Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in August, 2013
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Wilson worked as an admissions representative, recruiting students to enroll in CEC’s culinary arts college. CEC admissions representatives worked under a contract that gave them a bonus for each student they recruited, above a threshold, who completed a full course or a year of study. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Education issued regulations prohibiting this kind of arrangement; new rules were scheduled to take effect in July 2011. CEC decided announced to its admissions representatives that it would cease paying bonuses at the end of February 2011 and that no bonuses would be regarded as earned by that date unless the relevant student had completed the year of study or course by that time. Wilson sued, asserting that CEC owed him bonuses for “pipeline” students, whom he had recruited and who were on target to complete a full course or year of study between March and June 2011. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Wilson successfully pleaded that CEC exercised its right to terminate the agreement in bad faith and in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Wilson v. Career Educ. Corp," on Justia Law

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ATF agent Foreman investigated Wiseman’s purchase of eight handguns at Indiana outdoor‐gear retail stores. Wiseman told Foreman that she purchased the guns for Ghiassi, who was prohibited from possessing firearms because he had prior felony convictions for stalking and taking another person’s vehicle without consent; he was also the subject of a protective order. Wiseman stated that Ghiassi wanted to sell an AK‐47 assault rifle. Foreman arranged an undercover purchase, using Wiseman as an intermediary. After Ghiassi turned the weapon over to Foreman, a search of Ghiassi’s vehicle produced multiple weapons that had been purchased by Wiseman. Ghiassi admitted that Wiseman had illegally purchased weapons for him, but did not acknowledge any particular number of weapons. Foreman also reviewed surveillance footage in which Ghiassi could be seen at the firearms counter looking over guns with Wiseman. Ghiassi pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a sentence of 70 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in finding Ghiassi responsible for eight or more firearms and deprived him of due process by relying, in substantial part, on his co‐defendant’s testimony at her sentencing to make that finding. View "United States v. Ghiassi" on Justia Law

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Wiza was staking out a parking lot, to arrest Johnson for an attack at a bar and as a suspect in a recent shooting. A van known to be associated with Johnson arrived. Johnson exited the vehicle with Carthans; Wiza exited his vehicle and drew his gun. Howard and Williams then exited the van. Wiza ordered the men to the ground. Officer O’Keefe arrived, and while O’Keefe attempted to handcuff Johnson, Carthans fled. Howard and Williams were compliant. O’Keefe found 11 grams of crack cocaine in Johnson’s pocket. All of the men had bloodstains on their clothing. The officers frisked the men and, in Howard’s pocket, found half an ounce of crack cocaine. Wiza searched the van and found a baseball bat and a gun wrapped in a bloody shirt. Soon after, Madison police arrived and said that the men were suspects in an armed robbery that had occurred in Madison less than an hour earlier. Howard later told police that he used the shirt to wipe the robbery victim’s blood off the gun at Johnson’s request. The district judge concluded that the stop and the frisk were reasonable to protect the officers during an unexpectedly chaotic encounter and refused to suppress the drugs or Howard’s statement. Howard entered a conditional plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Once Howard was stopped, the discovery of the drugs in his pocket became inevitable. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

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Laskin worked for Jefco from 1966-1974 and participated in the company pension plan, accumulating a fully vested retirement account balance of $5,976.09. Soon after she left the company Laskin contacted Siegel, a trustee of the pension plan, and asked whether she could withdraw the funds to buy real estate. Siegel sent Laskin a letter explaining that her account would accrue interest at the passbook rate and that the plan had been amended in 1975, raising the retirement eligibility age from 55 to 65. Over the next 10 years, Laskin received statements, indicating that she was receiving from 5% to 5.5% interest on her balance. In 1988, a statement indicated that her balance was $12,602.86. The pension plan dissolved on December 31, 1991. In 2008, Laskin contacted Siegel’s son (who had purchased his father’s interest in Jefco) and was told that pension funds had been completely disbursed and that she did not receive a payout because she could not be located. The district court dismissed her claims as barred by the limitations period in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1113. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Laskin v. Siegel" on Justia Law

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Laskin worked for Jefco from 1966-1974 and participated in the company pension plan, accumulating a fully vested retirement account balance of $5,976.09. Soon after she left the company Laskin contacted Siegel, a trustee of the pension plan, and asked whether she could withdraw the funds to buy real estate. Siegel sent Laskin a letter explaining that her account would accrue interest at the passbook rate and that the plan had been amended in 1975, raising the retirement eligibility age from 55 to 65. Over the next 10 years, Laskin received statements, indicating that she was receiving from 5% to 5.5% interest on her balance. In 1988, a statement indicated that her balance was $12,602.86. The pension plan dissolved on December 31, 1991. In 2008, Laskin contacted Siegel’s son (who had purchased his father’s interest in Jefco) and was told that pension funds had been completely disbursed and that she did not receive a payout because she could not be located. The district court dismissed her claims as barred by the limitations period in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1113. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Laskin v. Siegel" on Justia Law

