Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff suffered a stroke and claimed that the VA hospital failed to properly diagnose and take appropriate measures. He and his wife sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-80, and also sued their attorney for malpractice. The district court ruled in favor of the government and the attorney. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal as forfeited because plaintiff had supplied only a transcript of the testimony of the government's expert witness Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(3) and had failed to supplement. The district court properly refused to sanction plaintiff's attorney for ex parte communication with treating physicians. The court also properly credited the government expert and held that the hospital's actions were not the proximate cause of the stroke.

Plaintiff claimed that several of defendant's brands of toilet paper infringed on its trademark design. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that toilet paper embossed patterns are functional and cannot be protected as a registered trademark under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(8). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff patented the design, claiming it to be functional and can only claim the protection of a patent, not that of a trademark. The "central advance" claimed in the utility patents is embossing a quilt-like diamond lattice filled with signature designs that improves perceived softness and bulk, and reduces nesting and ridging. This is the same essential feature claimed in the trademarks.

Plaintiff, a plastics manufacturer, dealt with a container company that filed for bankruptcy in 2002, filed a creditor's claim for more than $7 million, and objected to the sale of assets and lien priorities. The debtor had pledged all of its assets as security for a line of credit with ANB, its primary lender. Plaintiff claimed that there was a fraudulent scheme under which the debtor would produce containers and not pay for them, so that that they would be part of inventory when a successor company, let by insiders, purchased the assets in bankruptcy. After its claims were rejected in the bankruptcy proceedings, plaintiff sued ANB and Gateway alleging violation of RICO (18 U.S.C. 1961) and common-law fraud. The district court dismissed as "res judicata" but denied Rule 11 sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, citing collateral estoppel, issue preclusion. The court did not find that the claims were frivolous or designed to harass.

In 1989, defendant pled guilty in Illinois to aggravated criminal sexual assault of a seven-year-old. In 2001, he was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to probation. He complied with registration requirements until 2007. In 2008, defendant moved to Wisconsin, but did not report his change of address or employment status. His whereabouts remained unknown until August 2009, when he was arrested for soliciting a prostitute. The district court judge sentenced him to one year and one day of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16913; 18 U.S.C. 2250.

Defendant approached an employee of his business for help in finding a hit-man to kill his business partner. The employee went to the authorities, was outfitted with a wire, and recorded conversations in which he and defendant plotted the details of the murder in person and over the telephone. A jury convicted defendant on charges that he used facilities of interstate commerce, a cellular telephone and his car, in furtherance of a murder for hire scheme (18 U.S.C. 1958(a)). He was sentenced to 138 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of "manufactured jurisdiction." The evidence was sufficient to refute a claim that defendant was entrapped into using his cell phone in furtherance of the murder scheme. Although the informant placed calls to defendant’s cell phone to discuss the scheme, defendant willingly reciprocated. The court correctly determined that intrastate use of a personal automobile falls within Commerce Clause power and can form the basis for a federal charge.

Plaintiffs want to represent a class of more than 100 people with stakes of more than $5 million and invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), the Class Action Fairness Act. They claim that the company violates the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act prohibition on pyramid schemes, 815 ILCS 505/2A(2). The company's customers sell each other the right to act as travel agencies, as well as selling travel services to the public. The district court did not decide whether the operation is a pyramid scheme, but ruled that transactions with residents of states other than Illinois are outside the Act, dismissed the non-Illinois plaintiffs, and decided that the suit is an intra-state controversy that belongs in state court. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Section 1332(d)(4) requires the court to decline jurisdiction when at least two-thirds of the members of the proposed class reside in the same state as the principal defendant. The class that plaintiffs propose is nationwide. Subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the state of things when suit is filed; what happens later does not detract from jurisdiction already established. While the pleadings do not establish that Illinois law does apply, they do not defeat the application of that law.

Plaintiff received a written warning from his supervisor for failing to complete a task and went to management to complain. The complaint triggered a series of events that led to his discharge. He sued his former employer, complaining of racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as discriminatory discharge, discriminatory employment actions, and retaliatory discharge, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but reversed as to the retaliatory discharge claim. The sum of the circumstantial evidence, including past discrimination, the investigation, and a "race card" statement, would not allow a rational jury to conclude that racial discrimination caused the firing. The evidence did not show that any similarly situated person actually received better treatment than plaintiff. Plaintiff did not prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence, but his history of complaints and the "race card" statement were enough to allow the retaliation claim to survive summary judgment.

Petitioner, age 14, and her mother, a biomedical researcher, entered the U.S. from Georgia on temporary visas in 1998. While their applications for permanent residency were pending, the mother violated the terms of her temporary visa by continuing to work after the visa expired. Both applications for residence were denied in light of the oversight. After the mother obtained a new temporary visa and reapplied for permanent residence, DHS determined that petitioner, who had turned 21 was no longer a derivative beneficiary of her mother and no longer eligible to apply for residence. When removal proceedings began, petitioner claimed that the Child Status Protection Act, 116 Stat. 930, operated to freeze her age as of the date of her mother’s original visa classification petition. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected the claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The CSPA applies to petitioner because her mother’s classification petition was approved prior to its enactment, and neither of her adjustment applications were decided prior to the enactment. The court noted that it is unclear whether the CSPA will help petitioner attain permanent residency.

Seeing that plaintiff was not wearing a seatbelt, the officer followed him to a store where plaintiff worked, arriving at 5:57 p.m.. Plaintiff, due at work at 6:00 p.m., sped into the parking lot. The officer pulled in behind him and activated his emergency lights. Plaintiff did not respond, so the officer drove the squad car between him and the store, then followed him toward the store and grabbed him. Plaintiff did not stop, but ran to the store. The officer used his taser. Apparently plaintiff continued to struggle and the officer used handcuffs and pepper spray. Plaintiff was fired. He filed suit for excessive force and false arrest under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. The officer counter-sued for battery. The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding against the officer on his battery claim, against plaintiff on his false arrest claim, and for plaintiff on his excessive force claim, but granting only nominal damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury could reasonably have believed that the tasering was justifiable and the judge acted within his discretion in denying attorney fees in a suit seeking to redress a private injury and based on an isolated incident.

The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act prevents states and their subdivisions from imposing discriminatory taxes against railroads. 49 U.S.C. 11501. In 2008, the drainage district, a subdivision of Illinois, changed its method for calculating assessments. All other owners are assessed on a per-acre formula, but railroad, pipeline, and utility land were to be assessed on the basis of "benefit," apparently based on the difference in value between land within the district and land outside the levees; annual crop rentals being paid; and agricultural production of lands within the district. Two rail carriers brought suit under a section of the Act, which prevents imposition of "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier." The district court held that the assessment was prohibited by the Act, but concluded that it was powerless to enjoin the tax. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the court has authority to enjoin the tax, but, under principles of comity, should eliminate only the discriminatory aspects, not the entire scheme. The assessment is a tax that, raises general revenues; its ultimate use is for the whole district. It imposes a proportionately heavier tax on railroading than other activities.