Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hoppe is a tenured professor of Philosophy at Lewis University. She lost the privilege of teaching aviation ethics after the new chair of the Aviation Department, Brogan, deemed her unqualified because she had no formal training in aviation, had never worked in the industry, and had not obtained any degrees or certifications relevant to the field. During the two years before her removal from the course, Hoppe filed a series of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, requesting an accommodation for her clinically diagnosed “adjustment disorder” and accusing the university of discrimination and retaliation. She sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court awarded the university summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While there was no evidence of Hoppe’s job functions or her inability to perform them, the undisputed evidence shows that the university offered Hoppe three different accommodations, which she rejected, and no rational trier of fact could find that the university’s efforts were unreasonable. Hoppe has no evidence of a causal link between her protected activity and Brogan’s decision and failed to make a prima facie showing of retaliation. View "Hoppe v. Lewis Univ." on Justia Law

Liu, a 50-year-old citizen of China, came to the U.S. in 2000 on a nonimmigrant visa, after protesting the loss of his job at a state-owned factory. He overstayed and, in removal proceedings, requested asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. He testified that he was persecuted after protesting layoffs and was beaten in jail. He claimed that officials told his wife that he would face “serious consequences” if he continued to make trouble. He stated that he never belonged to any political organization in China or the United States and acknowledged that he “didn’t do anything to protest or criticize the government of China.” The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the decision, denying relief and ordering removal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Liu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Tapia entered the U.S. illegally in 1992. He was removed to Mexico in 1997 following conviction for a hit-and-run accident. Tapia did not seek review, but reentered illegally and was again removed. He reentered again and DHS reinstated the 1997 removal order in 2010. Tapia contended that the 1997 order was invalid because he did not receive proper notice of his right to counsel and because his convictions did not meet the statutory definition of aggravated felonies. The Seventh Circuit rejected the claims as untimely and held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision to execute a removal order. Tapia filed a motion to reopen, which was rejected, and the Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Changing the caption on the document from “motion for stay” to “motion to reopen” does not create a right of judicial review. The only thing that a court of appeals could review would be the original removal order and that review must be sought within 30 days of the order’s reinstatement. Tapia missed the deadline. View "Lemos v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff taught sixth-grade at a public school and met with a student’s parents about a threat the student had made against another student. He met the parents again after seeing the student beating another student. The father threatened a lawsuit and told plaintiff that an older son, who had assaulted the assistant principal, should have assaulted plaintiff. During a subsequent class, the student used an assignment to write a song with lyrics about stabbing plaintiff. The police liaison encouraged plaintiff to file criminal charges; under Illinois law declaring a knowing threat of violence against a person at a school is disorderly conduct, 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(13). School administrators feared a suit and were not supportive. After plaintiff filed charges, his evaluations went from satisfactory to unsatisfactory and administrators advised him that they would recommend that he not be rehired. Plaintiff resigned and filed suit, claiming retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that the complaint was not protected by the First Amendment because it did not involve a matter of public concern. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Principles underlying the suit are well settled, which defeats claims of qualified immunity. View "Gschwind v. Heiden" on Justia Law

