Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McArdle was hired as principal of Lindbergh School in 2008 with a two-year contract that allowed termination after one year with payment of severance. Lindbergh’s prior principal, Davis, was McArdle’s superior. McArdle claims that she discovered irregularities, including Davis’ use of school funds for personal purposes; improper payment to a student teacher; and circumvention of rules regarding admission of nonresidents. McArdle alleges that she received evasive responses from Davis. Davis put McArdle on a performance improvement plan in 2009, asserting parental complaints, but refusing to identify complainants. McArdle was told that the board would consider termination of her contract. McArdle consulted an attorney and filed a police report, accusing Davis of theft of school funds. She sent letters to the board, listing improprieties. Davis was excused from the meeting; the board discussed McArdle’s allegations, then voted to terminate McArdle’s contract at the end of the school year. Davis was prosecuted for theft of school funds. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on claims under the First Amendment and of breach and interference with contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. McArdle’s reporting of misconduct was speech as a public employee, not shielded from her employer’s response; defendants’ motives are immaterial. View "McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. 150" on Justia Law

Dean boarded an airplane in Chicago bound for Canada, carrying a laptop computer housing more than 14,000 still images and 700 videos of child pornography. He served 21 months in a Canadian prison. Later, in U.S. custody, the district court found Dean competent. Dean acknowledged that he downloaded the files and knew that the laptop contained child pornography, but maintained that he “didn’t knowingly, purposely want to break the law … I had it on my computer, and my intentions were not to let it out of my hands until I could get rid of it … I did not knowingly break the law … I didn’t know that it existed.” The district court explained that 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) did not require knowledge of illegality but only knowing transportation of child pornography across state lines or an international border. Dean responded: “Yes. And that is why I plead to that.” The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 151- to 188-months’ imprisonment, but stated that the “range is too severe.” Beginning at 108 months, the court deducted 21 months for Dean’s Canadian imprisonment and imposed an 87-month term with lifetime supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “state of mind” argument. View "Unted States v. Dean" on Justia Law

Vidal planned with an undercover FBI officer to rob a “stash house.” He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846; (2)); attempt to possess with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. 846; (3)); Hobbs Act violation committed by attempting to rob the house (18 U.S.C.1951(a)); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and drug trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). The probation officer calculated an offense level of 35, upward adjustment for leadership role, and a reduction for his timely plea and acceptance of responsibility, that, with Vidal’s criminal history, yielded an advisory sentence of 210 to 262 months. The PSR noted a history of mental illness. A forensic psychiatrist diagnosed posttraumatic stress disorder, bipolar spectrum disorder, claustrophobia, and drug and alcohol abuse. The district court sentenced Vidal to 210 months with a consecutive term of 60 months, stating: “I also note the mental health issues that you appear to struggle with. Certainly your drug abuse problem does not go well with your mental health issues.” The Seventh Circuit remanded the sentence. The district court failed adequately to consider psychiatric history, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). View "United States v. Vidal" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, business owners appealed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related regulations requiring group health insurance coverage for contraception and sterilization procedures, 42 U.S.C. 300gg‐13(a)(4). Employers who do not comply face a penalty of $100 per day per employee and an annual tax surcharge of $2,000 per employee, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a). The Seventh Circuit granted an injunction, pending appeal, concluding that the businesses had established a reasonable likelihood of success on their claims, that the equitable balance favored granting the injunction; and that harm to religious‐liberty rights outweighed the temporary harm to the government’s interest in providing greater access to cost‐free contraception and related services. The court rejected arguments that a secular, for‐profit corporation cannot assert a claim under Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000 bb; that the free‐exercise rights of the individual plaintiffs are not affected because their corporation is a separate legal entity; and that the mandate’s burden on free‐exercise rights is too remote and attenuated to qualify as “substantial” because the decision to use contraception benefits is made by third parties, individual employees, in consultation with their medical providers. View "Grote v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Pharmaceutical company (Baxter) offered Dr. Rapold, who is Swiss and was living in Europe, the position of Medical Director of Cellular Therapy at its Illinois headquarters. The position was described as “at will.” Unable to wait while Rapold obtained a visa, Baxter entered into a consulting agreement with Rapold to enable him to begin work immediately from Europe. During the six-month consultancy, there were reports of problematic behavior involving rudeness and fits of anger. Baxter revoked the offer. The district court rejected his nationality discrimination claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred by refusing to tender his proffered mixed-motive jury instruction. View "Rapold v. Baxter Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Diaz-Rios, a 21-year-old Mexican national with no criminal history and a valid tourist visa, was staying with in-laws until he was kicked out. He spoke no English. He accepted a friend’s offer of the use of a car and agreed to pay for and pick up some “luggage” in return. Diaz-Rios suspected that “luggage” meant illegal drugs, but agreed because he felt obliged. Caught picking up 45 kilograms of cocaine, he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and faced a statutory minimum term of 10 years. The government stipulated to downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and anticipated that he would qualify for the “safety valve,” 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. 5C1.2, 2D1.1(b)(16). While the presentence investigation, Diaz-Rios declined to speak with the probation officer. He had debriefed government agents about the others involved in the crime, but that information was not shared with the probation officer, who concluded that Diaz-Rios did not qualify for a mitigating role reduction under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 At sentencing the prosecutor agreed that reduction was warranted. The district court found that Diaz-Rios was not a minor participant, without discussion or acknowledging any factor relevant to 3B1.2 apart from drug quantity. The Seventh Circuit vacated.View "Unted States v. Diaz-Rio" on Justia Law

