Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Six defendants moved to reduce their sentences for cocaine violations (21 U.S.C. 846; 18 U.S.C. 2) under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on the retroactive crack cocaine amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. At the time defendants were sentenced, offenses involving 1.5 kilograms or more of crack cocaine were assigned the highest possible base offense level of 38 (USSG 2D1.1(c)). After Amendment 706, only offenses involving 4.5 kilograms or more of crack cocaine are assigned an offense level of 38; offenses involving 1.5 kilograms to 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine are assigned a base offense level of 36. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendants were responsible for distributing more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine and, therefore, not eligible for relief.

Gay is a deeply disturbed Illinois inmate with a history of self-mutilation, scheduled for parole in 2095. Between 1996 and 2011, he filed more than 30 federal civil cases. Gay lost two at trial, settled two, and lost or withdrew the remainder. At least four were dismissed as frivolous, leading Gay to strike out under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury, Gay may not proceed in forma pauperis in federal court. He sued prison mental health professionals, alleging constitutionally inadequate treatment and retaliation for a prior lawsuit. The district court required him to post a $1,000 bond, which it knew he could not afford, to cover costs if this suit proved unsuccessful. The court required the bond without evaluating the merit of Gay’s claims. When Gay did not post the bond, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit reversed. District courts have several tools for dealing with indigent litigants who abuse the court system. Requiring a party to post a cost bond that the court knows the party cannot afford, however, is not one of those available tools for dismissing or discouraging frivolous suits.

In 1986 two victims were found murdered in their home. They had been stabbed numerous times and their home had been set afire. Whitlock and Steidl were convicted in 1987. They spent the next 21 and 17 years in prison, respectively, before each obtained reversal on the basis of numerous Brady violations. Whitlock and Steidl brought suit against state officials for violations of their constitutional rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss some of the defendants. Following discovery the district court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment and set a trial date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an interlocutory appeal. The prosecutor is not protected by immunity from liability for alleged fabrication of evidence; presentation of perjured testimony violates a clearly established right. The state police defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on a claim that they took affirmative steps to quash an investigation to further conceal the evidence. The court rejected claims of sovereign immunity.

While on probation for a state drug conviction, Defendant-Appellant Mashica Spann met Carlos Hoffman in court mandated group therapy and joined his heroin-distribution ring. She was indicted in federal court for her role in the operation and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin. After rejecting Defendant's argument that she was a minimal or minor participant in the crime, the district court calculated her guidelines imprisonment range as 57 to 71 months without the mandatory minimum, which made the applicable range 60 to 71 months. The government moved for a sentence below the mandatory minimum, citing Defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation of Hoffman and others. The court granted the motion and sentenced Spann to 24 months, less than half of the mandatory minimum and more than a year below the government's most favorable recommendation. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, but her appointed counsel has concluded that the appeal is frivolous and sought permission to withdraw. Upon review, the Seventh Circuit found "no basis to assail the reasonableness of the sentence," and accordingly, granted counsel's motion to withdraw.

Defendant-Appellee Ingrel Estiel Ortega-Galvan appealed his 41-month sentence for entering the United States without authorization after having been removed. The issue before the Seventh Circuit concerned whether and when a district judge could reduce a defendant's sentence after discovering an error in an earlier conviction, which left undisturbed, would support a higher sentence. The probation service calculated the defendant's criminal history as a category IV. The combination of a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of IV yielded a guidelines range of 57 to 71 months of imprisonment. Had it not been for a sexual felony Defendant committed as a teenager, his criminal history category would have been only II (based on a burglary and marijuana possession conviction), and his guidelines range (given his total offense level of 21) would have been 41 to 51 months instead of 57 to 71. Defendant should have been convicted of a misdemeanor, not a felony for the sex offense because he was 16. His lawyer asked the district judge to eliminate the 16-point felony enhancement from his total offense level and also eliminate the felony from his criminal history. These two adjustments would have brought his guidelines range from 57 to 71 months down to 0 to 6 months. The judge refused to make the first adjustment, but made the second, reducing the defendant's guidelines range to 41 to 51 months; and she sentenced him at the bottom of it. "Had the district judge in this case, in computing the defendant's total offense level, shaved points off because the felony conviction was erroneous, she would have been failing to treat the guidelines as 'the starting point and the initial benchmark,' because determining whether a conviction that affects the calculation of the total offense level is valid is not a permissible step in that computation." Upon review, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district judge erred in "tinkering" with the guidelines range, but that the error was harmless. "[The judge gave Defendant the sentence she wanted to give him irrespective of the guidelines, and the sentence [was] consistent with sections 3553(a) and 3661 of the Criminal Code." Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's sentence.

