Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Based on his participation in a mortgage fraud scheme, Rucker was convicted of one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343 and sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and payment of $73,488.95 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rucker’s claim that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to impeach a testifying co-defendant with evidence of that co-defendant’s 2000 conviction for theft concerning a program receiving federal funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A), for which she received a sentence of five years’ probation. The conviction, more than 10 years old, had little probative value, given that the witness had admitted pleading guilty to 11 counts and that her plea agreement contemplated that the government would move for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 in exchange for her truthful testimony. View "United States v. Rucker" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit a robbery affecting interstate commerce, a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and to carrying firearms in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), based on a plan that, armed with guns, the conspirators would rob a truck used by marijuana traffickers to transport cash from Illinois to California, buy marijuana, and haul it back to the Chicago area. The conspirators lost the truck in traffic and were unable to complete the robbery. The district judge sentenced the defendant to 30 months for the conspiracy plus 60 months on the firearms count, the statutory minimum and required to run consecutively to the conspiracy sentence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Another conspirator, guilty of the same offenses, received an identical sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the judge’s addition of two levels to the base offense level for conspiring to subject the robbery victims to physical restraint under U.S.S.G. 2X1.1(a), 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Conversations recorded by a government informant had revealed that plan. The court also upheld refusal to reduce the base offense level by three levels because the conspiracy did not come to fruition as a substantive crime, U.S.S.G. 2X1.1(b)(2). The conspirators were “dangerous people,” so there was little doubt that they would have attacked the truck, “with mayhem a likely result.” View "United States v. Dosen" on Justia Law

Medlock, an Indiana University sophomore, lived, by choice in a dormitory, where he was required to allow inspections of his room by graduate students employed by IU. Medlock was given a week’s notice by email and inspection of his floor was announced by intercom on the day of the inspection. On that day, a student inspector entered Medlock’s unoccupied room and saw a clear tube on the desk. Based on his training, he believed that it contained marijuana. Another inspector concurred and called University Police Officer King. They also noticed burned candles, an ashtray containing ashes, and a rolled‐up blanket at the bottom of the door. Smoking of any kind is forbidden in the dormitory, as are “open flame materials,” such as candles. Medlock’s closet was ajar. Officer King saw that it contained six‐foot‐high marijuana plant. He obtained a warrant; further search revealed marijuana paraphernalia, a grow light, and 89 grams of marijuana. Medlock was charged with felony possession of more than 30 grams of marijuana. For unexplained reasons, charges were dropped. The university suspended Medlock for one year. After a year obtained readmission to IU. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which he sought destruction of the record of his expulsion, and damages from the student inspectors and King. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the ”in‐your-face” flagrancy of violations of university rules and of criminal law. The case is “near frivolous,” suing the student inspectors “offensive,” and “most surprising … is the exceptional lenity.” The court opined that the relation of students to universities is “essentially that of customer to seller.” View " Medlock v. Trs. of IN Univ." on Justia Law

