Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Although Hall has been a plumber for the City of Chicago since 1995, she was on disability leave from 1999 to 2003 due to a work-related injury. Hall returned to the City’s employ with the limitation that she could not lift over 25 pounds. Hall and the City agree this restriction precluded her from resuming work as a plumber, so Hall began working in the House Drain Inspectors Division of the Department, which was composed of 13 male house drain inspectors and the supervisor’s female secretary. Hall claims that the supervisor created a hostile work environment by assigning her menial work and prohibiting coworkers from interacting with her. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in her Title VII suit, finding that the conduct was not hostile in comparison to other employees’ responsibilities and that Hall failed to produce evidence that the supervisor’s conduct was because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a jury could infer that deliberate isolation of Hall was sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment and that the supervisor’s comments to Hall could indicate that Hall’s gender played a part in his actions. View "Hall v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2008, Harris N.A. loaned Acadia money on a revolving basis. Acadia is a limited liability company consisting of members of the Hershey family and three trusts. The loan was personally guaranteed by Loren Hershey, a managing member of Acadia. The amount of the loan was enlarged to $15.5 million, again guaranteed by Hershey. The agreement enlarging the loan amount required Acadia to reduce its principal debt to Harris to less than 35 percent of the value of Acadia’s assets by the end of each quarter and to make a principal payment of $3 million by January 31, 2009. By February 2009, Acadia had not made the $3 million principal payment and was in default. After granting additional time, Harris declared a default and filed suit to collect the debt from Acadia and to enforce Hershey’s guaranty. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Harris as to all issues except the calculation of prejudgment interest. Acadia sought bankruptcy protection and its appeal has been stayed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Hershey and, finding the appeal frivolous, imposed sanctions under FRAP 8. The court noted that there was no evidence of various promises Hershey claimed were made. View "Harris N.A. v. Acadia Invs. L.C." on Justia Law

In 2003 the Jacksons obtained a $282,500 home mortgage refinancing loan with a 30-year fixed interest rate of 5.875% from AWL. They used a mortgage broker, MFMS, to apply for the loan. The Jacksons allege that other defendants have been “involved with the mortgage process in various capacities.” The Jacksons went into default in March 2010. Although there was no foreclosure action, the Jacksons initiated an action to quiet title on the property in December 2011. They claimed that defendants negligently evaluated the Jacksons’ ability to repay the loan and that the loan contract was substantively and procedurally unconscionable. The district court dismissed all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Jackson v. Bank of Am. Corp." on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to being in the U.S. illegally after having been removed. The judge sentenced him to 84 months in prison. The statutory maximum prison sentence for illegal reentry is usually 2 years, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), but removal after conviction for an aggravated felony (defendant had two such convictions) increases the maximum to 20 years. § 1326(b)(2). Defendant’s appellate attorney asked to be allowed to withdraw from the case on the ground that there is no colorable basis for appealing, but also stated that the district court imposed conditions beyond its authority. The Seventh Circuit modified the judgment of the district court to eliminate the post-release terms concerning the use of controlled substances, drug tests, and collection of a DNA sample, and otherwise dismissed the appeal, granting the lawyer’s motion to withdraw. View "United States v. Gutierrez-Ceja" on Justia Law

Scott pleaded guilty to distribution of 50 or more grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). His plea agreement, entered under FRCP 11(c)(1)(C), specified a prison term of 192 months; the district court accepted the agreement and that sentence. Later, Scott filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c), seeking a reduction in his sentence based on changes to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied that motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Scott was not eligible for a reduced sentence. When a plea agreement is governed by Rule 11(c)(1)(C) and accepted by the court, the judge does not play as great a role as usual in selecting the final sentence. Scott chose to accept a binding sentence to induce the government to dismiss a repeat-offender notice that it had filed under 21 U.S.C. 851. Had the government not done so, Scott would have been subject to a 240-month mandatory minimum sentence, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). View "Unted States v. Scott" on Justia Law

