Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in February, 2013
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Sanders and an accomplice pushed into Nobles’s apartment and abducted Nobles’s 10-year-old daughter, R.E. in order to induce Nobles to rob her own mother. Nobles attempted to comply and left bag of cash for Sanders’s accomplice to pick up. Law enforcement authorities were already aware of the plot and arrested Sanders’s accomplice. Sanders surrendered shortly thereafter. No one was injured, and police recovered the money. A jury convicted Sanders of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201, and extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Two mandatory minimums apply to kidnapping: 18 U.S.C. 1201(g) requires 20 years and 18 U.S.C. 3559(f)(2) requires 25 years. The district court concluded that the higher penalty applied and sentenced Sanders to concurrent sentences of 25 years on the kidnapping count and 20 years on the extortion count. . The Seventh Circuit affirmed both the conviction and the sentence, rejecting arguments that the court denied Sanders due process by admitting Nobles’s three identifications of him and abused its discretion by limiting his cross-examination of Nobles. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

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Moral, a citizen of Ecuador, was admitted to the U.S. in 1988 as an immigrant. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings in 2011 because of his multiple criminal convictions, including unlawful use of a weapon and sexual abuse of a minor. The Immigration Judge granted five continuances, four of which allowed Moral to pursue state-court post-conviction proceedings seeking to set aside his guilty plea for sexual abuse of a minor occurring in 2002. After the state criminal court dismissed his petition, the IJ denied his request for another continuance and ordered removal. The BIA denied an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). The court reasoned that the provision, which is phrased more broadly than subsection (B), applies to denial of a continuance. View "Moral-Salazar v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Yassan sued his former employer, Chase, approximately nineteen months after the termination of his employment, claiming that Chase had terminated him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and public policy and that Chase had committed fraud by inducing him to sign a severance agreement through “explicit and false representation[s].” Before Chase’s deadline to answer the complaint, Yassan’s counsel failed to appear at a status hearing and the state court judge dismissed for want of prosecution. Unaware of this dismissal, Chase filed a notice to remove the case to federal district court. The district court concluded that the removal after dismissal constituted a procedural defect that had been waived by Yassan’s failure to object within 30 days, then granted Chase’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that removal of the case to federal court was properly accomplished and noting that Yassan received valuable consideration for a release he signed when his employment was terminated. View "Yassan v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co." on Justia Law

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Officers stopped a truck after they witnessed occupants apparently engaging in a drug deal. Hunter fled from the passenger seat with something resembling a gun in his hand. Officers ordered Hunter to stop, but Hunter continued to run. The officers heard a gunshot and fired at Hunter, striking him in the left buttock and in the foot. Hunter fell to the ground and was handcuffed. Police recovered a revolver from the ground close to Hunter, with one spent shell casing in the cylinder. Hunter was transported to a hospital by ambulance. Detective Karzin accompanied Hunter, who was handcuffed to the hospital gurney at all times. Doctors administered narcotics, but a treating nurse later testified that he had remained “alert and oriented.” While Hunter was receiving treatment, Karzin sat silently in the room until Hunter initiated interaction. Karzin read Hunter his Miranda rights. At some point, Hunter gave the name of his lawyer and asked if Karzin would call him. Karzin did not do so. Hunter made incriminating statements to officers who arrived after the conversation. The district court suppressed the statements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the interrogation occurred after Hunter unambiguously invoked his right to counsel. View "United States v. Hunter" on Justia Law

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Canopy Financial developed and marketed software for banks and health-care payers to handle health-related savings accounts and administered the health-care funds of almost 2,000 entities. When Canopy entered bankruptcy in 2009, it came to light that Banas and Blackburn had misappropriated more than $90 million from Canopy’s investors and the customers. Each was sentenced to more than 10 years’ imprisonment. Blackburn committed suicide. The Trustee for the benefit of Canopy’s creditors has recovered about $50 million by seizing assets from Blackburn’s mansion and is attempting to recover from recipients of fraudulent conveyances, transfers made while Canopy was insolvent, not in exchange for reasonably equivalent value, 11 U.S.C. 544(b), 548, 550; 740 ILCS 160/1 to 160/12. According to the Trustee, Banas and Blackburn spent more than $80,000 of Canopy’s money at a Nevada nightclub. After obtaining default judgment, the Trustee began to collect from its assets in Nevada. The owner sought to vacate the default under Rule 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect by its agent for service of process. The bankruptcy judge declined. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the owner had the burden of proof, but chose not to present any evidence about whether the agent received the essential documents. View "Buddha Entm't, LLC v. Paloian" on Justia Law

