Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nunez illegally entered the U.S. in 1992. In 1998, his father’s I-130 Petition on Nunez’s behalf was approved. In 1999, Nunez was convicted of misdemeanor battery. Nunez contends that, on that date, he was illegally removed, but the record only shows that Nunez was subjected to expedited removal a week later, when he attempted to enter California with a resident-alien card for “Mendoza-Gutierrez.” Under oath, Nunez stated that the card was not his; that he lacked documentation to enter; that he had no immigration applications pending; and that he previously had never been in the U.S. Nunez was informed that he could not re-enter for five years. Nunez re-entered in 1999. The IJ concluded that Nunez was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had not remained physically present in the U.S. for 10 years prior to application, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). Before the Board ruled, his wife became a citizen and filed an I-130 petition. Following remand, an IJ held that Nunez was ineligible for adjustment of status because he had illegally re-entered. The Board agreed, although the previous removal order never had been reinstated. Nunez was ineligible for cancellation because he was not physically present for 10 years. The Seventh Circuit denied appeal. View "Nunez-Moron v. Holder" on Justia Law

Lynch was injured while working at a jobsite as a mechanic for Metropolitan Rail (Metra), when the top rail of a chain-link fence he was installing fell and struck him on the back of his neck and shoulders. In his suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that Lynch adequately raised material issues of fact concerning whether Metra was negligent. View "Lynch v. NE Reg'l Commuter R.R.Corp." on Justia Law

Anderson, a U.S. Postal Service worker, suffers from asthma. While he is virtually symptom-free outside of the workplace, his asthma regularly flared up at his job as a part-time mail processor. Between 2002 and 2009, Anderson filed numerous Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, an Occupational Health and Safety Administration complaint, and union grievances relating to his condition, requesting reasonable accommodations. He was absent from work for extended periods of time throughout the 2002-2009 period. Anderson sued USPS, for alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and the Americans with Disability Act, for retaliation, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and violations of the Family Medical Leave Act. The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Anderson cannot point to temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse action on the part of USPS. Nor did he present evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that USPS acted pretextually. View "Anderson v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

The Flukers, father, son, and daughter, operated various fraudulent, Ponzi-like schemes that duped victims into investing millions of dollars. By the time the overall scheme ended in 2007, the Flukers had already received more than $16 million from one scheme, involving more than 3,000 people, and more than $2.6 million from another, involving more than 25 people. Bank records demonstrated that the money received was never invested in any significant way in order for a return to have been generated. The three were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343 by mail and wire fraud. The district court found the father “the person who is most responsible for what happened.” Though the Sentencing Guidelines called for a range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment, daughter was sentenced to 96 months’ incarceration, plus restitution of $10,783,960.45. The district court sentenced son to 96 months’ imprisonment with restitution of $7,336,957.49. Father was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment plus $7,336,957.49 restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings, to calculation of the sentences, and to the district court’s decision to provide the jury with an “ostrich” instruction. View "United States v. Fluker" on Justia Law

White created a website to advance white supremacy and included a statement that “everyone associated with the Matt Hale trial has deserved assassination for a long time.” The site also included information related to the foreperson of the jury that convicted Hale, a white supremacist, of criminally soliciting harm to a federal judge. Although a jury convicted him of soliciting the commission of a violent federal crime against a juror, 18 U.S.C. 373, the district court held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that White was guilty of criminal solicitation, and that White’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the conviction and remanded for sentencing. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, based on the contents of the website, its readership, and other contextual factors, White intentionally solicited a violent crime against Juror A by posting Juror A’s personal information on his website. Criminal solicitation is not protected by the First Amendment. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

