Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a 1999 auto accident, plaintiff had severe back pains and was diagnosed with a Chiari malformation, a protrusion of brain tissue into the spinal canal. After three operations on her brain and spine, her vision and speech problems lessened, but she developed hydrocephalus, a buildup of cerebrospinal fluid in the brain that required installation of a shunt in her brain. She has not worked since the auto accident and was last insured for social security disability benefits in June 2005 (when she was 34 years old), so only if she was disabled from full-time work by that date is she eligible for benefits. An administrative law judge found her capable of sedentary work. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the ALJ failed to bridge the gap between medical testimony and plaintiff's testimony and his conclusion.

Plaintiffs challenged the school district practice of giving preference to the boys' Friday and Saturday night basketball games, asserting that non-primetime games result in a loss of audience, conflict with homework, and foster feelings of inferiority. The district court dismissed the claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) and an equal protection claim, 42 U.S.C. 1983 on grounds of sovereign immunity. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Plaintiffs presented a genuine question of fact that such practices violate the statute. Defendants are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983, subject to suit under that statute.

Defendant has three prior felony armed robbery convictions, all arising from a crime spree that occurred more than 35 years ago. Since his 1990 release from prison, he has lived a fairly crime-free life. After his step-mother reported that he was selling guns that were part of his father's estate, he entered a plea of guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 15 years in prison followed by three years of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and 924(e)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging some sympathy for the defendant, but stating that his arguments were for the legislature.

Illinois law provides that workers at public works projects must be paid not less than general prevailing rate of hourly wages for work of a similar character on non-federal public works in the locality, 820 ILCS 130/3. The public body awarding the contract is required to determine prevailing wage, but the Department of Labor conducts annual investigations of prevailing wage for each type of construction and demolition work in each locality and, in practice, public bodies simply adopt that determination. Landscape contractors who do non-federal public works projects sued the Department, arguing that it violated the due process clause by delegating ascertainment of prevailing wage to private entities, namely a labor union and contractors with which it has a collective bargaining agreement. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the contractors did not object to the prevailing wage determination.

Defendant, a U.S. citizen, had a romantic relationship and lived with an illegal alien, who was later arrested on drug charges. After being deported to Mexico, he returned illegally and again lived with defendant. When he was again arrested on drug charges, defendant was convicted under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A), (iii), as one who knowingly or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien was in the U.S. in violation of law, concealed, harbored or shielded such alien. The statute also covers attempts and transportation. The district judge sentenced her to two years' probation and to pay a $200 fine. The Seventh Circuit reversed, distinguishing between "harboring" and providing shelter, without concealing or shielding from detection.

Defendant was convicted of 14 counts of willfully assisting in preparation of tax returns containing materially false and fraudulent claims, including phony medical and business expenses and charitable donations. The evidence at trial proved tax loss of $31,849. At sentencing, the government proposed a tax loss figure of $1.6 million by identifying 662 returns that contained materially false claims similar to those proven at trial and eliminating contested returns. The district court discounted the loss to $400,000- to $1-million to compensate for possible selection bias in a sample of 100 returns and imposed a sentence of 42 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The tax loss figure was not outside the realm of permissible computations. The district court considered defendant's family circumstances as well as substantial aggravating circumstances, including her education, financial and intellectual abilities, knowledge of the tax code and duty to provide truthful information, and that her actions caused the IRS to audit her clients. Defendant also failed to appear for a sentencing hearing, was dishonest to the court, frivolously denied the court had jurisdiction over her, and similarly asserted she was an independent sovereign protected by the Eleventh Amendment.

Petitioner, a Chinese woman, applied for asylum and for withholding of removal on the ground that because of her opposition to China's "one child"” policy she faces persecution if she is returned to China. She had been briefly jailed for resisting officers who came for her pregnant cousin. She came to the U.S. in 1999, married, and gave birth to two children who live in China with their grandparents and claims she faces sterilization. She applied for asylum seven years after the expiration of the one-year deadline. The BIA denied relief under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A). The Seventh Circuit denied review, reasoning that the alleged jail time and beatings may have been the result of resisting arrest or other factors, rather than based on opposition to government policy.

Convicted of attempted murder, criminal confinement, domestic battery, and invasion of privacy, defendant was sentenced to 51 years in prison. He was unsuccessful at seeking post-conviction relief in Indiana state court and filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court looked at counsel's performance as a whole and deferred to the Indiana Court of Appeals conclusion that counsel's decisions to pursue alibi and misidentification defenses were strategic in nature and reasonable under the circumstances. Counsel's decision to lie, during opening statements about petitioner's whereabouts, was "troubling" but did not change the analysis. It is unlikely that a different result would be reached, absent counsel's errors.

Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1, based on denial of overtime pay. For the IMWL claim, the district court certified two classes: "hourly" and "assistant branch manager." The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the certification order did not comply with the commonality requirement of FRCP 23(c)(1)(B). The court referred to the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, and concluded that the defendant's unofficial policy concerning overtime provided the "common answer" that will potentially resolve the case.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court set a base offense level of 24, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), relying in part on a California first-degree residential burglary conviction as a crime of violence, and imposed a sentence of 93 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The burglary conviction qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B), as a crime that otherwise presents a serious potential risk of injury rather than under the enumerated crime of "burglary of a dwelling," but it nonetheless qualifies as a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(2).