Plaintiff-Appellee Chaunte Ott was wrongly convicted and incarcerated for the 1995 murder of Jessica Payne. He brought a civil rights action against the City of Milwaukee and several police officers. This appeal was filed when Plaintiff served subpoenas on two non-party state agencies, the Wisconsin Crime Laboratory and the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. Rather than comply, the state agencies filed motions to quash. The district court denied those motions, at which point the state agencies filed this appeal, invoking jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. Upon review, the Seventh Circuit concluded that this was not a proper case for that basis of jurisdiction, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Mohawk Industries, Inc. v.Carpenter," (130 S. Ct. 599 (2009)): "[the Court added] that even if [it] read "Mohawk Industries" too strictly and jurisdiction [was] proper, [the Court] would find that the state agencies' arguments lack[ed] merit."

Officers, responding to an assault in progress, saw defendant, who voluntarily submitted to a pat down. A pistol was found in his coat pocket. Charged possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant insisted that the police had planted the gun. His lawyer believed that he could not argue that the firearm was the fruit of an unreasonable search. Following his conviction, defendant brought a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance in that his attorney did not move to suppress the firearm as the product of an unreasonable and did not explain to defendant that his testimony at a suppression hearing could not be used at trial as evidence of his guilt. The district court rejected the petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendant’s insistence that the police planted the gun neither justified nor compelled counsel to refrain from challenging the search that produced the weapon. The court remanded for determination of whether defendant was prejudiced by that failure.

During his intake interview, King informed the jail’s nurse that he had asthma, diabetes, a heart problem, high blood pressure, seizures, and mental health problems. The jail contracted medical services from a private company. The doctor, 300 miles away, visited once a week. The doctor did not obtain details about King's existing prescriptions, but scheduled him to be quickly weaned off of a drug that was not on the company’s formulary. The drug that was substituted was not normally appropriate for King’s conditions. Although King suffered side effects and requested to see a doctor, he was not seen by the doctor for 10 days. Later, when he was convulsing on the floor, the nurse indicated that he was "faking" a seizure. He was left lying on the floor, then moved to a padded cell, where he later died. His widow brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. There was significant evidence that the jail’s policies violated King’s constitutional rights.

Defendant robbed a bank and pleaded guilty to bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during a bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). He received consecutive sentences of 36 months and 84 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that, during the sentencing hearing, the district court denied him his right of allocution under FRCP 32. The six-page transcript showed that defendant spoke at length on a variety of topics, including his troubled childhood, his relationships with various family members, and his time in the U.S. military, before the court interrupted in a way that was not intended to intimidate or terminate his allocution.

The Chicago Tribune published articles revealing that the University of Illinois had a special process for reviewing applications from students with well-placed supporters. The President of the University system, the Chancellor of one campus, and seven of the nine members of the Board of Trustees eventually resigned. The Tribune sought additional information through the Freedom of Information Act, 5 ILCS 140/1: the names and addresses of the applicants' parents and the identity of everyone involved in the applications. The University invoked Exemption 1(a), which provides that agencies will withhold information specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law, pointing to 20 U.S.C. 1232g(b)(1), Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, as prohibiting disclosure. It precludes federal funding for any educational institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein) of students without the written consent of their parents. The Tribune asked a federal district court for a declaratory judgment, which was granted on grounds that the 1974 Act does not prohibit disclosure, just funding. The Seventh Circuit vacated and ordered dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.