacks, and a financial expert witness, who confirmed the $328,881.89 loss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Marr’s conviction, rejecting arguments that the government relied upon improper propensity evidence, that jury instructions incorrectly explained the law, and that the district court lacked the authority to order restitution. View "United States v. Marr" on Justia Law

Charged with four counts of transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1); and one count of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(5)(B)McLaughlin pled guilty to one count of transporting child pornography. His collection included photographs of adults sexually abusing pubescent and prepubescent minors, children engaged in sexual acts with animals, and children engaged in sexual acts with other children; he had more than 150 videos and more than 500 photographs of child pornography. He was sentenced to 130 months’ imprisonment, a fine of $50,000, and 20 years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding application of the four-level sentencing enhancement under section 2G2.2(b)(4) for “material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence.” The court also rejected arguments that the sentence was based on speculation and unfounded allegations; that the district court failed to address his argument regarding his unusual susceptibility to abuse in prison; and that the court failed to articulate its reasons for imposing a $50,000 fine. View "Unted States v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law