During tax years at issue, State Farm filed consolidated returns for life insurance and non-life subgroups. The IRS determined deficiencies. State Farm responded that, using a revised method for calculating alternative minimum tax, rather than owing $75 million in additional taxes, it was entitled to $500 million in additional refunds. State Farm also raised a loss reserve issue. The Tax Court ruled that State Farm should not have included a $202 million award of compensatory and punitive damages for bad faith in its insurance loss reserve for 2001 and 2002 returns. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, regarding punitive damages. Pending clearer guidance from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (to whom Congress has commanded deference), punitive damages should be treated as regular business losses that are deductible when actually paid rather than deducted earlier as part of insurance loss reserves. With regard to the compensatory damages portion of the award, the court reversed. Extra-contractual obligations like compensatory damages for bad faith have long been included in insurance loss reserves; NAIC guidance supports that result. The court affirmed rejection of State Farm’s recalculation of alternative minimum tax, which would result in “creation from thin air of a virtual tax loss some $4 billion larger than” actual loss. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Trinity terminated Dr. Assaf’s employment in 2009t. Assaf filed suit for breach of contract. While the case was pending, Assaf negotiated with Trinity’s new CEO, Tibbitts, Apparently without attorneys, Assaf and Tibbitts signed an agreement that provided that Assaf would receive a salary of $50,000 each year from 2009 to 2011. After that, his employment would automatically renew for a year unless either party gave notice of termination. Trinity refused to honor the agreement. The district court decided to enforce the agreement, but granted Trinity’s motion to bar any evidence of Assaf’s lost professional fees. Trinity never re-employed Assaf, claiming that “there is a policy against ordering specific performance of a personal services contract.” The court ordered Trinity to reinstate Assaf. Rather than reinstating Assaf, Trinity filed a “motion to clarify or stay.” The court reversed its earlier order, proceeded, without trial, to award Assaf his salary for the years 2009 through 2011, attorney’s fees, and compensatory damages. The court did not award any amount in lost professional fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed, declining to address specific performance because Trinity properly reterminated Assaf in 2011. The district court abused its discretion in barring evidence of lost professional fees. View "Assaf v. Trinity Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In 2004, Resurrection sought to rezone property around Saint Joseph Hospital in Chicago to allow further development of the campus. Plaintiffs own property within 250 feet of the property and objected to the rezoning. In 2006, the city approved the rezoning and amended the Chicago Zoning Ordinance to create IPD 1019. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court, claiming that the ordinance violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the due process clauses of the Illinois and U.S. Constitutions because it was inconsistent with provisions of the Chicago Zoning Code. The state trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, stating: “The IPD ordinance … is not rendered unconstitutional simply because this municipality, a home rule unit, violated its own self-imposed ordinances in enacting the IPD ordinance.” The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Plaintiffs filed in federal court. The district court dismissed the claim as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which federal district and circuit courts lack jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.View "Commonwealth Plaza Condo. Assoc. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After seeing Tebbens soliciting funds in an intersection using a fireman’s boot, Chicago Police Officer Mushol determined that Tebbens possessed firefighter identification, but was not a firefighter. Seeing Tebbens soliciting a second time, the officer issued tickets for not having a valid city permit to solicit funds on behalf of his charity and one for failing to display a city permit, both of which eventually were dismissed. On charges relating to theft of the firefighter identification, Tebbens accepted court supervision. Seeing him soliciting a third time, Officer Mushol arrested Tebbens. Charges were later dismissed. Tebbens sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the arrest was without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He sought indemnification against the City of Chicago under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that Officer Mushol had probable cause to arrest Tebbens for violating the terms of his court-ordered supervision and was entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Tebbens for violating the supervision order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Tebbens v. Mushol" on Justia Law

Park hoped to become a dental surgeon when she enrolled at the Indiana University School of Dentistry (IUSD) in 2006. After one year at the school, Park began to experience a series of serious setbacks, including several failing grades and allegations of professional misconduct. Eventually, the school dismissed her. Park appealed without success to school committees and administrators. The district court dismissed her suit, alleging Equal Protection and Due Process violations, as well as claims for state law breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Park did not allege bad faith in the dismissal and had no contract claim. Park’s interest in becoming a dentist is not one that the due process clause protects. Park did not allege intentional discrimination. View "Park v. IN Univ. Sch. of Dentistry" on Justia Law

Medina first entered the U.S. illegally, at age 16, in 1982. He was deported after two 1989 convictions, one for selling or transporting cocaine and the other for attempted robbery. He returned and was convicted of illegal reentry and again deported. He entered unlawfully a third time and was convicted of being found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). He appealed the 37-month sentence he received, contending that he should not have received a sixteen-level enhancement for being deported after a felony conviction for a “drug trafficking offense” where the imposed sentence exceeded 13 months or after a felony “crime of violence.” Medina argued that his 1989 convictions did not fall within those definitions under the 1989 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and so the enhancement does not apply. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the crimes qualify under the 2010 Sentencing Guidelines, which were the guidelines in effect at the time of Medina’s sentencing. View "United States v. Medina" on Justia Law