Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Smiley was a part-time instructor in the college’s Radio Department from 1994 through January 2009. She is of Palestinian and Lebanese descent. Near the end of the fall 2008 semester, one of the nine students in Smiley’s class met with two faculty members and said he felt Smiley had singled him out in class because he is Jewish. At one of the faculty members’ request, the student outlined his complaint in an email. Faculty members and administrators interviewed the student on several occasions and also interviewed Smiley, who asserted that she was “joking.” The school ultimately informed Smiley that it would not ask her to teach further classes. Smiley claimed that the decision was based on her race or national origin in a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the college. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Investigations of other instructors to which Smiley referred do not suggest more favorable treatment. The school’s procedures did not require the school to contact other witnesses to alleged discriminatory conduct, and the school’s investigation of the complaint does not indicate that its reason for terminating her position was pretextual. View "Smiley v. Columbia College Chicago" on Justia Law

Tucker was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), the use of which resulted in death, and sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment. During the trial, the prosecutor made references to the devastating effects of heroin and to possible its impacts on members of the jury, the criminal backgrounds of Tucker’s coconspirators, the plea agreements made by coconspirators “with the judge,” and the consistency of statements by coconspirators outside trial. Tucker’s trial counsel did not object to these statements. The jury also heard from the lead investigator on the case, Officer Baranek, describing how his investigation of Tucker unfolded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct and a challenge to the use of Officer Baranek as a “dual capacity” witness, without giving the jury any guidance on how to properly evaluate such testimony. A “dual capacity” witness weaves fact and expert opinion testimony together and the prosecutor did lay a foundation for Officer Baranek’s expertise. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Mexican native, first entered the U.S. illegally before June 1988. He was convicted of receiving stolen property, auto theft, attempting to pass a fraudulent check, selling cocaine, and forgeries, and was deported in 1992. In 1994, he burglarized Nebraska construction companies. He was deported again in 1999. By 2005, defendant had returned and was convicted of burglarizing companies, stealing payroll checks, and fraudulently cashing checks. He was deported for the third time in 2008. In 2010 defendant stole blank checks from Illinois and Iowa businesses. Three banks cashed checks, losing more than $42,000. Defendant was charged with unlawful reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2); bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; conspiracy to utter forged securities, 18 U.S.C. 371; and uttering forged securities, 18 U.S.C. 513(a). Defendant pleaded guilty unlawful reentry and to three bank fraud counts,. The district court sentenced him to a total of 84 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. Neither party objected to the sentencing reports at the time, but both agree that the sentence was based on an improper U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range and that the error affected defendant’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Tovar-Pina" on Justia Law

Kamlager was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide and use of a dangerous weapon in the death of his girlfriend, Wis. Stat. 940.01(1)(a), and was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility for extended supervision. He was also convicted of hiding a corpse and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. After exhausting postconviction remedies, Kamlager sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied his writ of habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing as “harmless error” the admission of statements Kamlager made to officers after he requested to see counsel. Given the “overwhelming” evidence of guilt, it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict even if the tainted evidence had been suppressed. View "Kamlager v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Under the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977, the Secretary of Labor protects the health and safety of miners, acting through the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Regulations under the Act require mine operators to report all mine-related injuries and illnesses suffered by employees. In 2010, MSHA acted on a new and broader interpretation and informed 39 mine operators that they would be required to permit MSHA inspectors to review employee medical and personnel records during inspections. Two operators refused to provide the records. MSHA issued citations and imposed penalties. An ALJ and the Review Commission found that the demands and enforcement were lawful under 30 U.S.C. 813(h) and 30 C.F.R. 50.41. Mine employees intervened to raise personal privacy challenges. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting arguments that MSHA does not have authority for the requirement; that 30 C.F.R. 50.41 is not a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was not properly promulgated; that the requirement infringes operators’ Fourth Amendment right not to be searched without a warrant; that the demands violate the miners’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights in their medical records; and that penalties imposed for noncompliance violate the operators’ Fifth Amendment due process rights. View "Bickett v. Fed. Mine Safety & Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Ni came to the U.S. in 2001 from Fujian Province, China. An Immigration Judge ordered him removed in 2003, but he has remained in the U.S., and has started a family. In 2011, following the birth of his second child, Ni moved to reopen his removal proceedings, arguing that he will personally face forced sterilization under China’s “one-child policy” if he returns to Fujian Province, a form of persecution based on “political opinion” for which asylum may be granted, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(B). The Board of Immigration Appeals denied Ni’s motion, holding that his evidence was not sufficient to establish a change in circumstances or country conditions, as generally required when an applicant moves to reopen more than 90 days after entry of a final administrative order. The Seventh Circuit granted review, noting that courts of appeals have received scores of similar petitions involving Fujian Province in recent years, and have regularly upheld the BIA’s refusal to grant relief. “Routine can be numbing, however, and it can lead to errors. Here, the BIA failed meaningfully to address documents bolstering Ni’s assertion that family planning officials in and around his hometown recently launched a crackdown on those who flout the “one-child policy.” View "Ni v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2006, W&S hired Martino, a naturalized citizen born in Italy, as a sales representative. He signed an agreement that prohibited him from engaging in any other business or work for remuneration or profit without consent. W&S only approved outside positions requiring five or fewer hours a week on average, not including Sundays, and average weekly pay of $100 or less. Martino also served as a pastor of a small church and he submitted an outside position request, indicating that his pastoral position involved eight to 10 hours per week, not including Sundays, with average weekly pay of $300. After rejecting Martino’s argument that his position was a public service, human resources responded that W&S was not discharging Martino but asking that he resign his pastoral position. Martino subsequently was unable to timely produce I-9 eligibility to work documentation. Within two months of hiring him, W&S terminated Martino. The district court entered summary judgment for W&S in Martino’s suit, alleging termination based on religious beliefs and defamation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Martino’s evidence neither called into doubt W&S’s explanation for his discharge nor established a prima facie case of defamation. View "Martino v. W & S Fin. Grp." on Justia Law

