Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The national organization, chartered by Congress (36 U.S.C. 80302), decided to reduce the number of local councils, which are, essentially, franchises. The plan called for dissolution of the plaintiff council and dividing its territory among other councils. The district court ruled in favor of the national organization, reasoning that to apply the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law to the national organization would violate the organizationâs freedom of expression, guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The fact that a law of general application might indirectly and unintentionally impede the organization's efforts to communicate its message is not enough to render the law inapplicable. The law, which forbids a franchisor to terminate or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement without good cause, applies to the nonprofit organization; the national organization "all but abandoned" its argument that it had good cause.

A $15,000 insurance policy covering the decedent named his brother as beneficiary. The brother was killed in the same accident that killed the decedent. Although the insurer received notice that the decedent's mother (estate administrator) had assigned the policy to pay for the funeral, the company obtained an order from the state court and paid the benefit to decedent's children, applying a "facility-of-payment" clause, which provided: "if the beneficiary he or she named is not alive at the Employeeâs death, the payment will be made at Our option, to any one or more of the following: Your spouse; Your children; Your parents; Your brothers and sisters; or Your estate." The assignee (finance company) filed suit. The federal district court entered judgment in favor of the insurer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, exercising jurisdiction under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132. Insurance companies have broad discretion under facility-of-payment clauses and the insurer's decision was not arbitrary. The court declined to award attorney fees.

The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, establishes minimum wage and requires employers to pay 150 percent of hourly wage for hours worked above 40 a week except to "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity." Plaintiff, an account manager, acted as a bridge between software developers and her employer's customers; she did not negotiate contracts. The district court rejected her overtime claim on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffâs primary duties were directly related to the complex and varied general business operations of her employer and of customers; her hours varied each week. There are some "administrative" functions she did not perform, but she was one of many specialists below the highest executive level, as is typical of modern business.

The Equal Access to Justice Act entitles a prevailing party to fees only if the position of the United States was not substantially justified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of fees for a remand to an administrative law judge for an explanation of the determination of a precise date on which the social security applicant became disabled. The ALJ did not ignore, mischaracterize, selectively cite, or otherwise bungle a significant body of relevant evidence, but committed the sort of articulation error that ordinarily does not taint the commissionerâs position. A reasonable person could conclude that both the ALJâs opinion and the commissionerâs defense of the opinion had a rational basis in fact and law.

Following a shooting, an informant stated that he had seen defendant leave after being directed to get a weapon. Another confirmed telling defendant to get the weapon and seeing him with the weapon at some point. Another spoke about neighborhood talk about defendant's use of guns and seeing his car. A detective who planned the December 24 arrest did not get search warrants, because of time pressure and a belief that defendants would open the door. The detective told the on-scene officer that they had enough to get a warrant. Defendant answered the door and was arrested. Defendant's girlfriend told officers to get a warrant; the detective told her that they could get a warrant but that they believed there were guns in the house and that, if she cooperated, police would not destroy her house during the inevitable search. She gave verbal consent, but would not sign. Police found the guns. Following a remand the district court found that the threat to get a warrant was not pretextual and that the consent was voluntary. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The detective who planned the search had a reasonable factual basis for probable cause and took actions consistent with the mindset of someone who believed he could, if necessary, get a warrant.

Defendants faxed unsolicited advertisements to plaintiff and others, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. One of the recipients filed a proposed class action in Wisconsin, but dismissed its complaint after the four-year limitations period had run, but before the class was certified. Plaintiff's motion to intervene was denied. The district court denied a motion to dismiss plaintiff's subsequent complaint, reasoning that the limitations period was tolled by the state court filing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal.

The hospital opposed a proposed medical office building by lobbying public officials, conducting a public relations campaign, offering incentives to discourage prospective tenants, and making negative statements about the developer. Prospective tenants withdrew from conditional agreements and approvals were denied. The developer sued, alleging antitrust violations under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, under which efforts to petition government are shielded from liability, and rejecting a claim of "sham." Even if the hospital made material misrepresentations during and relating to village board proceedings, which were legislative in nature, those misrepresentations are legally irrelevant because those meetings were inherently political in nature. The public relations campaign was inextricably intertwined with efforts before the board. The hospitalâs contacts with other healthcare providers constituted mere speech that is not actionable under the Sherman Act. No reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the record that the successful effort to convince physicians not to relocate their practices constituted predatory conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws.

Plaintiff, previously employed by defendant as a driver-technician, claims racial and sexual discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation, all in violation of Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000(e)), and retaliatory discharge in violation of the Illinois Workersâ Compensation Act. He had been suspended for poor performance, then injured his back, and has not been present for work since 2005. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the company, but denied the company's request for sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, but reversed on the retaliation claim. The Title VII claims of discrimination were time-barred and the plaintiff did not claim discriminatory discharge before the EEOC; he filed with the EEOC after being fired, so the termination was not retaliation for that filing. There was evidence that could support a claim of retaliation of the Workers' Compensation filing.

At 3:30 a.m., a police officer observed the defendant walking on a sidewalk with a waistband bulge that resembled a gun. After he called the defendant over, the defendant passed newspaper stands and the bulge disappeared. The defendant gave a false name, resulting in a "no record found" report. Suspicious, the officer did a pat down and found a gun and ski mask; he then learned that there were warrants on the defendant. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty as a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, finding that the officer acted on reasonable suspicion.

Plaintiff makes glucose monitors and other diabetes-related products that incorporate software written by defendant, under a contract that entitles it to use the software for two years after the contractâs initial term, 2006-2010, and any extension. It also gives plaintiff a right of first refusal should defendant agree to sell its stock or assets to one of plaintiffâs competitors "during the term of this Agreement." Defendant would not extend the contract after the original expiration date. Plaintiff learned that investors in defendant were negotiating to sell stock to a company that plaintiff considers a competitor. Defendant asserted that, because the transaction would not close until 2011, the right of first refusal did not apply. Plaintiff sought an injunction pending arbitration. Based on concerns about irreparable harm to each party, the district court entered an injunction to allow the sale to proceed, subject to a requirement that plaintiff be allowed to use the software through 2012; the injunction expires when the arbitrator renders a decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, modifying to add conditions to ensure that defendant remains a separate firm so that the transaction can be undone if the arbitrator rules in plaintiffâs favor.