Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff first sued tennis star Connors in 1997; the suit settled with payment of $10.5 million by Connors and an agreement that provided mutual promises of indemnification. In 2010, plaintiff's former law partner sued plaintiff, claiming fraud and concealment with respect to the money from Connors. Plaintiff sought indemnification. The district court dismissed, holding that the indemnity provision created an infinitely repeating loop of liability and failed by its terms; Illinois public policy generally prohibits contractual indemnification for intentional misconduct; and the indemnity provision was not specific enough to exempt it from the general rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the indemnity provision does not apply to this matter, and, if it did, would be unenforceable under Illinois public policy.

The employee sued for retaliatory discharge and civil conversion under Indiana law, claiming that the employer wrongfully terminated his employment for filing a workersâ compensation claim and unlawfully retained his personal property after termination. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting evidence that the company terminated employee for his post-accident statement that he might not pass a drug test (he later passed the drug test) and refusal to sign an agreement requiring him to undergo counseling and random drug testing to retain his job. The employee did not show that the proffered reason for termination was a lie to cover up retaliation. His property was stolen from an office where it was being temporarily held; the company did not have the required intent to commit conversion.

Defendant, with four prior felony convictions, discharged a gun inside the bank he was robbing and shot a bystander in the face outside the bank. He entered a plea of guilty to armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d)); discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c); and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)) and was sentenced to a total of 300 months of imprisonment plus payment of restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no procedural error and that the sentence was reasonable.

The borrowers, former high-level employees, participated in the companyâs shared investment program by purchasing company stock. The entire purchase price was funded by personal loans from banks. The company guaranteed the loans, received loan proceeds directly from the banks, and held the shares. Some participants made a profit, but in 2001 the company filed for bankruptcy. After settling with the lenders, the bankruptcy trustee filed actions against the borrowers. The district court ruled in favor of the trustee. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The borrowers may have enough evidence to satisfy the "in the business of supplying information" element of a negligent misrepresentation defense. The borrowers may raise margin Regulations G and U as an affirmative excuse-of-nonperformance defense; it is not clear whether the borrowers, the banks, the company, or the plan violated those regulations. Summary judgment on the Securities and Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Section 17(a) illegality defenses was also in error.

The debtors filed Chapter 11 petitions and the court ordered joint administration. The court rejected the debtors' proposed procedures for auctioning property, holding that the plan did not qualify for "fair and equitable" status and could not be approved over the objections of creditors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that the matter was not moot, despite the fact that the reorganization plan is no longer before the court. When a debtorâs reorganization plan has not been approved by its secured creditors and proposes the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens, Section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides the exclusive means by which it can be confirmed. In this case, the proposed auctions would deny secured lenders the ability to credit bid, and lack a crucial check against undervaluation.

After participating in a kidnapping that involved the victim's girlfriend obtaining the ransom from the bank where she worked, defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit attempted robbery of a federally-insured bank (18 U.S.C. 371), attempted bank robbery (18 U.S.C.2113(a)), and knowingly using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). The defendants convicted on counts one and two challenge their convictions and all challenged their sentences. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but vacated one sentence based on the court's misunderstanding of the defendant's history with respect to firearms. There was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; purportedly "leading" questioning of a federal agent did not prejudice the defendants. The judge's response to a jury question and sentence enhancement, based on a determination that the kidnap victim was "the victim" in the extortion, were proper.

Following remand on sentencing after conviction for conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846), possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)), and using a telephone to facilitate a felony drug crime (21 U.S.C. 843(b)), the district court found that defendant was accountable for 23 grams of crack and sentenced him to 72 monthsâ imprisonment and 48 monthsâ imprisonment, to be served concurrently. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the court's decision to attribute 23 grams to defendant, but noted that the evidence would have permitted a lower drug quantity finding and remanded for consideration of defendant's argument for a reduced crack-to-powder ratio.

Based on a series of incidents, during which managers showed hostility to the efforts of truck drivers to unionize and toward drivers who supported the union, an ALJ found that the company engaged in several unfair labor practices and imposed remedial sanctions. The NLRB affirmed. The Seventh Circuit ordered the company to reinstate an individual, to make its pro-union employees whole for losses attributable to its unlawful conduct, to post a remedial notice and to cease and desist from the conduct found to have been unlawful. The company violated the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a), by deviation from its seniority system and manipulations to discriminate against pro-union drivers, by creating and filling new positions based on a new evaluation test without bargaining, by excluding pro-union drivers from those positions, and by contracting work outside the bargaining unit. The company violated the rights of an employee who was interrogated without union representation.

In 1997 petitioner shot and killed four men; he was sentenced to death. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the sentence. On remand the court reimposed the death sentence; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner waived state post-conviction relief after the court found him competent to forego further challenges to his sentence; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. He changed his mind. The trial court dismissed a petition for post-conviction relief as untimely; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The federal district court granted habeas relief, holding that the prosecutor violated the Sixth Amendment by offering to forego the death penalty if petitioner would waive a jury trial, and ordered resentencing. The Seventh Circuit reversed without considering petitioner's additional claims. The U.S. Supreme Court twice vacated the Seventh Circuit's decisions. On remand, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district courtâs judgment granting habeas relief on the basis of the claimed Sixth Amendment violation; affirmed that Indiana courts did not mishandle the issue of competence to waive post-conviction remedies; and remanded for consideration of remaining grounds for habeas relief.

Plaintiff was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to three consecutive 30-year terms to begin after a 28-year sentence for an unrelated conviction. Five years later, DNA testing revealed a match to plaintiff's uncle. Plaintiff's conviction was vacated. He sued the city and two officers, alleging malicious prosecution and due process violations (Brady v. Maryland) under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was ample probable cause to commence proceedings against plaintiff, apart from the victim's identification: shoe prints in snow leading from the crime scene to plaintiffâs residence; wet shoes in the house; no other male present when police arrived; plaintiff behind the residence holding jeans that matched the victim's description; plaintiff's wallet in those jeans; and an alibi that did not check out. Plaintiff had no evidence of malice and the officers enjoy state-law immunity, because there was no willful and wanton conduct. Even if police failed to disclose "pressure" they put on the victim to identify plaintiff during a "show-up," there is no evidence that they coerced her to lie; it is unlikely that the result would have been different if the pressure had been disclosed.