Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The employer sought an early withdrawal from its obligation to make pension contributions to a multiemployer pension fund; it entered into a new collective bargaining agreement, six weeks before expiration of the existing agreement, that abrogated its obligation to make payments to the fund. The fund sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1145. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the agreement was ambiguous in providing that the employer could not “prospectively” change its obligation.

Law enforcement authorities believed that defendant was a supplier of illegal drugs to another dealer, Cabrera, who was selling to a paid police informant. The informant, after ordering a pound of methamphetamine from Cabrera, overheard a phone conversation between Cabrera and defendant in which defendant said he would deliver the meth to a garage. Police were listening remotely and arrested Cabrera and defendant at the garage after they carried meth from a truck into the garage. Officers searched defendant and seized a cell phone, searched his truck and seized two more. Defendant denied ownership of the phones in the truck. Officers obtained the phone number, subpoenaed records, and used the call history of the phone found on defendant's person as evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that officers did not "search" the phone, but were content with obtaining its number.

Defendant pleaded guilty to producing and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(4)(B). After calculating an imprisonment range of life, the district court sentenced him to a total of 384 months. The Seventh Circuit upheld the sentence as reasonable. Defendant, who had no criminal history, argued that no harm came to the children he filmed because there was no sexual contact, but the court noted that he circulated his films on the Internet and caused distinct and serious harm to his victims by giving their images a permanent existence and the potential for endless replication.

While playing World of Warcraft online, defendant requested sexual pictures of CG, a minor. CG blocked him, but reinstated him in exchange for online “currency.” Defendant again sent sexual messages; CG again blocked him. Defendant, on release following arrest for possession of large-capacity firearms, paid to obtain CG’s address, told others he planned to kill CG, dug holes in his yard, and removed the release latch from his trunk. He amassed weapons, drove 20 hours to CG’s home, and impersonated an officer to lure CG out of the house and kidnap him. CG’s mother refused to allow defendant into the house. He pointed a handgun at her face, but she slammed the door and called police. He was arrested and pled guilty to brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The district court sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A district court may consider a wide range of conduct at sentencing, including acquitted conduct and dismissed offenses, and the sentencing ranges for those offenses. The court rejected arguments that the court treated defendant’s psychological conditions as an aggravating factor or impermissibly considered rehabilitation.

Plaintiff, wrongly convicted of two murders in 1986, obtained a certificate of innocence in 2009 and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 from Illinois Assistant States Attorneys, Wharrie and Kelley, alleging that they induced false testimony during his trial and retrial and suppressed the compromised nature of the testimony and its acquisition, denying him due process. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging denial of their claim of absolute immunity. They also claimed that Illinois sovereign immunity law precludes federal jurisdiction, and only the Illinois Court of Claims may hear the state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to immunity and suggested that the district court consider relinquishing jurisdiction over state claims. Wharrie is entitled to absolute immunity for alleged solicitation of false testimony from a co-defendant/fellow gang member after the original trial, as well as for alleged suppression of its falsity. Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Kelley with respect to his alleged coercing testimony from an eyewitness.

In 2009 the fire protection district adopted an ordinance requiring commercial buildings and multi-family residences to have fire alarms equipped with wireless radio technology to send alarm signals directly to the district's central monitoring board. The ordinance provided that the district would contract with one private alarm company to provide and service signaling equipment, displacing several private fire alarm companies that have competed for these customers. The alarm companies sued on claims under the U.S. Constitution, federal antitrust law, and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the alarm companies on the basis of state law and enjoined the district from implementing the ordinance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the district has statutory authority to require that commercial and multi-family buildings connect directly to its monitoring board through wireless radio technology. The district does not, however, have authority to displace the entire private market by requiring all customers to buy services and equipment from itself or just one private company.

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit, charging racial discrimination in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and sought class certification (FRCP 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4)) for deciding whether defendant engaged in practices that have a disparate impact on members of the class. The district court denied certification. After determining that appeal was timely, based on a renewed motion for certification made in reliance on the Supreme Court's 2011 decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Whether defendant's company-wide policies put blacks at a disadvantage is a question common to the class. While individual suits may be necessary to determine damages, that question could be resolved in a single proceeding, making limited class action treatment appropriate.

Lawyers, who represented the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case, were sanctioned for improperly joining a defendant that had never employed the plaintiff and were ordered to pay attorneys' fees of $1,475. The judge also dismissed the entire suit with prejudice. The lawyers filed notice of appeal from the sanctions after expiration of the 30-day deadline, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, rejecting an argument that since the award of fees was based in part on Rule 11, the award was outside the scope of Rules 54 and 58(a)(3), required a separate document, and did not become final until that document was filed. A post-judgment sanctions order, made while the judgment is already on appeal, does not fit the ordinary understanding of "judgment," and if it is not a judgment, no separate judgment document was required.

Following published stories about an investigation of their business practices, principals of a waste-management company improved their chances of winning a bid for a contract to refurbish garbage carts for the City of Chicago by slashing their bid. They encouraged other companies to bid in hopes of being hired as a subcontractor if another company won the bid. Each bidder had to certify that it had not entered into any agreement with any other bidder or prospective bidder relating to the price, nor any agreement restraining free competition among bidders. The company won the bid, and after a Justice Department investigation for antitrust violations, the principals were convicted of mail and wire fraud. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the purpose of "colluding" with other potential bidders had not been to prevent them from underbidding but to provide insurance against the bid being rejected based on the earlier investigation. There was no harm as a result of the company encouraging additional bidders.

Defendant performed occasional maintenance and repairs for a fleet of plaintiff's delivery trucks. Defendant usually provided service onsite at plaintiff's plant, but sometimes would take trucks to its shop. In 2007, defendant's employee caused a fatal traffic accident while driving plaintiff's tractor-trailer to defendant's shop for service. The district court concluded that under Illinois law only plaintiff's insurance policy provided coverage for the accident. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Both insurers provide coverage: defendant's policy by its plain language and plaintiff's policy operation of Illinois public policy. Plaintiff and its insurer are, however, ultimately responsible for the settlement amount. Under Illinois law the vehicle owner's policy is primary over the operator's policy unless a statute provides otherwise. The Illinois tow-truck insurance statute does not apply to provide an exception.