Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

CE is a small Chicago-area engineering firm that has filed at least 150 class action suits under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. In this case, CE sued Cy’s Crab House on behalf of a class of junk-fax recipients. Truck is the liability carrier for the Cy’s Crab House restaurants and provided a defense under a reservation of rights. The case was certified as a class action, and went to trial. In the middle of trial, without notifying the insurer, Cy’s settled with the class, for policy limits. State-court coverage litigation ensued. The district court approved the final settlement and entered final judgment. Less than a month later, the Seventh Circuit issued a decision casting doubt on the conduct of class counsel. In light of that decision, Truck moved to intervene to reopen the judgment, challenge the settlement, and seek class decertification based on misconduct by class counsel. Instead of filing a conditional appeal, Truck asked the district court for a 14-day extension of the time to appeal. Ultimately the court denied intervention as untimely. Truck Insurance filed a notice purporting to appeal both the order denying intervention and the final judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the order denying intervention, but could not grant any meaningful relief because it lacked jurisdiction to review the final judgment. View "Truck Ins. Exch. v. CE Design Ltd." on Justia Law

The Zuno brothers were charged as members of a conspiracy to possess cocaine and marijuana with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846. Ismael also was charged in 19 cocaine distribution counts, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); Jose, was charged with 19 counts of cocaine distribution and two counts for use of a communication facility to commit a drug trafficking offense, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). Both had prior felony drug convictions, so the prosecution filed an information under 21 U.S.C. 851, triggering for each the potential of a ten‐year mandatory minimum term of incarceration. Both pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count and Ismael also pleaded guilty to the 19 distribution counts. Jose’s plea was entered under a plea agreement that included provisions resulting in the dismissal of all other charges against him and the prior conviction information; he was sentenced to an 80‐month term. Ismael’s guilty plea was entered without an agreement; he was sentenced to a term of 120 months. In calculating the sentences, the district judge determined that both were organizers or leaders of a drug organization that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a), resulting in a four‐level increase in their base offense levels. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Zuno" on Justia Law

Perez worked for a gasoline and convenience store, 2005-2009, and was working as the store manager when she sold herself about $127 worth of candy bars for $12. She was fired for failure to “control cash and/or inventory.” A few months earlier, Perez’s non‐Hispanic male supervisor had committed a similar act and was only given a warning. The district court rejected her suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging gender and national origin discrimination, on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that, although Perez’s behavior was wrongful, and a jury might find that her firing was not tainted by unlawful bias, a jury could also find that her wrongdoing was comparable to the wrongdoing of her supervisor, and that animus against women and Hispanics tainted the termination decision. View "Perez v. Thorntons, Inc." on Justia Law

Jin, a naturalized American citizen of Chinese origin, with a bachelor’s degree in physics from a Chinese university and master’s degrees in physics and computer science from American universities, was employed as a Motorola software engineer, 1998-2007. Her duties involved a cellular telecommunications system: Integrated Digital Enhanced Network (IDEN). While on medical leave in China, 2006-2007, she sought a job with a Chinese company, Sun Kaisens, which develops telecommunications technology for the Chinese armed forces. She returned to the U.S., bought a one‐way ticket to China on a plane scheduled to leave Chicago days later, then downloaded thousands of internal Motorola documents, stamped proprietary, disclosing details of IDEN, which she was carrying with $31,000 when stopped by Customs agents. She stated she intended to live in China and work for Sun Kaisens. She was convicted of theft of trade secrets, but acquitted of economic espionage, under the Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. 1831, 1832, and sentenced to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that what she stole was not a trade secret and that she neither intended nor knew that the theft would harm Motorola. The court characterized the sentence as lenient, given Jin’s egregious conduct, which included repeatedly lying to federal agents.p View "United States v. Jin" on Justia Law

Police responded to an anonymous 911 call reporting a group of 25 people acting loudly and displaying hand guns in a parking lot, but actually found a smaller group of individuals, none of whom appeared to be acting inappropriately. The officers approached the group, which had begun to disperse slowly. For no apparent reason, an officer singled out Williams and performed a frisk. Williams began to resist and tried to escape, but was ultimately restrained. Officers searched his body and found a handgun and several ‘ecstasy’ pills. The district judge denied a motion to suppress and Williams pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, reserving his right to appeal. The district judge applied two sentencing enhancements, which significantly increased William’s offense level and applicable range of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the conviction, finding that the search was unlawful. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Fallon purchased a one‐way train ticket from Chicago to Seattle, causing DEA Agent Romano to suspect that Fallon might be a drug courier. Romano approached Fallon, who provided identification with an out-of-date address and stated that he was unemployed and was going to visit a friend. Fallon refused to provide a current address; Romano noticed that Fallon was sweating and trembling. Fallon allowed a search of his duffle, but declined to permit agents to open a locked brief case, stating that it contained $50,000 and that he intended to purchase a house. Romano directed Fallon to exit the train. While waiting for a drug‐detection dog, Romano pried the briefcase open, and observed that it contained currency. Fallon then claimed that the currency belonged to a third person to be used for investment. The dog alerted to the briefcase, which contained $100,120. The government initiated civil forfeiture and the owner of the Funds, Marrocco, filed a claim. Marrocco, who was not charged with any crime connected, moved to quash the seizure, arguing that it was the fruit of an illegal search. The district court held that the agents lacked probable cause to open the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. Ultimately, the district court entered summary judgment, holding that the currency was either the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction, or was intended to facilitate such a transaction. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Marrocco’s testimony, recounting his employment history and relatively expense‐free living, created a dispute of material fact regarding whether the Funds could have been Marrocco’s legally-acquired life savings. There was also expert evidence challenging whether the dog’s alert demonstrates that the Funds recently were in contact with illegal drugs. View "Marrocco v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand, One Hundred Twenty Dollars." on Justia Law