In 2010, Dunne filed a discrimination complaint under 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(2), with the Mine Safety and Health Administration, a division of the Department of Labor, claiming that had terminated his employment for engaging in protected safety-related. The Secretary of Labor determined that the complaint was not frivolously brought, and Vulcan agreed to a temporary (economic) reinstatement pending a determination on the merits. The Secretary later determined not to prosecute Dunne’s complaint before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and Vulcan moved to dissolve the reinstatement order. The Commission denied Vulcan’s motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in favor of Vulcan, which argued that the term “complaint” in the statutory phrase “final order on the complaint,” refers only to the complaint brought by the Secretary after she determines that section 815(c) has been violated. Placement of the temporary reinstatement provision in the same subsection that describes the Secretary’s investigation, merits determination, and complaint, suggests that Congress meant for temporary reinstatement to continue only during the Secretary’s involvement. View "Vulcan Constr. Materials, L.P. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2011 Indiana prohibited state agencies from providing state or federal funds to any entity that performs abortions or operates a facility where abortions are performed ( 5-22-17-5.5(b)). The Hyde Amendment already prohibits use of federal funds for most nontherapeutic abortions; Indiana has a similar ban. The new law prohibits abortion providers from receiving any state-administered funds for other services. Planned Parenthood provides medical services to low-income patients (named plaintiffs) and claimed that the law violates Medicaid’s requirement that state plans allow patients to choose their providers, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23); that it is preempted by a statute authorizing grants for programs related to sexually transmitted diseases, 42 U.S.C. 247c(c); and that it places an unconstitutional condition on receipt of funds. The district court enjoined enforcement with respect to Medicaid and 247c(c) funding. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. The free-choice-of-provider requirement creates a private right of action; although Indiana may exclude unqualified providers from its Medicaid program, it may not exclude a class of providers for a reason unrelated to qualifications. Other claims are not likely to succeed; the grant statute does not create actionable private rights and the law does not conflict with that statute. The government’s refusal to subsidize abortion does not impermissibly burden a woman’s right to obtain an abortion. View "Planned Parenthood of IN, Inc. v. Comm'r of the IN Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

On December 23, 1980, police found a body in a ditch and another nearby; both had been shot in the head. Months later, an informant implicated Pamela Thompkins; she was arrested and confessed to assisting her former brother-in-law (Willie Thompkins) and a friend in a robbery that became double murder. Willie agreed to talk after receiving Miranda warnings. During interrogation, he took a phone call from an attorney, but continued to talk without invoking his right to counsel; in court for a bond hearing, he confessed. A jury convicted him, based on his confession, eyewitness testimony, and evidence from the scene. He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessful direct appeal and years of state post-conviction proceedings, the Governor commuted the sentences of all death-row inmates, and Thompkins was resentenced to life. He exhausted remaining post-conviction claims. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply federal law in holding that the right to counsel had not yet attached when Thompkins confessed, so the trial court properly declined to suppress the confession, or in rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance based on procedural default and lack of factual support. View "Thompkins v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Before selling 13.4 grams of crack cocaine to a police informant in 2010, Ousley had five felony drug convictions. Departeingthe scene of the transaction, Ousley initially eluded officers and abandoned his vehicle. Officers apprehended him, searched his apartment, and discovered 579 grams of crack cocaine and several firearms. Ousley was convicted of distribution of more than 5 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession of more than 50 grams of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a federal crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and felony possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 851, the government had expressed intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on Ousley’s prior convictions. Because Ousley had at least two prior drug felonies and possessed more than 50 grams of crack cocaine that he had intended to distribute, 841(b)(1)(A) required a sentence of life imprisonment on the possession-with-intent-to-distribute count. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments precludes a mandatory life sentence for dealers who possess a smaller quantity of crack cocaine than the quantity of powder cocaine necessary to trigger a similar sentence.View "United States v. Ousley" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, runs a number of youth detention facilities. Jamal, age 16, had a history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times when he arrived at one of those facilities in 2008. His intake assessment noted a history of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, major depression, bipolar disorder, psychosis, behavior disorders, and anger and drug abuse counseling. His behavioral history included delinquency, gang affiliations, anger, aggression, setting of fires, cruelty to animals, putting a gun to a cousin’s head, threatening to kill teachers, learning disabilities, alcohol abuse, and cannabis use. Jamal denied that he had manic or depressive symptoms, that he was depressed, or that he had experienced suicidal thoughts since his June 2008 attempt; the intake doctor prescribed Prozac and lithium. Jamal was noncompliant, had disciplinary problems, and was periodically evaluated for suicide risk before he committed suicide by hanging himself from a bunk bed. In his mother’s suit, alleging deliberate indifference to Jamal’s serious mental illness, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Miller v. Nordstrom" on Justia Law