Animal control officers responded to a complaint about the Abbotts’ dog running loose. Travis interfered with efforts to capture the dog and made threats, prompting a call to police. After his mother, Cindy, coaxed him out, Officer Sweeney informed Travis that he was under arrest for obstruction and assault. Travis attempted to evade the officers. Sweeney handcuffed Travis and placed him in a cruiser. A taser was used. Seeing Travis struggling in the moving car, with no partition, Sweeney reached to gain control. His foot slipped and his cruiser rolled into Cindy’s vehicle. Cindy became upset and began screaming. Sweeney, concerned that she was trying to help Travis escape, ordered her to stop, but she continued toward the vehicles. He shot her in the abdomen with his taser. Cindy fell; after another jolt, she was handcuffed. Cindy was never informed of charges against her. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part; Sweeney had probable cause to arrest Travis and is entitled to qualified immunity on Travis’s excessive-force claim. Qualified immunity also applies to Cindy’s false-arrest and false imprisonment claims, but the court vacated with respect to her excessive-force claim.View "Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty." on Justia Law

In 1983, Matamoros was sentenced to 10 years in prison, with a three-year special parole term to follow. When his ordinary parole term expired in 2005, Matamoros’ parole officer issued a Notice of Discharge, explaining that he was no longer subject to supervision by the U.S. Parole Commission. Neither the Commission nor Matamoros’ parole officer noticed that Matamoros still had the special parole term left to serve until a month later, when the Commission issued a Certificate of Special Parole, nunc pro tunc. About six hours after the Commission issued the Certificate, Matamoros participated in an armed robbery, for which he was later sentenced to jail in Wisconsin. The Commission issued a warrant for Matamoros’ arrest for violating the conditions of his special parole. The warrant later lodged as a detainer that remains in effect. Matamoros sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of the special parole term imposition, the detainer, and the delayed dispositional review of the detainer. Matamoros argued that the government should be estopped from enforcing the detainer because he was mistakenly told he was no longer subject to the Commission’s supervision. The district court rejected the arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Matamoros v. Gram" on Justia Law

At the request of a local detective, Winkle, a member of the violent crime task force, was dispatched to investigate a group of men, reportedly drinking beers on a public sidewalk. The location was in a high-crime area; there had been multiple, recent reports of shots-fired; two nights earlier, there had been a drive-by shooting one block from the site. Several officers arrived and converged on the men, blocking escape. Patton was among the group. The officers directed the men to a spot for a pat-down before writing citations. Winkle noticed Patton backing away, looking from side to side nervously, and perceived Patton’s behavior as a “flight or fight” response to police presence that could mean he had a weapon or was wanted on a high-bond warrant. Ultimately he began walking forward, his demeanor still nervous. Winkle then patted the front of Patton’s waistband and immediately felt a gun. Patton entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a weapon 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) after the court denied a motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the pat-down was supported by a reasonable suspicion that Patton might be armed and therefore pose a danger to the officers.View "United States v. Patton" on Justia Law

Porayko entered bankruptcy in 2009, having $10,000 in a checking account at TCF. Crowell, holding a $73,000 judgment against Porayko, served Porayko with a citation to discover assets, asserting a lien. 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(m). Crane, the bankruptcy trustee, argued that only a citation served directly on the bank would establish a lien. The bankruptcy judge lifted the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(d). The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The statute provides that a citation to discover assets creates a lien on all “nonexempt personal property, including money, choses in action, and effects of the judgment debtor,” including “all personal property belonging to the judgment debtor in the possession or control of the judgment debtor or which may thereafter be acquired or come due to the judgment debtor.” A bank account may be an intangible interest, but intangible rights are personal property and a checking account’s holder controls the right to designate who receives the funds on deposit, which makes its value a form of “personal property” under Illinois law. View "Crane v. Crowell" on Justia Law