Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Executing an arrest warrant for Wilson, officers talked to people who had seen Wilson enter a particular house. The officers were invited inside to talk with the owner, Rawls, who gave them permission to look around to confirm that Wilson was not there. In the kitchen they smelled the burnt marijuana. Richards sat at the table. An officer saw what he thought was a rock of crack cocaine on a plate, and a marijuana cigarette, a small amount of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and plastic baggies on the table. An officer had to use pepper spray to subdue Richards. When officers handcuffed Richards and lifted him to his feet, a handgun fell from his waistband. A knife was sticking out of his pocket. The officers conducted a protective sweep of the house. In the unlocked bedroom that Richards used when visiting Rawls, an open briefcase on the bed appeared to contain cocaine. An officer read Rawls his Miranda rights. Rawls was never handcuffed or detained. Rawls told the officers that he understood his rights and willingly signed consent to search after one request. Although Rawls was 86 years old, neither officer observed signs of confusion. Richards was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a place for using and distributing controlled substances, U.S.C. 856(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm having been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court denied motions to suppress and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Unted States v. Richards" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Adkins of attempting to possess heroin with intent to distribute and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 90 months. In a separate case, Adkins pled guilty to receipt of child pornography. In consolidated appeals, he challenged evidentiary decisions, jury instructions, allegedly improper statements by the government, and the sentence in the heroin-handgun case. The Seventh Circuit rejected those claims, but vacated his sentence for child pornography, finding a condition of supervised release unconstitutionally vague. The condition stated that “defendant shall not view or listen to any pornography or sexually stimulating material or sexually oriented material or patronize locations where such material is available.” Read literally, the condition might preclude Adkins from using a computer or entering a library, regardless of what he views, because both are “locations” where “sexually stimulating material … is available.” He might not be able to ride the bus, enter a grocery store, watch television, open a magazine or newspaper, read a classic book, or even go out in public, given the ubiquity of advertisements that use potentially sexually oriented or sexually stimulating images. View "United States v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Zayas worked at the Hospital as an ultrasound technician from 1999 until her discharge, at age 55, in 2011. Griesman, Zayas’ supervisor, was responsible for hiring and terminating Zayas and, before firng her, had warned Zayas about sending disrespectful emails. Zayas is Puerto Rican. She brought a national origin discrimination claim and a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. Her case was based on the fact that she was the oldest technician in the department, and was replaced by a younger employee and on evidence of several incidents during which Zayas believed that Griesman or her co-workers were disrespectful. The district court granted the Hospital summary judgment on all three claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Zayas cited a number of hostile incidents, none were related to her national origin, nor were they objectively severe enough to survive summary judgment. Although Zayas’ coworkers did not like her, it was likely the result of “workplace pettiness,” not her Puerto Rican origin. View "Zayas v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp." on Justia Law

In a previous suit, an Illinois county claimed that a mortgage services company (MERSCORP) and banks doing business with it violated an Illinois statute that requires every mortgage to be recorded with the county in which the property is located. MERSCORP operates an online system for registration and assignment of mortgages by banks. Although MERSCORP becomes the mortgagee of record for purposes of recording, the assignments are not substantive. The purpose is to enable repeated assignments of the lender’s promissory note to successive holders. These assignments are not recorded in the county land registries. Only MERSCORP pays a recording fee. Subsequent “assignees” do not have a mortgage to record because they are assignees, not of the property interest that secures the homeowner’s debt, but only of the promissory note. The Seventh Circuit rejected the county’s claim that the defendants were unjustly enriched by using system to claim the valuable protection of recording, using MERSCORP as a placeholder mortgagee and a legal fiction that mortgage transfers are not assignments. The court affirmed the district court’s subsequent dismissal of a similar suit, by another county, again noting that the system is not unlawful.View "Macon Cnty v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

IMCC loaned Harbins $60 million to buy Georgia land to construct a shopping center. In addition to a mortgage, IMCC obtained a guaranty from Chivas, providing that if IMCC “forecloses … the amount of the debt may be reduced only by the price for which that collateral is sold at the foreclosure sale, even if the collateral is worth more than the sale price.” Harbins defaulted; IMCC foreclosed in a nonjudicial proceeding, involving a public auction conducted by the sheriff after public notice. IMCC successfully bid $7 million and filed a petition to confirm the auction. Unless such a petition is granted, a mortgagee who obtains property in a nonjudicial foreclosure cannot obtain a deficiency judgment if the property is worth less than the mortgage balance owed. A Georgia court denied confirmation. Chivas refused to honor the guaranty. A district court in Chicago awarded IMCC $17 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the Georgia statute “is odd by modern standards,” but does not prevent a suit against a guarantor. The agreement guaranteed IMCC the difference between what it paid for the land and the unpaid balance of the loan, even if the land is worth more than what IMCC paid for it. The agreement is lawful under Georgia and Illinois law. View "Inland Mortg. Capital Corp v. Chivas Retail Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Officers executed a search warrant at a house Vela had rented and recovered 101 marijuana plants. A co-conspirator was at the house with a loaded gun. At Vela’s home, officers recovered 112 grams of cocaine, a loaded gun, and 390 grams of marijuana. He was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana (21 U.S.C. 841(a)); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and, in a second indictment, conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute 100 or more marijuana plants and possession with intent to distribute 100 or more marijuana plants. Vela entered guilty pleas to both counts of the first indictment; the government dismissed the second indictment. Vela agreed that his role in the grow house conspiracy would be relevant for sentencing purposes. The plea agreement called for a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintenance of premises for manufacturing controlled substances under the 2011 U.S.S.G. Manual, 2D1.1(b)(12), which did not become effective until four months after Vela’s arrest. The district court used the new Guidelines, rather than those in effect at the time of the offense, calculating a range of 97 to 121 months. Without the enhancement, the range would have been 78 to 97 months. Vela also faced a statutory mandatory minimum consecutive sentence of five years on the firearm offense, 18 U.S.C. 3561. The court sentenced Vela to 138 months. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. A defendant’s decision to waive his right to appeal as part of a plea agreement is not rendered involuntary by a subsequent change in the law. View "United States v. Vela" on Justia Law

