Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Aschermann suffers from degenerating discs and spondylolisthesis and had lumbar fusion operations in 2002 and 2004. Until 2003 she worked as a sales representative. Back pain left her unable to perform its duties. Between 2003 and 2009 she received disability payments under the employer’s disability plan, a welfare-benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The policy provides that after the first two years of benefits, the question becomes whether the recipient can perform any job in the economy as a whole. Lumbermens stopped paying disability benefits to Aschermann in fall 2009, concluding that she could do sedentary work. The district court held that the decision to end her disability benefits was not arbitrary. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Aschermann does not deny that her education B.S. in psychology and master’s degree in social work and experience suit her for many desk-bound positions, but claimed inability to work more than four hours a day. The insurer gave notice complying with ERISA, (29 U.S.C. §1133(1), that it wanted new diagnostic test results and other recent information; she was given a “reasonable opportunity” to supplement the file and receive a “full and fair review.” View "Aschermann v. Aetna Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Winforge claimed that defendants breached a hotel development agreement between the parties, causing delay and costs that caused Winforge to default on the separate construction loan agreement between the parties. Defendants cross-claimed that Winforge breached the development agreement. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants and found that the parties had never entered into a final, enforceable contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even a signed writing is not a contract if there is no mutual assent or “distinct intention common to both;” the parties continued to exchange new drafts of the Scope of Work even after they had signed the Agreement. To the extent that defendants incurred any obligations, their failure to perform was not a breach because that failure was due to Winforge’s deficient performance of Winforge’s duties. View "Winforge, Inc. v. Coachmen Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Industrial grease, propelled in a jet with enough energy to penetrate and pass through the human body like a bullet, hit and disabled a worker at a steel rolling mill. At trial the jury found that the accident was caused by a design defect in a heavy industrial product designed and manufactured by Xtek and installed in the mill. That equipment contained an internal spring that could exert over 10,000 pounds of force. The jury accepted the theory of plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Hutter, that the spring was the culprit mechanism behind the accident and that an alternative design of a thrust plate in the equipment would have prevented the disabling accident. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in denying Daubert motion that sought to bar Dr. Hutter from offering his expert opinions, which were essential to the plaintiffs’ case. The purpose of the Daubert inquiry is to scrutinize proposed expert witness testimony to determine if it has “the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field” so as to be deemed reliable enough to present to a jury. View "Lapsley v. Xtek, Inc." on Justia Law

Travelers sought a declaratory judgment that they had no duty to defend their insured, Rogan Shoes, in an Illinois state court class action for violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g), which prohibits businesses from including on sales receipts the expiration date or more than the last five digits of the purchaser’s credit or debit card and authorizes damages of up to $1,000 per unlawful receipt. The suit sought statutory damages of $387 million. Rogan settled for $16 million; the settlement specified that the judgment would be satisfied only through proceeds from Travelers’ policies, with the exception of $50,000 to cover legal costs. Rogan assigned its claims and rights to payments under the policies. The state court approved the settlement. A state court citation to discover assets was served on Travelers’ agent. The district court dismissed the declaratory judgment action on the ground that parallel state proceedings were pending. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the case did not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a), because Rogan had assigned its interests in its policies to class members, none of whom individually claim a share of more than $75,000. View "Travelers Prop. Cas. & Travelers Indem. Co. v. Good" on Justia Law

While officers were following a vehicle in which Jones was riding as a passenger, Jones threw a handgun out the window. The driver pulled over and officers obtained consent to search from both Jones and the driver. Jones had an empty handgun holster around his waist and 18 grams of marijuana in his shoe. The officers then retraced their route and retrieved the handgun from a driveway a few blocks away. Jones admitted the gun was his. He was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon and was sentenced as an armed career criminal based in part on a prior Illinois conviction for vehicular fleeing, which the judge counted as a third violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years to life. The judge sentenced Jones to 184 months, just above the mandatory minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a vagueness challenge to the residual clause. The court noted that a majority of the Supreme Court has rejected the argument, albeit only in response to dissents, not in the more formal sense of deciding an explicit void-for-vagueness challenge. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

