Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Claimant owned a hotel adjoining the CDC landfill. CDC hired debtor to build a system for dealing with gases generated in the landfill. In 1999, debtor was forced into bankruptcy. The landfill's gas control system failed; debtor lacked funds to fix it. The failure released foul odors that, traveling underground, entered the hotel through electrical outlets and cracks, sickening guests and employees. Claimant's hotel declared bankruptcy in 2005. The landfill was permitted to terminate its contract with debtor. Claimant filed a bankruptcy claim for the loss in value in selling the hotel, characterizing it as an administrative claim, superior to others, and brought a tort action in state court, which settled. The bankruptcy judge and district judge rejected characterization as an administrative claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Administrative claims have priority because they are claims for reimbursement of expenses incurred after the declaration of bankruptcy, in order to preserve the value of the bankrupt estate for the benefit of creditors. A tort victim is a creditor, whose actions do not benefit the debtor-tortfeasor. Tort liability is an expense of doing business, like labor or material costs, and should be treated the same way.

Plaintiff, a supplier of outdoor power equipment, gave defendant, a disttributer of such equipment, as well as of irrigation equipment, a distributor agreement with a multi-state territory. After about four years, plaintiff provided notice of termination and shifted sales to another distributor. Defendant was in significant debt, its lenders had refused to loan it any more money. Defendant is now out of business. During the contract period, defendant also distributed products for other companies. Plaintiff claimed that defendant owed for products purchased. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff on the breach of contract claim and rejected defendant's claims of wrongful termination and that the new distributor improperly induced plaintiff to terminate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rejecting a Connecticut Franchise Act claim, the court noted that defendant failed to show that more than 50 percent of its business resulted from its relationship with plaintiff. The district court properly awarded interest and rejected claims of unjust enrichment and tortious interference.

Petitioner, a native of Guatemala and a lawful permanent resident in the U.S. since 1980, faced removal as a result of a 1989 Illinois conviction for sexual abuse of a minor. He initially argued that he was not subject to removal because the judge who convicted and sentenced him issued a judicial recommendation against deportation. Before the immigration judge, petitioner's attorney conceded, without consulting his client, that the JRAD was invalid because it was entered outside the 30-day postsentencing window specified in the JRAD statute 8 U.S.C. 1251 (repealed in 1990). He retained new counsel, but the Board of Immigration Appeals held that prior counsel had waived the issue and denied a motion to reopen. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The JRAD was valid. Although it was entered about a month outside the 30-day postsentencing window, the state-court record confirms that the judge unequivocally indicated her intent to retain jurisdiction for the express purpose of considering a JRAD, and the JRAD entered without opposition from immigration authorities or the prosecutor.

A sergeant, passed over for promotion to lieutenant, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was passed over because he is a Republican and did not contribute to the then-sheriff's campaign fund. The district judge granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, as a group heavier contributors to the campaign were treated worse and that plaintiff was not asked to contribute and did not allege that he was told he had to contribute money if he wanted to be promoted. Plaintiff's visible involvement with the Republican party was minimal and there was significant evidence that the sheriff did not know plaintiff or his political affiliation.

Convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), defendants were initially sentenced to 292 months and 188 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated. On remand, the district court reimposed the same sentences. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the recent Supreme Court decision, Pepper v. U.S., entitled defendants to raise new arguments on remand. Even if the defendants should have been allowed to raise new arguments, any error was harmless. The district court addressed defendants' waived arguments and explained why they would not have prevailed.

During a radio call-in show, plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, called in response to critical comments regarding defendant's (county sheriff) involvement with an African-American community organization dedicated to reducing crime and indicating that defendant was not a good fit for his position. Defendant called in and retorted by describing plaintiff as a "slacker" and mentioning a disciplinary action taken in 2004 against plaintiff for "sexual harassment." In actuality, the disciplinary action was for violation of a department rule that prohibited offensive conduct or language. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for disclosure of plaintiff's disciplinary history, a claim under Wisconsin's Open Records Law, and a claim under Wisconsin's Right of Privacy statute. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There was no Records Act violation; there was no request to inspect a disciplinary record, no permission granted, and no balancing test undertaken. The information at issue is a matter of public record, so there was no Privacy Act violation. Rejecting a First Amendment retaliation claim, the court noted that there was no threat, coercion, or intimidation.

The parties, involved in patent infringement cases, agreed to a settlement that required dismissal of their lawsuits and included an arbitration provision and request that a bank subordinate its interests in defendant's patents to the settlement. Defendant stated that the bank had agreed; the parties executed the agreement and dismissed their suits. When plaintiff became aware that the bank would not cooperate, defendant demanded arbitration, but plaintiff went to court to vacate dismissal of its claims and seek compliance with the agreement. The court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Before the Federal Circuit ruled on an appeal, the parties participated in mediation. Plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal, then filed new claims, including claims against defendant's bank and attorneys, claiming that defendant and its attorneys lied or the bank reneged on its commitment. The district court held that defendant had waived its right to arbitrate and that the bank and attorneys, not parties to the settlement, could not be compelled to arbitrate. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that defendant's participation in earlier litigation did not amount to waiver under the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. 1, and vacated with respect to the bank and attorneys. Plaintiff may want to arbitrate with those parties if it must arbitrate with defendant.

Plaintiff's decedent was shot and killed by her ex-boyfriend as she left her church. The shooter committed suicide; he was on parole for an earlier homicide and had a history of harassing and assaulting decedent in violation of his parole and a court order of protection. Law-enforcement and corrections officials were aware of these violations and could have ensured that he was detained without bail, but neither issued a parole-violation warrant nor arrested him for violating the order of protection. The district court held that female victims of domestic violence are not a suspect or protected class for purposes of equal-protection analysis and that a claim against the state department of corrections director was barred by the Eleventh Amendment as seeking damages from the director in his official capacity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint did not plausibly state a policy-or-practice equal protection claim, but included only generalized allegations that the city failed to have specific policies in effect to protect victims of domestic violence from harm inflicted by those who violate their parole or court orders of protection. The complaint alleged, in essence, that the city failed to single out domestic-violence victims as a class for special protection.

After receiving a call from the owner, stating that a robbery suspect was in the store, a police officer fatally shot a man as he exited a convenience store. The decedent disregarded the officer's repeated commands to stop and turned away with his hands not visible, then grabbed at the officer's gun. After his family sued the officer and the city, a jury found that the officer had not used excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court ruling admitting into evidence that the decedent had drugs secreted in his mouth at the time of the shooting, which were discovered during an autopsy. The court noted the limited use of the evidence.

In 2004 plaintiff began working with a new supervisor,who removed many of plaintiff's job duties because he thought plaintiff, age 57, was too old. Plaintiff complained to the vice president of the company and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The vice president investigated and eventually fired the supervisor. In the meantime, plaintiff took leave, under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. When he returned, a new supervisor assigned plaintiff to revamp a training class. Plaintiff suffered a psychological breakdown, exhausted his disability leave, and retired. He sued for discrimination and retaliation (Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621) and for interference with reinstatement under the FMLA. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the evidence, viewed in plaintiff's favor, established that the 2004 supervisor discriminated against him because of age, the ADEA provides no remedy because the discrimination did not cause any loss and was not linked to the disability that precipitated early retirement. There was no evidence of retaliation based on plaintiff's complaining about discrimination. There was no claim under the FMLA because when plaintiff returned to work after medical leave, the company assigned him equivalent duties without regard to his medical leave.