An inmate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, complaining that officials denied him an accommodation of his religious observances. He is a member of a religious sect, the African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem, and took the “Nazirite vow,” which committed him not to cut his hair. He wore his hair in dreadlocks, which form naturally in some people who do not cut their hair. His previous suit, based on the prison’s refusal to allow him to have visitors unless he consented to a haircut, settled in 2003; the parties agreed that he could receive visitors, if he allowed prison staff to search his hair before and after any visit for concealed contraband. In 2004, for appearance in court in a case he had filed, the prison gave the inmate a choice: a haircut, or segregation as punishment for eluding his scheduled trip to court. He chose the haircut. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Precedent recognizes the need for and validity of rules regulating the hairstyles of prisoners in the interest of security; the Nazirite vow is an optional rather than mandatory observance for African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem. View "Peter Lewis v. Jerry Sternes, et al" on Justia Law

Peterson pled guilty to one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), after robbing a bank to pay off a debt with a drug dealer. During Peterson’s sentencing hearing, the district court read from a portion of the probation officer’s confidential sentencing recommendation, which she had submitted only to the court. The report noted a relatively easy childhood, followed by a history of drug abuse and other offenses. After the hearing, the district court sentenced Peterson to 168 months in prison, within Peterson’s sentencing guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court’s reliance on the probation officer’s confidential sentencing recommendation violated Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because Peterson had no opportunity to respond to the analysis contained therein. Peterson received and had the opportunity to comment on all facts supporting the probation officer’s analysis and his counsel presented a comprehensive sentencing argument on the basis of those facts. View "United States v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Zheng, a native of China, arrived in the U.S. in 1991 and applied for asylum, which was denied. The INS charged him with removability in 1998, but Zheng renewed his request for asylum, asserting that his wife (who arrived from China in 1994) would be forcibly sterilized under China’s one-child policy because they had two children. The immigration judge denied his application, relying on Zheng’s lack of credibility, and the BIA affirmed in 2002. Zheng remained in the U.S. and filed three motions to reopen, which were denied as untimely and successive and because Zheng failed to demonstrate changed country conditions as to forced sterilization, 8 U.S.C. 1229a. In 2011, Zheng filed a fourth motion, arguing that he would be persecuted in China because he converted to Christianity in 2010 while in immigration detention. He submitted evidence to show that China’s treatment of Christians had materially worsened since 1999. The BIA rejected the claim. The Seventh Circuit denied appeal. BIA’s conclusory rejection of Zheng’s argument was error, but was harmless, given the highly generalized nature of Zheng’s evidence, which failed to show with any meaningful level of specificity that the persecution against Zheng’s practice of Christianity had materially worsened since 1999. View "Zheng v. Holder" on Justia Law

The original named defendants in the case, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to overtime pay, were JT Packard, the plaintiffs’ employer, and Packard’s parent, Bray. A parent corporation is not liable for FLSA violations by its subsidiary unless it exercises significant authority over the subsidiary’s employment practices. The district judge allowed substitution of Betts, which had purchased Packard’s assets and placed them in a wholly owned subsidiary. After a conditional settlement for $500,000 in damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, Betts appealed the substitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no good reason to reject successor liability in this case. Packard was a profitable company. It was sold, not because it was insolvent, but because it was the guarantor of its parent’s bank loan and the parent defaulted. View "Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of stock purchasers, alleging that Boeing committed securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5. The suit related to statements concerning the new 787-8 Dreamliner, which had not yet flown, and did not specify a damages figure. At argument the plaintiffs’ lawyer indicated that the class was seeking hundreds of millions of dollars. The district court dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(6) before deciding whether to certify a class. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal; Boeing cross-appealed denial of sanctions on the plaintiffs’ lawyers for violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal with prejudice, but remanded for consideration under 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(c)(1), (2), of Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiffs’ lawyers. No one who made optimistic public statements about the timing of the first flight knew that their optimism was unfounded; there is no securities fraud by hindsight. Plaintiffs’ lawyers had made confident assurances in their complaints about a confidential source, their only barrier to dismissal of their suit, even though none of them had spoken to the source and their investigator had acknowledged that she could not verify what he had told her. View "City of Livonia Emps' Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law