Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2000 the Tribe received funding under the Hazardous Fuels Reduction program, created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to gradually reintroduce the beneficial aspects of fire into ecosystems such as densely-wooded forests. After obtaining BIA approval, the Tribe began HFR work in December 2000, and began invoicing BIA in 2001. Reports of diversions of funds prompted an inspection. Inspectors concluded that the invoices overstated the work done and that some of the work actually increased the risk of fire. A second inspection led to the conclusion that the defendants were submitting false invoices. After further investigation and failed settlement negotiations, the government filed a False Claims Act suit, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, in 2007. After a nine-day trial, the defendants prevailed; they moved for attorney's fees under Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), or sanctions under Rule 37(c)(2). The district court denied both motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging its discomfort with apparent "government overreaching." The government’s position throughout trial was substantially justified, so the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the EAJA motion.

In 2003, the Trust sought group accident and life insurance policies as a benefit for its union members. Consistent with the Trust's request, the broker's RFP specifically sought a policy where the "Trust is the owner of the policy and also [a] beneficiary." Defendant's proposal contained only a summary of proposed terms, expressly cautioned that it was not a contract, and omitted reference to the Trust’s desired beneficiary provision. The policy drafts sent to the Trust did not contain the beneficiary provision the Trust wanted and stated that payment of the required premium after delivery of the policies would constitute acceptance. The Trust's chairman signed and paid the first premium in 2003 In May, 2004, the Trust made a claim on the group life policy. Defendant responded that the terms of the policy required it to pay the full benefit to the decedent's beneficiaries. The Trust terminated the policy, stopped paying premiums, and filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and rescission of the contract. The district court dismissed the Trust's claims and entered judgment for defendant for $95,059.99 in unpaid premiums. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the parties had an enforceable contract.

After obtaining evidence of his involv3ment in an armed bank robbery, officers stopped and searched Martin's vehicle and discovered marijuana, cocaine, and a revolver. Martin was arrested and transported to the sheriff's department. An officer read Martin his Miranda rights. Martin acknowledged that he understood, agreed to speak with officers, and admitted he was a convicted felon but denied knowledge of the drugs and gun. An officer asked if he would provide a written statement. Martin responded, "I'd rather talk to an attorney first." The officer ended the interview and returned Martin to the lock-up. Other detectives arrived a few hours later, but were not informed that Martin requested to speak with an attorney. The detectives advised Martin of his Miranda rights and he again waived those rights and agreed to speak. He admitted that he loaned a gun to a friend, who returned it by placing it under the hood of the vehicle. The officers did not request a written statement. The district court denied a motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Martin's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was limited to written statements.

A medical provider filed proofs of claim in about 3,200 bankruptcy cases, 2003-2008, listing the debtors' medical treatment information. The filings were public and available on the docket. Debtors filed class action suits under a statute that allows individuals to sue if their health care records are disclosed without permission, Wis. Stat. 146.84. The bankruptcy judge granted the provider summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed and remanded for lack of jurisdiction. Bankruptcy judges lack authority under Article III of the Constitution to enter final judgments on claims that constitute "the stuff of the traditional actions at common law." The debtors' claims are based on a state law that is "independent of the federal bankruptcy law" and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditor’s proof of claim in bankruptcy.

Officers stopped to investigate a gathering in front of a house. They saw defendant flee from the scene with a handgun in his waistband. After a chase, they arrested defendant and placed him in the back of a squad car. An officer read the Miranda rights; asked if he understood those rights, defendant bobbed his head and made a sighing sound. In response to questions, defendant indicated that he had a gun due to a "murder hit" put on his head, that he did not want to go back to jail and that he would like to strike a deal. At the station, defendant was again informed of his rights under Miranda and responded "Yeah" when asked if he understood and again when asked if he wanted to continue speaking. The Seventh Circuit affirmed conviction for illegal possession of a firearm, stating that defendant's attempts to negotiate a deal and his selective answering of questions are evidence that he understood his rights and voluntarily waived them

An officer obtained a warrant to search defendant's home with a supporting affidavit, based primarily on information provided by a confidential informant, who stated that he observed defendant with a firearm in the residence within the past 72 hours, that defendant lives at that address with family, and that the residence was shot at in the past two weeks due to an ongoing gang feud. The officer stated that he considered the informant reliable because he had provided information in the past six months that resulted in three arrests and that he was able to partially corroborate the informant’s statements. Execution of the warrant recovered two firearms. Defendant entered a conditional plea and appealed denial of a motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the informant could have provided additional information regarding past interactions with defendant or regarding the model of firearm the defendant illegally possessed, the affidavit set forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause.

Former Illinois Department of Transportation employees alleged they were wrongfully terminated because of their political beliefs and party affiliation. They were among about 190 employees laid off in 2004 as part of budget cuts. They filed their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims exactly two years after the effective date of the terminations. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations. The limitations period began to run when plaintiffs received unequivocal notices of termination.

Defendant, an immigrant, cleaned houses. She formed a cleaning service in 1992. Defendant would deposit customers' checks in the business checking account, keep some money as a fee, and withdraw the remaining amount to pay individual cleaners. The bank informed her of the requirement (31 C.F.R. 103.22(b)(1)) that it document and report transactions involving withdrawals of cash greater than $10,000. After being informed of the requirement, defendant would often withdraw more than $10,000 over the course of two days, but less than 24 hours; she withdrew amounts over $9,000 and less than $10,000 on 244 occasions in about six years. She was convicted of 23 counts of structuring transactions to avoid bank reporting, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3). The court gave an "ostrich" instruction, concerning defendant's knowledge. The jury returned a special verdict subjecting $279,500 to forfeiture; the court imposed a sentence of three years of probation as well as an additional judgment of $4,800. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no constitutional violation in weighing the forfeiture against the severity of the crime. Any error in giving the ostrich instruction was harmless.

The former mayor and the head of the engineering department were convicted of conspiring to embezzle and embezzling government funds, based on use of government funds and government employees to renovate the mayor's house. The mayor claimed that he was unaware of the scheme. The district court gave the jury a conscious avoidance instruction. The mayor had an initial offense level of 10 under the Guidelines, but the court applied enhancements for obstruction of justice, leadership role, and abuse of a position of trust, for a total offense level of 18. With a criminal history level of one, the guidelines range was 27-33 months' imprisonment. The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months, a $60,000 fine, more than $14,000 in restitution, a $200 special assessment, and three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court was within its discretion in issuing an ostrich instruction, in applying sentencing enhancements, and in its upward departure from the guidelines.

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846, and 18 U.S.C. 2, and of conspiracy to import a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 952, 960, and 963, and 18 U.S.C. 2. The district court declined to reduce his offense level by two under the Sentencing Guidelines "safety valve" provision, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) because defendant's proffer was unreliable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting claims based on the court's rejection of two of his proposed jury instructions. The court's determination that defendant had not been granted use immunity with respect to his statements was not clearly erroneous. The evidence did not establish that alternate jurors inappropriately deliberated with the petit jury.