Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The 1987 Public Utilities Act, 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1, was intended to encourage development of power plants that convert solid waste to electricity. Local electric utilities were required to enter into 10-year agreements to purchase power from such plants designated as “qualified” by the Illinois Commerce Commission, at a rate exceeding that established by federal law. The state compensated electric utilities with a tax credit. A qualified facility was obliged to reimburse the state for tax credits its customers had claimed after it had repaid all of its capital costs for development and implementation. Many qualified facilities failed before they repaid their capital costs, so that Illinois never got its tax credit money back. The Act was amended in 2006, to establish a moratorium on new Qualified Facilities, provide additional grounds for disqualifying facilities from the subsidy, and expand the conditions that trigger a facility’s liability to repay electric utilities’ tax credits. The district court held that the amendment cannot be applied retroactively. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amendment does not clearly indicate that the new repayment conditions apply to monies received prior to the amendment and must be construed prospectively. View "Illinois v. Chiplease, Inc." on Justia Law

The Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901, originally included a “15-year presumption” that total pulmonary or respiratory impairment of a coal worker with 15 years of experience in the mines was due to pneumoconiosis (black lung). Congress removed this presumption in 1981, but in 2010 revived the presumption for claims filed after January 1, 2005, still pending on or after March 23, 2010. Bailey, employed by Consolidation Coal for 26 years, also smoked cigarettes for many years. He was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and sought benefits. Three claims were considered during the interval when the 15-year presumption was withdrawn. Two were denied, and he withdrew a third. For his current claim, filed in 2007, three doctors agreed that Bailey is totally disabled by COPD. Because of the rejected claims, Bailey was required to show a change in condition. An ALJ, using the 15-year presumption, held that Bailey can now establish pneumoconiosis caused in part by coal dust exposure, two elements deficient in earlier claims, and awarded benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The ALJ correctly applied the 15-year presumption, addressed evidence relating to Bailey’s health and smoking history, and delivered a rational decision, supported by substantial evidence. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

In 2011 Miller pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. The prosecution contended that a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), was required because three of his prior convictions qualified as “violent felonies.” Miller did not dispute that his two burglary convictions qualified, but objected to inclusion of a Wisconsin conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Construing ACCA’s “residual clause,” the district court denied the objection. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that the approach for evaluating prior convictions under the residual clause has changed. Mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun is not a violent felony under ACCA because mere possession does not fit with the more active crimes included in the statute; and not all instances of possession pose a risk of violence. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

FBI agents Freeman and Howell investigated the Hinds, who worked for Indiana criminal defense attorney Alexander, for bribery of witnesses, including Kirtz. They equipped Kirtz and Chrisp with recording devices for a meeting, during which Alexander stated that he did not know about Hinds’s bribery and would attempt to find out what was going on. Although Kirtz and Chrisp later confirmed that this meeting occurred and that they delivered the recordings, the agents never produced the recordings and claimed that the meeting never occurred. Months later, McKinney, who had a grudge against Alexander, became the new prosecutor. Alexander claims that McKinney conspired with Kirtz and Chrisp (then under investigation for participation in an arson ring) to destroy the recording and manufacture evidence against Alexander. Alexander was acquitted of bribery charges and filed a Notice of Tort Claim with the FBI, stating his intention to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680. The FBI declined to act. Alexander filed suit, alleging malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed, based on failure to state a claim for malicious prosecution and untimely filing of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Alexander alleged specific events that fell within the limitations period. View "Alexander v. United States" on Justia Law

From 1981 to 1989, Schultz worked painting equipment, floors, walls, ceilings, and pipes at AMC company plants. In 2005 he was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia (AML). He died 2006. His wife sued paint companies, alleging that the companies produced or distributed the paint Schultz used at work and that benzene from the paints caused his disease. She offered reports from two experts: Stewart, an industrial hygienist, who reconstructed Schultz’s work with the paints to quantify his benzene exposure, and Gore, an oncologist, who testified that benzene is generally known to cause AML and specifically was a substantial factor in the development of Schultz’s disease. The district court granted the companies summary judgment on the ground that Gore’s testimony was scientifically unreliable; without that evidence, Schultz had no way of linking his disease to the paints. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in excluding Gore’s testimony. View "Schultz v. Glidden Co." on Justia Law

Pro-Pac, a packaging business, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2006, then filed an adversary proceeding against WOW, a logistics service provider, for aiding and abetting a Pro-Pac employee’s breach of fiduciary duty. The bankruptcy court found that WOW had aided and abetted the Pro-Pac employee, but based its award on an independent unjust enrichment claim. The district court ordered the bankruptcy court to dismiss, reasoning that the unjust-enrichment argument had been introduced too late in the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the district court erred in dismissing the case, but that the bankruptcy court erred in assessing Pro-Pac’s damages. On remand, the bankruptcy court must reexamine issues relating to WOW’s tort liability. If the bankruptcy court wants to award punitive damages, it must first award compensatory damages based on the harm Pro-Pac suffered. View "Pro-Pac Inc. v. WOW Logistics Inc." on Justia Law

Muratovic admitted to planning, with co-conspirators, robbery of a truck that he believed would carry drug money from Illinois to California, by following the truck and robbing it at a rest stop after a passenger exited. The co-conspirators would wear disguises, threaten the driver at gunpoint, and use violence if necessary. The co-conspirators unknowingly invited a police informant, wearing a wire, to participate. The crew met in a parking lot, carrying firearms for use in the robbery, traveled to obtain another gun, located their target, and began surveillance. Two co-conspirators went to get gas cans and extra gas. The target truck never left the parking lot and, thinking that its driver had spotted them, the crew left without robbing the truck. Muratovic did not dispute the facts nor the pre-sentence report and received a 90-month prison term for violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that there was no factual basis for Hobbs Act jurisdiction, for finding that he took a substantial step toward commission of the robbery, and that conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act is not a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). View "United States v. Muratovic" on Justia Law

Seitz and Welter were partners in Wasco, a property management company. Greg was also a police officer. Elgin’s police chief confronted Greg with the emails showing that Greg had used the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) to research cars parked in front of Wasco properties. Illinois limits use of LEADS to criminal justice purposes. The chief notified Gregg of a misconduct investigation regarding his use of LEADS. The city allegedly received its information after Tamara, Greg’s then wife and a fellow police officer, and Beeter accessed Greg’s email account and conveyed print-outs to the corporation counsel under cover of anonymity. Greg and Seitz sued Tamara and Beeter, alleging violations of the Federal Wiretap Act (FWA), the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and state law claims. They sued Elgin under the FWA. The district court dismissed the complaint against the city, concluding that the FWA, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1) prohibits “persons” from intercepting communications, but does not extend its definition of “person” to municipalities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A 1986 amendment permits suit against governmental units by adding “entity” to the text, but only for substantive provisions that identify an “entity” as a potential violator of that provision. View "Seitz v. City of Elgin" on Justia Law

In 1996, Singh fled India to escape police officers allegedly trying to kill him. In 1997 he was charged as removeable. He sought asylum based on his religion and political beliefs and withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In 2009 an Immigration Judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the agency’s conclusions about past persecution “problematic,” but agreeing that Singh does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Singh v. Holder" on Justia Law

A 1952 collective bargaining agreement still governs aspects of the employment of some members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, including the attendance and leave policy. In 2003 the Union Pacific Railroad adopted a new attendance policy. The union demanded arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, arguing that the new attendance policy conflicted with the 1952 agreement. An arbitrator found that the 2003 attendance policy did not conflict with the 1952 agreement. The union sought to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction in interpreting the 1952 agreement. View "Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law