Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Poole, an Illinois prisoner, believed that a required $2 co-payment for dental care furnished at the prison violate his rights under the Eighth Amendment. After paying the fee, he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Poole’s complaint “frivolously” accuses defendants of “committing strong arm robbery” against a “captive market of inmates.” After screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C.1915A, the district court dismissed Poole’s claims against several defendants with prejudice, but allowed the action to proceed against Isaacs, the prison healthcare administrator, because Poole alleged that he “didn’t have any money” for the co-payment. That allegation was false, and following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Isaacs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that both the original lawsuit and the appeal were so lacking in merit that they warrant the imposition of two strikes under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Isaacs did not deny dental care for Poole, nor is she to blame for the delay in treatment. Poole had sufficient funds in his trust fund account but opted to refuse treatment rather than part with his money. View "Poole v. Issac" on Justia Law

Adigun was charged with three drug offenses after officers seized crack and cocaine powder from him on two separate occasions. On the day of his scheduled trial, Adigun pled guilty in open court and was later sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Adigun argued that the district court erred by failing to suppress contraband seized from his car and by incorrectly calculating a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Adigun waived any objection to the suppression ruling by entering an unconditional guilty plea before the district court. Although the minimum sentence should have been reduced pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, the error was harmless in Adigun’s case because it had no impact on the sentence imposed. View "United States v. Adigun" on Justia Law

School administrators approved a seventh grade field trip to Mauthe Lake. Students were not required to attend. The school district forbids swimming on field trips unless a lifeguard is present. The administrator, present at the lake, knew that there was no lifeguard and that there were places in the swimming area where water would be over the children’s heads. Several students entered the lake at the beach. The chaperone told the children not to go deeper than their chests, Kamonie, with others, walked until the water reached his chest, and was pulled down to water over his head. He drowned inside the designated swimming area. His parents sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming that the defendants deprived Kamonie of his life in violation of the due process clause. The district judge dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A state does not deprive a person of his life in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to prevent death, but only if the death was caused by the reckless act by a state employee acting within the scope of employment. Negligence enhanced the risk to Kamonie, but negligence is not enticement, or deliberate indifference, or blindness to obvious dangers. The parents may have state law claims, but damages would be capped at $150,000. View "Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs.of the City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

The class consists of chemical companies that purchase sulfuric acid as one of the inputs into their production of chemicals. The defendants own smelters that process nonferrous minerals such as nickel and copper. They also produce sulfuric acid and sell or sold it to the members of the class. The class was certified, but the suit, alleging violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, was dismissed on the merits. The district judge ruled that the case could not go to trial on a theory of per se liability. The plaintiffs could have gone to trial on a theory of liability under the rule of reason, but chose to appeal the dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on how the defendants organized their operations. The court stated that: “ If there were no joint venture, there would still be no per se violation for there would still be the legitimate business reasons for the defendants to have cooperated.” View "In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

In 1999, Earls was convicted in Wisconsin of three felony counts of sexual assault of a six-year-old and sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment. After exhausting state remedies, Earls sought federal habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2004, the Seventh Circuit ruled in his favor. The state opted for retrial. Earls posted a $25,000 bond and, as conditions of release, agreed to appear at court dates, have no contact with minors, and notify the court of address changes. Earls was listed as living with his sister. In 2005, Wisconsin charged Earls with 12 counts of bail jumping and having contact with a minor. A passport issued to Earl’s former brother-in-law was used to enter Panama, Nicaragua and Costa Rica and, in 2010, the U.S. Marshal Service arrested Earls in Panama. Earls was convicted of making a false statement on a passport application, aggravated identity theft, and knowingly transferring a stolen identification document and sentenced to consecutive term of 36 and 24 months’ imprisonment. The district court noted that this above-range sentence was not greater than necessary, in light of Earls’ prior convictions for sexually abusing his daughter and another 13-year-old, and general lack of respect for the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Earl" on Justia Law