An investigator downloaded child pornography videos from an internet protocol address registered to Miller and searched Miller’s home. Miller told agents that they might find child pornography. The search yielded computers and an unconnected hard drive containing multiple video files and images of child pornography. Miller’s wife stated that she had confronted Miller about the pornography on his computer, that his six-year-old granddaughter had alleged that Miller had watched her get undressed and inappropriately touched her, and that Miller’s teenage stepdaughter claimed that Miller “regularly” walked in on her while she showered. Miller voluntarily admitted that he had downloaded child pornography. Charged with distributing, receiving, and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), (b)(1); 2252(a)(2); 2252(a)(4), Miller testified that he did not “seek out images of naked children.” The court allowed questions about allegations by his granddaughter and stepdaughter, but prohibited extrinsic evidence concerning the allegations and instructed the jury that the evidence was relevant only to questions of intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. While it was error for the court to admit the evidence without first weighing probative value against risk of unfair prejudice, the error was harmless because evidence of guilt was overwhelming. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 1990, defendant, a Mexican citizen, illegally entered the US. Between 1994 and 2005, he was convicted of multiple crimes, including theft and drug offenses, and was deported twice. In 2009, he was convicted in state court of attempted aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to four years in prison. While serving that sentence, he was discovered by immigration authorities. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry without a plea agreement, 18 U.S.C. 1326(a). At sentencing, after a 16-level enhancement pursuant to USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), the district court determined an offense level of 12 and a criminal history category of IV. The corresponding range was 57-71 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: defendant was deprived of the opportunity to argue for a concurrent sentence and should therefore be given credit for time already served on his attempted aggravated kidnapping conviction; to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, a below-Guidelines sentence is appropriate to account for the lack of a fast-track program in the Northern District of Illinois; and that that the district court erred when it added a 16-level enhancement. View "United States v. Garcia-Ugarte" on Justia Law

Defendant, a 27-year-old Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to being in the U.S. after being deported, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), and was sentenced to 71 months, the top of the 57-71 month guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge should not have taken into account 41 arrests that had not resulted in convictions without determining that defendant had actually engaged in conduct for which he was arrested. A court may not rely on the prior arrest record itself in determining a sentence, but may consider underlying conduct detailed in arrest records where there is sufficient factual basis to conclude that the conduct actually occurred. For 15 arrests there was a summary either of a petition for adjudication of wardship or of the arrest report. The defendant did not question the accuracy of any of those and did not suggest that the other 26 arrests were ungrounded. The judge was entitled to assume that the arrests considered as a whole, coupled with five convictions, gave a more accurate picture of the likelihood of recidivism than the convictions and arrest summaries alone and justified the sentence. Given defendant’s criminal record, there was no basis for a cultural-assimilation adjustment. View "United States v. Lopez-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Mortier was a major marijuana distributer with a network of street-level sellers around Madison, Wisconsin. He disappeared in 2004, and the District Attorney’s Office opened a John Doe proceeding to determine whether a crime had been committed. Prosecutors subpoenaed Mortier’s known drug associates, including Stadfeld. Rather than assert his right to remain silent and follow the steps necessary to obtain formal immunity, he talked to investigators informally in exchange for an oral nonprosecution agreement. Stadfeld’s counsel mistakenly advised him that this nonprosecution agreement immunized him against the use of his statements by state or federal prosecutors. Almost four years later, based in part on his statements to the investigators, Stadfeld was indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Stadfeld was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Stadfeld’s statements were not the product of law-enforcement coercion, and the erroneous advice from his lawyers did not make his statements involuntary or inadmissible based on ineffective assistance of counsel. To the extent that Stadfeld thought he had a comprehensive immunity agreement, it was conditioned on his telling the truth and he breach it by lying to investigators. View "United States v. Stadfeld" on Justia Law

Dooley lied about her marriage status and income to obtain Social Security benefits and food stamps. While employed at a hospital, she stole credit cards and identification documents from approximately 100 patients, then made purchases on the accounts of the vulnerable (often helpless) people and used the credentials to obtain additional credit cards and Social Security numbers in spurious names, to defraud additional persons. She pleaded guilty to nine counts including three counts charged aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C.1028A, which provides that every conviction is punished by two years in prison and that every sentence must run consecutively to every sentence for a different crime. Sentences for multiple aggravated-identity-theft convictions may run concurrently with each other. The district judge determined the sentences for the six convictions other than under 1028A, and had to add at least 24 months; he was entitled to add 48 or 72 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated the judge’s decision to add 48 months and remanded for sentencing in light of considerations set out in USSG 5G1.2 Application Note 2(B) for determining whether sentences should be concurrent or consecutive. View "United States v. Dooley" on Justia Law