Baugh suffered severe brain injury when the Cuprum ladder he was using to clean his gutters collapsed. In a suit, alleging defective design and negligence, there were no eyewitnesses, and, because of the injury, Baugh could not testify. Three months before trial, Cuprum informed plaintiff’s counsel that it intended to use an exemplar of the ladder at trial, built to the exact specifications of the ladder Baugh had been using. In a pretrial conference, the ladder was marked as an exhibit “for Demonstrative Purposes.” Plaintiff objected. Discovery had closed two years earlier, and the ladder had not been included in expert disclosures. The judge determined that since the ladder was being offered only as a demonstrative exhibit, plaintiff’s objections were irrelevant. Cuprum used the ladder during trial to argue that, contrary to plaintiff’s design defect theory, the ladder would not collapse under a normal load with all legs on the ground. Cuprum’s expert presented testimony and video in which he tested the ladder, including jumping on the ladder as if it were a pogo stick. Over plaintiff’s objection, the judge allowed the jury to inspect the ladder during deliberation. The jury returned a verdict for Cuprum. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that sending the ladder to the jury room was not harmless error. View "John Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. De C.V." on Justia Law

Bolton was convicted of first degree murder for a 1994 shooting. On appeal, Bolton argued insufficient evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to join a stipulation between the state and a co‐defendant concerning an exculpatory pre‐trial statement; and that his 50-year sentence was excessive. The Illinois appellate court affirmed. Bolton did not appeal, but filed a state post‐conviction petition, claiming that the state fraudulently withheld photographs of the lineup and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial on that basis. The court rejected Bolton’s Brady claim because there was no reasonable probability that the photographs would have altered the outcome of the trial, characterizing the evidence against Bolton as “overwhelming,” and rejected Bolton’s Strickland challenge as waived because it was not raised on direct appeal. After unsuccessful appeals, Bolton filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming newly discovered evidence in support of his constitutional claims; prosecutorial misconduct in withholding photographic evidence of the lineup that was favorable to the defense; and that counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, finding that Bolton did not preserve the claim that he was denied due process because the lineup was suggestive. View "Bolton v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Madden had almost reached the railroad crossing when her car stalled. She re‐started it and drove onto the crossing; the car stalled again. The crossing gates began to descend, the warning lights began flashing, and the crossing bells sounded. Madden tried to restart her car, according to witnesses, and another driver got out of his car and started walking toward the crossing. He saw Madden open her car door when the train was only 45 to 50 yards from the crossing, and start to run. The train struck the car, pushing it against her, causing fatal injuries. Her estate sued the railroad, claiming that the crossing gates had descended, the warning lights had begun flashing, and the locomotive horn had been blown, all fewer than 20 seconds before the train reached the crossing, in violation of federal safety regulations, 49 C.F.R. 222.21(b)(2), 234.225. The district court entered judgment in favor of the railroad. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that neither “the children’s testimony, reflecting their incompetent efforts to reconstruct the accident, nor the experts’ worthless evidence, nor both bodies of evidence combined (0 + 0 = 0), would enable a reasonable jury to infer negligence on the part of the railroad. View "Nunez v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

The defendants, affiliated companies, owned ATMs in Indianapolis bars that were popular with college students. Plaintiffs filed a purported class action, based on violation of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693b(d)(3). At the time, the Act required a sticker notice on the ATM and an onscreen notification during transactions. Defendants provided onscreen notice but not, according to the complaint, a sticker. The Act has been amended to remove the sticker notice requirement. The district court decertified the class. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the district judge did not provide adequate explanation. While the compensatory function of the class action has no significance in this case, the damages sought by the class, and, more importantly, the attorney’s fee that the court will award if the class prevails, will likely make the suit a wake‐up call and have a deterrent effect on future violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. View "Hughes v. Kore of IN Enters., Inc." on Justia Law