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An inmate of the Illinois Danville Correctional Center sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The inmate suffers from scoliosis and the prison rejected his “incessant” requests for a lower bunk and for a medical mattress, a back brace, and orthopedic shoes. The district judge granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, in an opinion that included references to a Wiki-How article on bunk-climbing and to the recent discovery of the skeletal remains of Richard III of England and a picture of inmates in bunks. The court noted “overwhelming” evidence that he had no medical need for any of the requested items, except, possibly a lower bunk. Noting the inmate’s claim that he was injured trying to get into the upper bunk after being refused permission to sleep in the health care unit, the court remanded for a determination of the facts on that claim. View "Withers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

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Administrators of city agencies were convicted of mail fraud for their roles in a scheme to award Chicago jobs and promotions to favored applicants. They had conducted sham interviews and falsified interview forms. Consistent with case law at the time, the jury was instructed that the defendants were guilty of mail fraud if they deprived the city of money or property, or if they deprived the city of its right to honest services. After the Seventh Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court ruled in Skilling v. U.S. (2010) that the honest-services fraud statute is limited only to schemes involving bribes or kickbacks. The district court rejected an argument that the defendants are entitled to collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the jury’s receipt of an honest-services theory was error because the scheme did not involve bribes or kickbacks, the error was harmless. The trial reflected a single scheme to take city jobs and promotions through false representations, and these jobs and promotions were the city’s money or property. Any honest-services violation had to be premised on the money/property fraud, and the Skilling error did not have substantial effect on the jury’s verdict.View "Sorich v. United States" on Justia Law

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Alam filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Miller Brewing, his former employer. The case settled in 2006. Subsequently, Alam, whose company provides software and consulting services to the brewing industry, approached MillerCoors about developing a software prototype for MillerCoors and its distributors. MillerCoors is a joint venture between Miller Brewing and Coors Brewing Company. After Alam spent two months working to develop the prototype and collaborating with MillerCoors employees, an executive at MillerCoors indicated that it would no longer consider working with Alam because of Alam’s prior lawsuit. Alam received a letter from counsel for MillerCoors, quoting the settlement agreement provision that: “I agree not to reapply for employment with or otherwise work for or provide services to Miller Brewing Company . . . or any of its parent, affiliates or subsidiaries.” After the EEOC issued Alam a right-to-sue notice, he filed a retaliation claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and a state law claim for promissory estoppel. The district court ultimately dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Alam had not exhausted EEOC remedies with respect to Miller and, with respect to MillerCoors, was not an employee nor seeking employment opportunities for purposes of Title VII. View "Alam v. Miller Brewing Co." on Justia Law

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After drinking very heavily and accelerating to 80-90 miles per hour on a road with a posted limit of 35 mph, to escape alleged pursuers, McNary woke up in a hospital and learned that he had killed a pedestrian and then two occupants of a vehicle, during a police chase. He claims that he has no memory of speaking to officers at the hospital, of receiving Miranda warnings, or consenting to blood alcohol test. He is serving two life sentences, without the possibility of parole, in an Illinois state prison. State courts rejected arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on failure to prove that McNary was in custody while speaking to officers by eliciting testimony from his sister about her observations at the hospital and eliciting prejudicial testimony from McNary. The district court denied a habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that reasonable jurists could not disagree with the conclusion of the Illinois appellate court. View "McNary v. Hardy" on Justia Law

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Wisconsin police recruits must complete probation. Statewide requirements are set by the Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB), Wis. Stat. 165.85. Milwaukee has interpreted Wis. Stat. 62.50(3)(b) as authority to adopt additional requirements; no new recruit becomes a full officer before 16 months of “actual active service.” Ramskugler’s probation in Milwaukee began in October 2007. Days later, Ramskugler injured her knee during training. The Department assigned Ramskugler to clerical duties. In November, she was given 2.5 months of leave for knee surgery. Ramskugler returned to duty in a clerical capacity for several months. She obtained medical clearance for unrestricted duty, but had to wait for the next recruit class to begin. Before graduating in November 2008, Ramskugler re-injured her knee. She had completed the course. After more leave and a second surgery, Ramskugler returned to clerical duties in January 2009. Although Ramskugler was a “law enforcement officer,” as defined by the LESB, she was on probation in Milwaukee, which did not consider clerical duties “actual active service.” The district court rejected a suit and, while appeal was pending, Ramskugler accepted a settlement. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that the union lacked standing to bring suit on its own behalf. View "Milwaukee Police Assoc. v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs" on Justia Law