Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2001 plaintiff received prenatal care from a clinic that receives federal funds. Its physicians and the clinic are deemed federal employees for purposes of malpractice liability, so that the United States could be substituted as a party to a suit. 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(1); claims would be governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act, and neither would face liability. For complex situations, the clinic contracted with UIC for specialists. Plaintiff's baby died following a difficult delivery. She sued the clinic, its doctor, the delivery hospital, and two UIC physicians who assisted. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services denied claims for damages. The district court entered summary judgment for the UIC doctors under the Illinois Good Samaritan Act, which shields physicians who provide "emergency care without fee to a person," 745 ILCS 49/25, but declined to dismiss the case against the government, which had been substituted for the clinic. The Seventh Circuit reversed, first holding that the district court had derivative jurisdiction. Although the salaried UIC doctors did not receive a direct financial benefit from the delivery, their employer billed the clinic for services. There was evidence that one doctor submitted a billing form with respect to the delivery; the other made a "bad faith" decision not to bill.

Petitioner left China to seek asylum in the U.S. and claims that family-planning authorities forced her to have an abortion. Her evidence included a letter from her mother, confirming her version of events and documents that she said were issued by the hospital. One was an outpatient medical record stating that the procedure was due to pregnancy without marriage; the other was a disease certificate. An immigration judge denied the application, concluding that, although she credibly testified to having an abortion, she failed to establish that it was involuntary. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted review and remanded, concluding that the agency misread precedent. The agency did not identify other readily- available evidence that might have helped prove the forced nature of her abortion, especially when the IJ found her testimony about her strenuous efforts to avoid the abortion as being credible.

A diabetic, suffering a hypoglycemic episode while driving, veered off the road. Officers believed he was intoxicated. When he did not comply with commands to step out of his car, they physically removed him, maced him two or three times, struck him four times with a baton to place handcuffs on him and prevent him from kicking his legs and flailing his arms, and kept him in the prone position until a paramedic arrived. The paramedic recognized the condition and took the patient to a hospital, where he died of natural causes roughly two weeks later. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for wrongful arrest, excessive force, failure to train the officers, and condoning the use of excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The officers had probable cause to be believe the driver was intoxicated and the force was not excessive, under the circumstances.

The state agency took a 15-month-old away from his home and parents and into temporary protective custody, following an accident and a hospital visit. Protective custody involved a safety plan that limited the parents' access to the child; the parents claimed to have been threatened into accepting the plan. In the parents' suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court determined that child welfare workers could have reasonably believed that taking temporary protective custody of the child was supported by probable cause and that the seizure did not violate a clearly established right. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the Fourth Amendment, substantive due process, and procedural due process claims premised on the initial removal, but vacated with respect to the Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims premised on the continued withholding of the child as well as the substantive due process and procedural due process claims premised on the safety plan.

South Sudan declared its independence from Sudan in July, 2011. President Obama formally recognized the new republic on the same day. One month earlier, the Seventh Circuit heard oral arguments in a case claiming that the Board of Immigration Appeals erroneously denied petitioner deferral of removal to Sudan under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner's home is in the new republic. The Seventh Circuit remanded, in light of the changed circumstances, the government's acknowledgement of legal errors in the opinion of the Immigration Judge, and the government's assertion that it no longer plans to remove petitioner to Sudan.

A sausage manufacturer brought claims against its former business partner, Pizza Hut, in 1993. In 2002 the manufacturer agreed to drop its last remaining claim, trade secret misappropriation, in exchange for a $15.3 million payment. When it received its $6.12 million take-home portion of the settlement, C&F, a shareholder and an S corporation, reported the income as long-term capital gain. Its shareholders reported their passed-through pro rata shares the same way. The IRS concluded that the settlement income should have been taxed as ordinary income and issued each of the shareholders a deficiency notice. The tax court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The tax court found that Pizza Hut paid for lost profits, lost opportunities, operating losses and expenditures and rightly concluded that the settlement did not represent the final phase of a 13-year-long transfer of a capital asset. Because there was not a complete transfer of all substantial rights, there was no sale of a capital asset or long-term capital gain resulting therefrom.

The parties agree that the company attempted to collect an overdue hospital bill in a way that violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 and that plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages of $1,000. Plaintiff's lawyer endeavored to transform the case into a class action, and the district court, frustrated by the effort, dismissed the whole action. The Seventh Circuit held that dismissal for want of prosecution was an abuse of discretion. All of the errors at issue were the fault of the lawyer and had nothing to do with the claim. The court should have considered other alternatives before dismissal.

Federal regulators limit the number of hours during which commercial truck drivers may operate their vehicles in a given day and over the course of a week, 49 C.F.R. 395.8(b) (2010). The traditional paper system for recording time is subject to manipulation and falsification. When the FMCSA considered requiring truckers to use electronic on-board records (EOBRs) instead of logbooks for documenting their records of duty status, it acknowledged that Congress contemplated rules mandating electronic monitoring, but also required the agency to ensure that any such device is not used to "harass vehicle operators." The 2010 final rule applied to motor carriers "that have demonstrated serious The Seventh Circuit held that the rule is invalid because the agency failed to consider an issue that it was statutorily required to address.

Petitioner entered the U.S. from Mexico as a three-year-old and grew up in Los Angeles. In 2001 he was arrested for importation and sale of a significant amount of cocaine; while on bail, he was twice arrested for driving on a suspended or revoked license. In 2002, he consented to a search of his car that turned up cocaine. Before petitioner could complete his sentence on the importation and sale conviction, he was removed to Mexico in 2004. He returned to Los Angeles without authorization, primarily to take care of his daughters. Following another traffic stop, he was deported and again returned unlawfully. He was arrested for possession of cocaine in 2009. Though that charge was dismissed, petitioner admits that he used cocaine that day. He pled guilty to illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. 1326(a)). The district court rejected arguments for a lighter sentence than the guidelines range of 46-57 months and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on petitioner's risk of recidivism, the court acted within its discretion in declining to consider his cultural assimilation and the absence of a "fast track" program that would have given him the opportunity to receive a lighter sentence in exchange for waiving certain rights.

The company employed plaintiff as activity director in a nursing home in from August 2006 to March 2007. In January 2007, plaintiff learned she was pregnant. Her doctor placed her on bed rest for two weeks, and, later, placed her on light duty restrictions. The company denied a request for accommodation and terminated plaintiff, who did not qualify for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act The district court entered judgment for the company under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and claims alleging retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The company's modified work policy was not direct evidence of discrimination and complied with the PDA because it treats nonpregnant employees the same as pregnant employees; both are denied an accommodation of light duty work for non-work-related injuries, which is all the PDA requires. Plaintiff did not identify a similarly situated, nonpregnant employee who was treated more favorably. Her physical impairment did not substantially limit a major life activity; there was no evidence that the company misperceived the nature of her condition, or denied her request for light duty work based on a stereotype of pregnant women suffering from complications.