The government alleged, under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, that API and seven other companies caused $1 billion in PCB contamination in the Fox River near Green Bay, Wisconsin, and hired a consultant to prepare reports on the companies’ percentages of responsibility. API unsuccessfully sought discovery of these reports by challenging a consent decree between the government and another company, then filed a Freedom of Information Act request seeking the material. The government refused under the FOIA exemption covering attorney work product. The district court ruled in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government used portions of its reports in two consent decrees, but that use does not waive work product immunity for all the related content. API misconstrued the privilege, erroneously suggesting that facts underlying the conclusions are unprotected.View "Appleton Papers Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Labor unions allowed non-union members, part of their bargaining units, to opt out of paying dues used to support political and other activities unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment, pursuant to CWA v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). The unions required that objections be renewed annually basis to remain opted-out. Nonmember employees filed unfair labor practice charges, arguing that the annual renewal policies violated the unions’ duty of fair representation by placing an undue burden on objectors. Although they did not seek refunds for themselves because they were always opted-out, they sought refunds for others who filed objections at one time, but failed to renew. The NLRB struck down the annual renewal policies, but did not grant refunds. The Seventh Circuit declined to address an appeal and an argument that the April 2012 final NLRB orders were not legitimate because the President’s January 4, 2012 recess appointments of three of the five NLRB members were invalid. Plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal since the NLRB struck down the annual renewal policies, which were the only source of injury each suffered. They no longer suffer an injury-in-fact and do not satisfy the statutory “aggrieved” requirement, 29 U.S.C. 160(f). View "Richards v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Humphries applied to Milwaukee County to renew her child care provider certificate. Muniz reviewed her application, sent a standard inquiry to a state agency as part of the background check, learned that Humphries had a substantiated finding of child abuse from 1988, and, after conferring with his supervisor, Muniz denied Humphries’s application. Humphries claims that she was not aware of the finding; she had been certified as a child care provider in the past. The abuse finding was later overturned and Humphries was certified. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment to Muniz and his supervisor on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a due process claim. Muniz and his supervisor had no involvement in the investigation or determination of the 1988 finding of substantiated abuse and did not violate Humphries’s constitutional rights when they relied on that finding to deny her child care provider renewal application.View "Humphries v. Milwaukee Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are 250 purchasers of timeshare interests in a resort in San José del Cabo, Mexico. They bought the interests between 2004 and 2006 from a Mexican company, DTR, which no longer exists. Each contract stated that “in case of controversy … the parties hereby agree to submit themselves to the applicable laws and competent courts of the City of Mexico, Federal District, expressly waiving any other forum that may correspond to them by reason of their present or future domiciles.” Plaintiffs allege that Raintree and Starwood defrauded them by “pretend[ing] to have a Mexican subsidiary (DTR) take in money for [villas] that would never be built.” The district court dismissed for improper venue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, even if the contracts of sale are fraudulent, it doesn’t follow that the clause is. The clause is not "unclear, in illegible print, in Sanskrit or hieroglyphics, or otherwise suggestive of fraudulent intent." There is no evidence that the defendants tried to mislead the plaintiffs concerning the meaning of the clause, or selected a foreign forum to make it difficult for the plaintiffs to enforce their rights under the contracts. Mexico was where the contracts were to be performed. View "Adams v. Raintree Vacation Exch., LLC" on Justia Law

On Halloween 1996, Parish, age 20, was arrested by Elkhart police as he prepared to take his three children trick-or-treating, and charged with attempted murder and armed robbery. No physical evidence tied Parish to the crime. Based mainly on eyewitness testimony, the jury convicted Parish. For eight years, Parish pursued appeals. In 2005, the appellate court ordered a new trial based on his attorney’s failure to properly investigate and introduction of an improper jury instruction. Parish was then 30 years old. The government offered a plea that involved no additional jail time, but Parish refused. The government then dismissed the case. Parish sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The jury found in favor of Parish, but awarded only $73,125 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. In his unsuccessful motion for a new trial, Parish presented evidence that the average jury award was nearly $950,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the court admitted testimony of eyewitnesses identifying Parish, but refused to allow Parish to present significant evidence that he was not guilty, including identification of other individuals as possible perpetrators, and recantations by the eyewitnesses. View "Parish v. City of Elkhart, IN" on Justia Law