Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Allen suffered a fatal heart attack in 2009, leaving a wife of three years, Arlene, and three adult children from a previous marriage. At the time of Allen’s death, his daughter and her children lived with Allen and Arlene. Allen had a will bequeathing $100,000, but his assets passed outside of probate, leaving his estate with insufficient funds for the bequest. Allen had designated his children as beneficiaries of assets, including a home, life insurance policies, retirement accounts, and other savings accounts. Allen had one life insurance policy as part of his compensation package as a pharmacist, which provided $74,000 in basic coverage and $341,000 in supplemental coverage. If the policyholder failed to designate a beneficiary by his date of death, the proceeds would pass to the policyholder’s spouse by default. The insurer never received any indication that Allen wished to designate a beneficiary. In the days following Allen’s death, however, the children found a change-of-beneficiary form, allegedly completed by their father more than a year before his death, but never submitted. The district court ruled in Arlene’s favor, finding that even if Allen had filled out a change-of-beneficiary form he had not substantially complied with policy requirements for changing beneficiaries. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kagan v. Kagan" on Justia Law

Hawkins has a long history of violent crimes, gun offenses, escapes, drug use, and violations of supervised release. In 2003 he assaulted U.S. marshals and pleaded guilty to violent assault with a weapon that inflicted bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b), 1114. The guidelines range would have been under 30 months, but with two prior felony convictions for “walkaway” escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a), the range was 151 to 188 months. At the time, the guidelines were mandatory; two years later the Supreme Court declared them advisory. On remand the judge reimposed the 151-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Three years later the Supreme Court held that walkaway “escape” is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The district court denied a motion to set aside the sentence reasoning that the legal error committed in deeming such an escape a violent felony was not the kind of error that can be corrected after a criminal judgment has become final. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Hawkins’ history would justify reimposing the sentence again. The court found that rehearing was not warranted by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Peugh v. United States, (2013), reasoning that, unlike this case, Peugh involved constitutional error: violation of the ex post facto clause. View "Hawkins v. United States" on Justia Law

Zivkovic, a Serbian, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1966. In 1976, he pleaded guilty to burglary and received a sentence of two to six years. In 1978, he was convicted of attempted rape and was sentenced to four to 12 years. In 2010, he was convicted of criminal trespass to a residence with a person present and of aggravated battery, where the aggravating factor was the victim’s age. In 2004 Zivkovic was charged as removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G); for attempt or conspiracy to commit a crime defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) (murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor); and under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as an alien convicted of two crimes. The BIA ordered removal because he had committed three aggravated felonies and was not eligible for special relief under 8 U.S.C. 1182(c). The Seventh Circuit granted Zivkovic’s petition, reasoning that two of his convictions are more than 35 years old and that the law has not remained static. The statutes are ambiguous and presumptions against retroactivity and implied repeal require remand. The court noted that even one of the convictions would guarantee near-automatic removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). View "Zivkovic v. Holder" on Justia Law

Adeyeye, a native of Nigeria, moved to the U.S. in 2008. He requested several weeks of unpaid leave so he could travel to Nigeria to lead his father’s burial rites. He explained that his participation in the funeral ceremonies was “compulsory” and that if he failed to lead the burial rites, he and his family members would suffer at least spiritual death. The employer denied the request, but he traveled to Nigeria for the ceremonies anyway and was fired when he returned to work. Adeyeye filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for failure to accommodate his religion. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that Adeyeye’s two written requests did not present evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that he had provided notice of the religious character of his request. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Whether or not Adeyeye’s letters might have justified holding as a matter of law that they provided sufficient notice of the religious nature of his request, they certainly were sufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the employer had notice of the religious nature of the request. View "Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC" on Justia Law

Robinson, the subject of an anonymous tip to Chicago police, was asleep on his grandmother’s living room sofa when officers conducted an early-morning search of her apartment, looking for evidence that Robinson was selling marijuana from the premises. The officers found less than two grams of marijuana, but recovered a loaded revolver from a laundry basket by the front door. According to officers, Robinson admitted, at the time of its discovery and during a later station house interrogation, that the revolver was his; Robinson denies making such statements. Robinson was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit vacated after rejecting arguments that the revolver should have been suppressed because the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that the district court should have conducted a Franks hearing to assess whether police officers knowingly or recklessly submitted false information in support of the warrant application. The court committed reversible error by refusing to give a requested limiting instruction about his prior felony conviction and that error was not harmless. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals knocked on Sabo’s trailer door attempting to locate a fugitive, Sabo’s stepson. When Sabo opened the door, they noticed a strong odor of marijuana. Sabo denied that his stepson was there. Asked whether he was smoking dope with his children in the trailer, Sabo responded, “Get the fuck out of here” and slammed the door. The deputies called the Sheriff’s office for assistance. Detective McCune, who knew Sabo, arrived and knocked. Sabo opened the door and physically blocked entry. McCune asked, “Terry, do you mind if I step inside and talk with you?” Sabo said nothing, but stepped back and let the door open. McCune did not force his way in, but entered and noticed the odor of marijuana and guns leaning against a wall. Sabo was a convicted felon. While the guns were secured, officers swept the trailer looking for the fugitive. McCune obtained a search warrant and seized marijuana in the subsequent search. The district court denied a motion to suppress and Sabo conditionally pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the search consensual. View "United States v. Sabo" on Justia Law