Creditor appealed the bankruptcy court's denial of her claim against the estate of debtor, her former husband and business partner. The state courts had determined that debtor still owed money to creditor after they divorced and unwound their "monster truck" business. The court had jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 158(d) because the decisions of the bankruptcy court and the district court were final orders as to creditor's claim. The court found that the issues concerning the validity of creditor's claim were previously adjudicated in the state courts and that the doctrine of issue preclusion prevented the bankruptcy court from rehearing those issues. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Adams v. Adams" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges relating to his operation of a commodity pool that he used as the vehicle for a Ponzi scheme. The government conceded that the judge erred in adding an abuse of trust enhancement in a fraud cause. While conceding the error in the calculation of the guidelines range, the government argued that it was not plain error because defendant did not argue in the district court that it was an error. The government argued that any error in adding the 2-level abuse of trust enhancement was offset by the judge's failure to include a 2-level vulnerable-victim enhancement. Concluding that the judge should have considered the vulnerable-victim enhancement, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Rushton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the FDIC, seeking judicial review of his disallowed claims. The district court granted the FDIC's motion to dismiss and plaintiff appealed. Pursuant to the statutory provisions in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, the court concluded that the complaint was untimely because plaintiff filed his complaint more than 60 days after the FDIC mailed a notice to the address he maintained at the Bank. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. FDIC" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the court ruled on motions to seal settlement agreements. In Goesel, the law firm filed a motion to maintain under seal documents disclosing the amounts of a personal injury settlement and of the lawyers' costs and fees. In Massuda, defendants sought to keep the redacted settlement agreement, in a suit for breach of fiduciary duty, kept under seal. The court concluded that the parties in both cases have failed to rebut the presumption of public access to judicial records. In neither case have they offered any reason for secrecy except that they have a confidentiality agreement and that was insufficient. The court denied the request in Goesel where an outsider to the litigation could not evaluate the dispute over the district judge's modification of the settlement without knowing the amount of the settlement before and after the modification. The court dismissed the request in Massuda where, inter alia, there was no indication that the amount of the settlement figured in the district court's decision. View "Goesel, et al. v. Boley Int'l, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against B&B and others, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962. The alleged scheme involved "Population Equivalents" (PEs), specified quantities of sewage that a house or other building was estimated to dump into the local sewage system. The complaint alleged that B&B had improperly taken control of the Wasco Sanitary District and used that control to divert to itself permit fees that should have gone to the district to finance an expansion of its sewage system. The district court dismissed the claim for want of RICO standing because plaintiffs could not demonstrate an injury to their business or property. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their application for an award of attorneys' fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) and (2). The court concluded that plaintiffs' suit, while meritless, was not frivolous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Fiala, et al. v. B&B Enterprises, et al." on Justia Law

Menzies, an air cargo handling business, leased CenterPoint’s 185,280-square-foot warehouse near O’Hare Airport. Another tenant used the building to store airplane parts until 2006. Under the lease, Menzies is responsible for repairing the “floor,” while CenterPoint is responsible for repairing the “foundation.” CenterPoint constructed improvements costing $1.4 million, at Menzies’ request, including increasing the number of dock doors from two to 38 and installing 45,000‐pound dock levelers. When Menzies began moving its operations into the building in November 2007, the six‐inch concrete slab did not exhibit any visible damage. By January 2009, the slab had begun to deteriorate. The damage was not consistent with typical wear and tear. The slab could not support Menzies’ equipment. CenterPoint paid $92,000 for repairs, then stopped doing so and did not submit an insurance claim. The slab is so damaged that it must be replaced, at an estimated cost of $966,000 to $1.23 million. Menzies sued CenterPoint for breach and CenterPoint counterclaimed. The district court held that neither party was entitled to recover because the slab had a “dual nature as both floor and foundation,” but “the damage at issue was related to the slab’s function as a floor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Aeroground, Inc. v. CenterPoint Props. Trust" on Justia Law

Manitowoc police brought in a man suspected of stabbing a police officer. The suspect apparently refused to eat, and officers believed he was mentally unstable. Police Chief Kingsbury arranged for the suspect’s mother to bring him a home-cooked meal, but the chief’s wishes were not communicated until after officers, including Swetlik, had already taken the suspect to the county jail for booking. Kingsbury called the jail and spoke with Swetlik. Swetlik told other police officers that Kingsbury had told him to lie to the jailers and had threatened him and reported the same to a deputy chief. The police union later took a vote of no confidence in Kingsbury and compiled a list of grievances, including Swetlik’s complaint. A private firm was engaged to investigate and ultimately recommended that both Swetlik and Kingsbury be terminated, concluding, based on a recording of the call, that Swetlik lied about the incident. The city council voted to bring termination charges against both. Swetlik was placed on paid leave until a hearing officer recommended dismissal of the charge. Swetlik was reinstated, but sued, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment by bringing charges against him for his complaints about Kingsbury. The district court rejected the claim, finding that Swetlik’s statements were not protected speech because they did not address a matter of public concern. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendants were justified in bringing the charge based on the investigation.View "Swetlik v. Crawford" on Justia Law