Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in September, 2011
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Plaintiff owns 2,485 acres containing Indiana's only antebellum plantation and 2,000 acres of "classified forest," with endangered species habitats. A utility company has a lease for storing and extracting oil and natural gas on portions of the property. The Lease continues so long as "oil or gas is produced in paying quantities" or "the Property continues to be used for the underground storage of gas" and will terminate upon the utility's surrender or failure to make payments. The lease contains provisions to protect historic sites and to calculate damage to trees, requires notice of utility activity, and requires that the utility's use be "as minimally necessary." Plaintiff sought damages and to terminate the lease and evict the utility. The district court entered judgment for the utility, finding that a disagreement about the use of land was not an express reason for termination and that the lease specifically provided that damages were the proper remedy. Plaintiff dismissed the damages claim with prejudice to appeal the ejectment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not show that damages are inadequate to compensate for the harm to its property.

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Plaintiffs, citizens of Illinois, brought a class action on behalf of licensed drivers in several states against West Publishing, asserting claims under the Driver’' Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2722. They contend that West acquires personal information contained in motor vehicle records of millions of drivers, directly or indirectly, from state DMVs for resale in violation of the Act. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.While the Act does create a federal private right of action for people who claim that their personal information has been disclosed in violation of the Act, it does not prohibit West Publishing from reselling the plaintiffs' personal information to those with uses permitted by the Act.

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In 2000, plaintiff sold 6600 acres of farmland for $16.35 million to an environmental organization, which wanted to restore it as an ecologically functional floodplain for the Illinois River. Plaintiff expressly warranted that there was no petroleum contamination. The organization discovered such contamination and sued. The district court awarded $800,000 in damages, some for a separate breach, failure to clean up livestock waste from lagoons. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed and filed suit against the local drainage district, which had a right of way and equipment on the land to pump surface waters into the river. The district stored petroleum in tanks; at least one was on the organization's land. The organization, wanting to restore the land as wetlands, turned off the pumps. The district court entered summary judgment for the district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A blameless contract breaker cannot invoke noncontractual indemnity to shift risk that he assumed in a contract. The suit is also barred by the economic-loss doctrine, based in part on concern with liability for unforeseeable consequences.

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The class action alleges that the company committed fraud by charging for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage that is worthless in light of policy restrictions. The district court remanded to state court based on the representative plaintiff's argument that the amount in controversy was less than $5,000,000. The Seventh Circuit reversed, calculating the cost if the company were to stop charging a premium or change the terms so that policyholders receive indemnity more frequently, and the availability of punitive damages in Illinois, and concluding that it is not "legally impossible" that policyholders would recover the jurisdictional amount.

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In 2000 husband and wife, citizens of Lithuania, entered the U.S. with illegally-obtained visas. They have two children born in Lithuania and a third born in the U.S. When the visa fraud was discovered, they cooperated and were sentenced to one year of probation. The government charged them with removability for being inadmissible at the time of entry and for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A), 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II), and 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Petitioners applied for asylum and withholding of removal. The Immigration Judge denied the request for asylum; the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The affidavits established, at best, that the government of Lithuania is unstable and does little to protect its citizens. Fear of retribution from co-defendants for an alien's cooperation with the U.S. government, in exchange for a reduced sentence, is not a well-founded fear based on a protected ground.

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Convicted of distributing crack cocaine, Count 1 involving distribution of five or more grams, and Count 2 encompassing distribution of 50 or more grams, defendant faced a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment on Count 1, and a statutory minimum of 20 years on Count 2. The court imposed the statutory minimum on both counts, to be served concurrently. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 was signed into law 17 days before sentencing and, if applied to the convictions, would have lowered the mandatory minimum sentence for Count 2, and have eliminated any mandatory minimum sentence on Count 1. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Act did not apply to conduct that pre-dated its enactment. The district court did not deny defendant the right to represent himself in violation of the Sixth Amendment; he waived his request by subsequent conduct and responses.

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Defendant entered a plea of guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, without a plea agreement. A probation officer recommended 262 to 327 months' imprisonment based on the Guidelines, which the district judge adopted without objection. Defendant was sentenced to 262 months' imprisonment and eight years of supervised The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court adequately considered to the disparity in the Guidelines between crack and powder cocaine offenses and adequately articulated its reasoning.

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Most of the world's reserves of potash, a mineral used primarily in fertilizer, are in Canada, Russia, and Belarus. Defendants are producers with mines in those countries. Plaintiffs are direct and indirect potash purchasers in the U.S. They allege that producers operated a cartel through which they fixed prices in Brazil, China, and India, and that inflated prices in those markets influenced the price of potash in the U.S. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. 6a. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The FTAIA limits the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Antitrust Act to foreign anticompetitive conduct that either involves U.S. import commerce or has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. import or domestic commerce. Whether it blocks jurisdiction or establishes an element of a Sherman Act claim, the FTAIA bars this suit. The complaint alleged little of substance concerning the relationship between the alleged overseas anticompetitive conduct and the American domestic market.

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Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to possession of firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and waived his right to contest any aspect of his conviction or sentence unless the sentence exceeded either the sentencing-guidelines range calculated by the district court "or any applicable statutory minimum, whichever is greater." The district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal to a term of 180 months, the statutory minimum, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). He did not pursue direct appeal. Nearly two years later, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in Oklahoma state court seeking to vacate two of the convictions that were used to enhance his federal sentence. The Oklahoma court entered an order purporting to dismiss the cases, along with six others pending against him. Petitioner moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court rejected the motion as untimely and held that it was barred by the waiver. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that while the appeal was in briefing, the Oklahoma court issued a nunc pro tunc order clarifying that its dismissal order did not in fact vacate the predicate convictions.

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Officers went to plaintiff's home to question her sons about a burglary. A confrontation ensued and escalated. One of the officers Tasered plaintiff three times, and the officers arrested her for obstruction and resisting arrest. Those charges were dropped, and plaintiff sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging use of excessive force and false arrest. A jury returned a verdict for the officers on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff waived her most plausible claim of trial error, the decision to admit two of her criminal convictions, when she introduced evidence of the convictions herself, before the officers could do so. The court also rejected claims based on evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. The parties told dramatically different stories about the confrontation and the jury was entitled to believe the officers’ version.