In 1971 Milwaukee County provided its employees with health insurance under an ordinance that stated that the “county shall participate in the payment of monthly premiums” and extended coverage to retirees. In 1993, the ordinance was amended to provide that “[t]he County shall pay the full monthly cost of providing such [health insurance] coverage to retired members” as “part of an employee’s vested benefit contract.” Upon her 1991 retirement, Hussey had paid no co‐payments or deductibles for her health care. Her benefit plan booklet explained that with 15 years of service: “the retiree may participate in the health plan in which he/she is currently enrolled on the same basis as … the active employee group. The County will make the full premium contribution.” Until 2012, the plan coordinated benefits so that expenditures not covered by Medicare were paid in full by the County. In 2012 the County increased deductibles, co‐payments, and co‐insurance charges and modified coordination of benefits so that retirees over age 65 would pay the same deductibles, co‐payments, and co‐insurance charges as active employees. Hussey filed a purported class action, alleging that the failure to provide cost‐free health insurance to retirees constituted an unconstitutional taking of property. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the County only promised retirees the ability to participate in the same health insurance plan as active employees on a “premium‐free” basis.View "Hussey v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

Beverly’s mother, Sarah, was diagnosed with end‐stage heart failure. Beverly lived with Sarah and acted as her primary caregiver; she administered insulin and other medication, drained fluids from her mother’s heart, and bathed and dressed her. Sarah told a hospice social worker that she had always wanted to visit Las Vegas. The social worker secured funding from a nonprofit organization. The six-day trip was scheduled for January 2008. Beverly requested unpaid leave from her Chicago Park District job to accompany her mother. The District denied the request. Beverly claims that she was not informed of the denial before her trip. She and her mother traveled to Las Vegas where they participated in tourist activities, while Beverly served as her mother’s caretaker. At one point Beverly drove her mother to a hospital when a fire unexpectedly prevented them from reaching their hotel room, where Sarah’s medicine was stored. Several months later, the District terminated Beverly for unauthorized absences during her trip. Ballard filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act, which refers to leave “to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition,” 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(C). The district court ruled in favor of Beverly, stating that “where the care takes place has no bearing on” FMLA protections. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Ballard v. Chicago Park Dist." on Justia Law

Jordan was released from federal prison in 2011 and began serving a three-year term of supervised release with conditions that Jordan could not leave the judicial district without permission, associate with a felon or person engaged in criminal activity, or commit a crime. He was required to report within 72 hours any arrest or questioning by law enforcement. In 2012 a probation officer sought to revoke Jordan’s supervised release. Jordan had been arrested in Texas for possession of 30 pounds of marijuana. The petition alleged that Jordan left the district without permission; associated with a felon; committed a new offense; and failed to report his arrest within 72 hours. Jordan admitted three violations, but disputed that he had possessed marijuana with intent to distribute. Jordan’s lawyer objected to introduction of the police report without the testimony of the arresting officer. The district court overruled the objections without explanation, found that Jordan had possessed marijuana with intent to distribute, and sentenced Jordan to 24 months in prison, without finding that the police report was reliable or making the “interest of justice” finding required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) if a defendant is denied the right to question any adverse witness in a revocation hearing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that failure to make the finding was not harmless error. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

In 1983 Bitler leased gas stations to Marathon. The Environmental Protection Agency adopted new regulations so that that underground petroleum tanks and pipes at the gas stations had to be removed, upgraded, or replaced, 40 C.F.R. 280.21(a). In 1992 the parties amended the leases to make Marathon “fully responsible for removing” the tanks and pipes, filling holes created by the removal, complying with all environmental laws, “leav[ing] the Premises in a condition reasonably useful for future commercial use,” and “replac[ing] any asphalt, concrete, or other surface, including landscaping.” Marathon agreed to return the Premises “as nearly as possible in the same condition as it was in prior to such remediation work,” and to be responsible “for any and all liability, losses, damages, costs and expenses,” and to continue paying rent. The properties can be restored as gas stations with above‐ground storage tanks, and may be suitable for other commercial outlets. After completion of the work Bitler sued Marathon, alleging breach of contract and “waste.” The Seventh Circuit vacated to waste regarding Michigan properties, with directions to double those damages. The court affirmed dismissal of some of the contract claims. It would not conform to the reasonable expectations of the parties to limit liability for waste or other misconduct by a tenant simply because a lease had to be extended for an indefinite period to allow a response to unforeseen changes. View "Bitler Inv. Venture II v. Marathon Petroleum Co. LP" on Justia Law