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Aponte sued four officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He brought one claim against each officer for unreasonably executing a warrant, and one against each for failing to prevent an unreasonable search and a state‐law claim for indemnification against the City of Chicago. See 745 ILCS 10/9‐102.) He claimed that because of damage done during the search, $9,462 was spent refurnishing his home. He also sought damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. The jury was instructed about compensatory damages and that if they found “in favor of Plaintiff but find that Plaintiff has failed to prove compensatory damages, you must return a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of one dollar ($1.00).” The jury form, however, had no space identified for the “one dollar” verdict. The jury found for Aponte on one claim against only one officer and awarded Aponte $100, which it recorded in the space designated for “compensatory damages.” Aponte sought attorney’s fees of $116,435 for 450 hours under 42 U.S.C. 1988, as a “prevailing party.” The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the verdict as a mere nominal victory with no public benefit. View "Aponte v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

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Salim, an Indonesian citizen of Chinese ethnicity and Christian faith, claims that while living in Indonesia as a teenager, he endured ongoing harassment from Muslim students at nearby public schools because of his Chinese ethnicity. He was robbed for his lunch money several times, and once a student with a knife threatened him and punctured his neck. Salim claims it was difficult for Chinese individuals and Christians to travel safely around Jakarta during intense rioting in 1998. Several Chinese businesses were burned during that time, though his family’s business was not harmed. Salim left Indonesia in 2000 and filed a timely application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ denied requested relief on grounds that Salim failed to show past or future persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed appeal of denial of a motion to reopen because Salim offered no new, previously unavailable evidence and relied on case law from outside the circuit. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding that Salim’s motion to reopen did not point to any evidence that was previously undiscoverable. View "Salim v. Holder" on Justia Law

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After researching qui tam actions and meeting with an attorney, Dr. Watson placed an ad in a Sheboygan newspaper soliciting minor Medicaid patients who had been prescribed certain psychotropic medications. The ad referred to participation in a possible Medicaid fraud suit and sharing in any recovery. Meyer responded and entered into an agreement with Watson, who never met Meyer’s child, but obtained the child’s records by using an authorization stating that Meyer was requesting the records “[f]or the purpose of providing psychological services and for no other purpose whatsoever….” Watson searched the records for “off‐label” prescriptions written for a purpose that has not been approved by the FDA. Off‐label use is common, but generally not paid for by Medicaid. In the child’s records, Watson identified 49 prescriptions that he alleged constituted false claims to the U.S. government. The district court rejected Watson’s suit under the qui tam provision of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.3729(a)(1)(A), reasoning that expert testimony was necessary to prove essential elements of the case and Watson had not named experts. While characterizing Watson’s tactics as “borderline fraudulent,” the Seventh Circuit reversed, citing the district court’s “overly rigid” view of the causation and knowledge elements of the claim. View "Watson v. King-Vassel" on Justia Law

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After a search of Medina’s garage revealed 9.5 kilograms of cocaine, packaging materials, $124,124 in cash, and $51,890 worth of jewelry, Medina pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Based on statements by Medina’s customer and cocaine seized from Medina, the government took the position that Medina was accountable for more than 50 kilograms of cocaine. He was sentenced to 190 months. A few months later, Medina provided a safety valve interview (18 U.S.C. 3553(f)) in an effort to obtain relief from the 10‐year mandatory minimum sentence, but challenged the quantities for which he was sentenced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge adequately considered the potential pitfalls of relying on the testimony of Medina’s customer and adopted a conservative estimate of drug quantity that was supported by the evidence. There was no improper speculation. View "United States v. Medina" on Justia Law

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Iacona worked as a process server for D&L, an investigation service owned by Clymer and agreed to purchase the business. Clymer structured the arrangement so that she would retain ownership of the business while Iacona paid $2000 per month for two years toward a purchase price of $95,000, with a balloon payment of the remaining balance. The agreement contemplated a line of credit to pay a recurring monthly expense for an investigative research service. In reality, Iacona established several lines of credit in the name of D&L and in Clymer’s name. He misrepresented his position with the company and the company’s income. He had his sister represent herself as Clymer, used Clymer’s social security number and personal information, and incurred significant debt unrelated to the business. Iacona was convicted of fraud in connection with an access device and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2) and 1028A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Where the evidence supports an inference that the defendant has lied, then a comment in closing argument as to his credibility, is a hard but fair blow, as long as the argument is based on the evidence and not a comment on the prosecutor’s personal opinion . View "United States v. Iacona" on Justia Law