A new union of ARC blood collection specialists was elected in 2007 and certified in 2010. During the unionization process, ARC filed repeated objections, ultimately overruled by the National Labor Relations Board, delaying certification. During the delay, ARC made changes in its union-represented employees’ terms of employment without notice to or bargaining with the new union, including: suspending merit pay increases; discontinuing matching contributions to the employees’ 401(k) plan; closing its defined pension plan to new employees; changing health insurance benefits; promoting team leaders to team supervisors and having them continue to perform unit work; reassigning truck loading work outside the bargaining unit; decreasing the number of personal time-off hours an employee can carry over; and allowing non-unit employees to perform bargaining unit work. As a result, worker involvement in union activities declined. Some employees feared retaliation and some were discouraged by the union’s failure to prevent ARC’s changes. An ALJ held that ARC violated 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5). The district court ordered rescission of ARC’s failure to grant scheduled merit pay increases and a temporary injunction prohibiting further unilateral changes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, but remanded for entry of the additional injunctive relief sought by the NLRB. View "Harrell. v. Am. Red Cross, Heart of Am. Blood Servs. Region" on Justia Law

Retirement accounts are exempt from creditors’ claims in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 22(b)(3)(C) and (d)(12). The debtor inherited, from her mother, a non-spousal individual retirement account worth about $300,000. The bankruptcy court held that the inherited IRA was not exempt from claims by the debtor’s creditors. The district court reversed. Noting a conflict with other circuits, the Seventh Circuit reversed, reinstating the bankruptcy court holding. The court noted that while it remains sheltered from taxation until the money is withdrawn, many of the account’s other attributes changed. No new contributions can be made, and the balance cannot be rolled over or merged with any other account. 26 U.S.C. 408(d)(3)(C); instead of being dedicated to the debtor/heir’s retirement years, the inherited IRA must begin distributing its assets within a year of the original owner’s death. 26 U.S.C. 402(c)(11)(A). View "Rameker v. Clark" on Justia Law

Central States is a multiemployer pension plan for members of the Teamsters union in the eastern half of the U.S. Ready Mix employed Teamsters labor and participated in the Central States plan. In 2007 Ready Mix ceased employing covered workers and incurred $3.6 million in withdrawal liability to fully fund its pension obligations. Two affiliated companies under common control by Nagy, the owner of Ready Mix, conceded liability for the shortfall under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. 1301(b)(1). The district court concluded that Nagy held and leased property to Ready Mix as a passive investment, not a trade or business, so the leasing activity did not trigger personal liability, but that Nagy’s work as a manager for a country club was as an independent contractor, not an employee, and this activity qualified as a trade or business under section 1301(b)(1), which was enough for personal liability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Nagy’s leasing activity is categorically a trade or business for purposes of personal liability under 1301(b)(1). View "Cent. States SE & SW Areas Pension Fund v. Nagy" on Justia Law