Third Site is a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) site that was part of a larger area, under common ownership by the Bankerts, used for recycling industrial wastes. Cleanup initially focused on other sites, but in 1987 and 1992 consultants found concentrations of volatile organic compounds; Third Site was transferring pollutants to Finley Creek, which flows to Eagle Creek Reservoir, which supplies Indianapolis drinking water. The creek was realigned. In 1999, the EPA entered into an Administrative Order by Consent (AOC) with potentially responsible parties. Non-Premium Respondents agreed to undertake an Engineering Evaluation and Cost Analysis (EE/CA) of removal alternatives and to settle a trust to bankroll the EE/CA. Premium Respondents, allegedly de minimis contributors, were entitled to settle out with a one-time Trust contribution under 42 U.S.C. 9622(g). Non-Premium Respondents met their obligations. In 2002, the parties entered into a second AOC to perform work described by the Enforcement Action Memorandum: Non-Premium respondents had the same Trust obligations for removal efforts. The Bankerts are Non-Premium Respondents under both AOCs, but have not met their obligations. In 2008, the Trustees sued the Bankerts and their insurers, seeking cost recovery under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a), and Indiana law. One of the insurers argued that its successful litigation in connection with cleanup of the adjoining site precluded a finding of coverage. Entering summary judgment for the Bankerts, the district court construed the CERCLA claim as seeking contribution under 42 U.S.C. 9613(f), and barred by the statute of limitations, so that issues concerning the insurer were moot. The Seventh Circuit remanded reinstated claims under 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4)(B), to recover costs incurred under the 2002 AOC and against the insurer. On rehearing, the court clarified that a party responsible for contamination may obtain an immediately effective release from the EPA in a settlement, or it may obtain only a performance-dependent conditional covenant not to sue with an accompanying disclaimer of liability. Whether, and when, a given settlement “resolves” a party’s liability under 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(3)(B) is case-specific and depends on its terms. In this case, the AOC did not provide for resolution upon entering into the agreement. View "Bernstein v. Bankert" on Justia Law

In 2009 the Fire Protection District passed an ordinance under which it took over fire alarm monitoring for all commercial properties in the District. Private alarm companies that had previously provided that service sued, alleging interference with their business, illegal monopoly, violations of constitutional rights, and exceeding statutory powers. Before the district court issued an opinion on remand, the District repealed the 2009 ordinance. Under a new ordinance, the District would not own any transmitters and would permit property owners to contract with private companies for alarm transmission, monitoring, and equipment; signals would still be transmitted via the District’s network to the District’s receiver. The district court entered a modified permanent injunction, requiring the District to permit alarm companies to receive and transmit signals directly from property alarm boards, independently of the District. The injunction barred the District from requiring that fire signals be sent to its station, charging residents for fire protection services, or selling or leasing fire alarm system equipment. It required the District to allow alarm companies to use any technology equivalent to wireless transmission and compliant with the NFPA code, to adopt the most current version of the NFPA code, and to refund fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as modified. The new injunction sets appropriate boundaries and does not contravene the earlier decision in most ways. The court struck provisions requiring refunds to subscribers and requiring the District to adopt the most current versions of the NFPA code. View "ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Chicago Metro. Fire Prevention Co." on Justia Law

Estremera was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine plus possessing a firearm despite an earlier felony conviction and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2007. Estremera sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his lawyer had misstated the terms of a plea bargain proposal. The district court denied the petition in 2012 without holding a hearing. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There was insufficient evidence to determine whether the petition was timely, given Estremera’s assertions of his own diligence and of abandonment by counsel. With respect to Estremera’s request that the prosecution be required to offer the original deal again, the court noted that it no longer possible for the defendant to fulfill promises that would have been valuable to the prosecutor, had a deal been struck before trial and that, assuming that it proceeds to the merits, the district court may think it prudent to await the Supreme Court’s opinion in Titlow before crafting a remedy. View "Estremera v. United States" on Justia Law

Green sued under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1606, claiming that U.S. Cash Advance misstated her loan’s annual percentage rate. The lender requested arbitration under the loan agreement, which referred to “binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.” The agreement was signed in 2012; the Forum has not accepted new consumer cases for arbitration since 2009, when it settled a suit alleging bias in merchants’ favor. The lender asked the court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under 9 U.S.C. 5. The judge declined, stating that identification of the Forum as arbitrator was “integral.” The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the agreement calls for use of the Forum’s Code of Procedure, not for the Forum itself to conduct proceedings. The court noted that the lender will have to “live with” the judge’s broad discretion in choosing an arbitrator, who might be familiar with practices in the payday loan industry or open to use of claimant classes in arbitrations, perhaps on a theory “that a consumer who would not voluntarily waive her rights under the Truth in Lending Act probably should not be deemed to have implicitly waived her right to the only procedure that could effectively enforce those rights.” View "Green v. U.S. Cash Advance IL, LLC" on Justia Law